ل

The Hebrew University in Jerusalem

Department of Political Science

Economic Voting in Israel

Submitted by:

Noam Brenner

Anna Lipsky

Alon Zoizner

June 2014

Jerusalem

The general feeling in Israel's political system is that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and other security issues are at the top of the agenda for politicians, the media and the public. However, in many other countries, the economic issue is the most influential subject. This research examines two questions: (1) Do citizens in Israel vote according to economic considerations? (2) Under what circumstances will this economic voting increase? Based on the 2013 elections survey, we show that economic voting exists in Israel. We also find that it was stronger that year than in the preceding elections of 2009. Furthermore, our results indicate that this rise in economic voting was due to the 2011 "social protest". These findings demonstrate that Israeli citizens do punish the incumbent for economic deterioration. They also demonstrate, although based only on the 2013 elections, that informal political participation might affect formal political participation.

1. <u>Introduction</u>

Until the summer of 2011, socio-economic issues were marginal in Israeli politics. Issues of peace, war and identity were the major basis for political mobilization. Furthermore, there was no apparent reason for those issues to rise. Israel's financial system remained stable throughout the 2007 global financial crisis, and growth rates and unemployment rates looked relatively good in 2009 and 2010 (Rosenhek and Shalev, 2013).

On July 14th, 2011, something remarkable happened. Several young Israelis gathered in tents in Tel Aviv in protest of high cost of living. This was followed by a series of demonstrations against socio-economic conditions. The movement rapidly gained mass support and participation, in similarity to protest movements in Spain and Greece, and was covered intensely by the media.

The Israeli government took a series of steps in response to the protest's demands, including an appointment of the Trajtenberg committee, which proposed solutions for the socio-economic problems. But as much as the protest came in storm, quickly it was removed from public agenda and left many wondering whether it had any significant impact for the long run (Ram & Filc, 2013a).

Although policy changes invoked by the protest are interesting to investigate, the scope of this study is the influence of the 2011 protest on Israeli voting behavior. We compare between voting behavior two years before the protest, in the 2009 general elections, and two years after it, in the 2013 elections. Different explanations are examined to *why Israeli citizens vote against the incumbent Prime Minister's party*. We will concentrate specifically on retrospective economic voting, meaning the

decision to punish an incumbent by voting for someone else, because of bad performance on economic issues.

Economic voting has been studied empirically for over four decades, starting from the late 1960s when the postwar economic improvement in the West made it clear that there is a relationship between the economy and voting behavior (Anderson, 2007). As Ronald Reagan said during the 1980 presidential debate, "Ask yourself: Are you better off than you were four years ago? Is it easier for you to go and buy things in the stores than it was four years ago?" But economic voting was hardly studied in Israel nor empirically tested with relation to social protests.

Our research will increase the scant research of economic voting in Israel. It will also provide a new perspective of how a major social protest can affect further economic voting, a subject that has hardly been studied as well. This way we could add to the understanding of how informal political participation can affect formal electoral participation.

2. <u>Literature Review</u>

During the last decades there is erosion in party affiliation and a decline of traditional social cleavages. At the same time, the importance of issues in voters' decision has become more prominent (Dalton, 2013; Dalton & Wattenberg, 2000). More than before, people tend to vote on the basis of their views on issues that are important to them, and to evaluate the candidates according to these positions.

Issue voting is divided into two types that can affect the voter's decision: *position-based voting*, which emphasizes the ideological proximity between the voter and the candidate, and *performance-based voting*; in which citizens alter their voting decision based on the government's performance in different arenas.

2.1 Economic voting

One of the most examined arenas in performance voting is economic voting. Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier (2007, p. 532) define the economy as the "top issue for the electorate". This can be due to the common assumption that every citizen can understand the economic situation (Hellwig, 2011). Kayser and Wlezien (2011) associate the strength of economic voting with the erosion of partisanship.

Economic voting is usually based on the "responsibility thesis": The voter holds the incumbents with the responsibility of the general economic performances, judges the economic conditions and assigns credit or blame to the incumbents (Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2007).

Issue voting, and in particular economic voting, can be divided into two time frames of candidate's evaluations: Retrospective and prospective judgments. The former evaluate government's performance in the past and therefore lean more on facts and self-experience, such as fluctuations in unemployment, inflation rates or real income (Dalton, 2013; Duch & Stevenson, 2008). If, for example, the unemployment rate was high during the last tenure, voters will hold the incumbent party responsible and will not vote for it in the upcoming elections. In general, voters tend to punish governments for a bad economy more than they reward them for good performance (Dalton, 2013).

In contrast, prospective judgments are based on expectations of future performance and forecasts (Ibid). Voters consider past performance of the economy along with an evaluation of alternative policies and their meanings (Hellwig, 2011).

Retrospective economic voting is the most common topic in performance issue studies (Dalton, 2013). The voters make their evaluations of the incumbent's past economic performance. According to Fiorina (1981, p. 5), the voter holds one solid piece of information: "What life has been like during the incumbent's administration". Even less-informed voters can focus on simple economic performance cues. In other words, the voter uses a *reward-punishment model* to judge the economic performance and changes her vote accordingly (Lewis-Beck & Paldam, 2000). If the economic situation in the previous four years has deteriorated, the voter will tend not to vote for the incumbent. Lewis-Beck and Paldam (Ibid) suggest that the causal chain starts from the economy and its perception by the voter, which then transforms to a vote. This sanctioning model has been widely adopted by economic voting scholars (Duch & Stevenson, 2008).

Another distinction regarding economic voting is its personal or national nature. Voters can shape their economic perceptions based on *pocketbook* or *sociotropic* considerations. *Pocketbook* voting (egocentric voting) is when the voter evaluates the incumbents according to her personal economic situation. In contrast, *sociotropic* voting means that citizens vote based on their evaluation of national economy (Dalton, 2013).

From a normative perspective, economic voting has an important role in democratic regimes. One of the arguments in favor of democracy is that the "elections produce good outcomes via the processes of sanctioning and selection" (Healy & Malhotra, 2013, p. 287). In this way, democratic citizens can hold the government accountable for its collective policies. Since policy makers have a responsibility to provide economic benefits to voters, the latter can prevent evading from this responsibility by providing disincentives for bad performance via electoral punishment. Although economic voting is a quite minimalist form of holding the incumbents accountable, it still assumes that even the most uninformed citizens have the ability to evaluate their policy makers (Anderson, 2007).

2.2 Single-nation and comparative perspective on economic voting

Studies have found different results regarding the economy's influence on the voter. While some observe strong presence of the reward-punishment model based on the economy, others do not. Much empirical work on economic voting has focused on the US case, and most of it has found strong support for economic voting (Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2000; 2007). Economic perceptions of the national economy influence vote preferences of US citizens (Fiorina, 1981; Kiewiet, 1983). However, outside the US there is little consensus over the strength of economic voting. Both aggregate-level and individual-level studies show that economic voting can vary across nations and also over time (Duch & Stevenson, 2008). Lewis-Beck (1988) concluded that economic voting exists but is weaker in countries with more parties in the coalition. Paldam (1991) found weak signs of relationship between fluctuations in macro-economic indicators and voting outcomes.

In order to solve these contradictories, Powel and Whitten (1993) added political context variables into the comparative perspective which can moderate economic voting. They emphasized several institutional factors which influence the "clarity of responsibility", meaning, the ability of the voters to assign credit or blame to the incumbent's performance. Among these factors is cohesion of governing parties or a well-developed committee system. The strength of the effect of the economy on voting varies according to the ability of the voter to identify who holds the responsibility inside the government.

However, analysis of aggregate election results at the macro-level makes it difficult to infer specific insights on the individual voting decision (Hellwig, 2011). In

addition, several studies which examined the clarity of responsibility thesis at the aggregate level did not find any support for it (Chappell & Veiga, 2000; Royed, Leyden & Borrelli, 2000).

Others adopted this "clarity of responsibility" factor and implemented it at the micro-level. Duch and Stevenson (2008) argue that the individual's own evaluation of the economy influences her vote for the incumbent (see also Lewis-Beck, Nadeau & Elias, 2008). They find that economic voting exists but varies according to context, and affects primarily the chief-executive's party (Duch & Stevenson, 2008). Economic voting is more prevalent when the responsibility for the economy can be assigned to a single party and when the economy is more dependent on external forces. For example, economies that are open to foreign trade are more dependent on global forces and their governments are less able to manage them. In these countries economic voting will be less prevalent since citizens find it difficult to hold the government responsible for the economy (Ibid).

Several revisionist scholars, who examined the individual level, find that economic voting is moderated by partisan affiliation. Kayser and Wlezien (2011) find that the strength of economic voting varies inversely with the voter's party identification: When voters' partisan attachment and information level are low, they are more influenced by the economic situation than highly informed citizens. Evans and Andersen (2006) find that political partisanship influences the economic perceptions themselves, and as a result, "the causal arrow between the economy and politics is reversed" (Ibid, p. 194). However, Lewis-Beck, Nadeau and Elias (2008) reinforce the traditional assumption that the economy still has an important influence on voting. This is through panel data analysis which indicates that the economy shapes the political preference and not vice-versa.

2.3 Voting in Israel

As in the Western world, issue voting has become more important in predicting Israeli election outcomes (Shamir & Arian, 1999). Nevertheless, in many Western countries the economic issue is usually the most important one on the public's political agenda (Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2007). In contrast, the Israeli elections are consistently dominated by security issues, specifically by disputes over the territories seized in 1967 and the Israeli-Arab conflict (Shamir & Arian, 1999; Arian & Shamir, 2008). This conflict "overpowers the political system, its organizations and its major actors"

(Arian & Shamir, 2008, p. 701). This is because the security dimension is not a foreign affairs issue per se. It is inherent to socio-demographic identity dilemmas, in which the state's borders and its relations with the Arab world are intertwined with internal identity questions of "Who is a Jew? What is an Israeli?" (Shamir & Arian, 1999, p. 266).

This dominance of security issues can greatly influence the outcomes of any elections. During the 2009 elections, the extreme right wing party, Yisrael Beitenu, which represented in the past the former Soviet Union immigrants, gained wide support of voters outside its traditional electorate. This was primarily due to the physical and psychological insecurity, caused by recent conflicts at the north front and near the Gaza strip (Bagno, 2010). Moreover, this focus on security issues has led the central Left-wing parties in Israel to lose many votes during the period between 1992 (56 mandates overall) to 2009 (16 mandates). Left wing voters neglected the line of "security, peace and prosperity" of these parties due to deteriorating security conditions (Abu, Yuval & Ben-Porat, 2010). Furthermore, there are gender differences in views on security issues. In the 2009 elections, Israeli women were less inclined to territorial compromises and emphasized the security issue over other issues, as opposed to men (Gedalia, Herzog & Shamir, 2010). Moreover, Sheafer and Weimann (2005) find that worsening security conditions lead to increased media coverage of this issue and to an influence on the voters' decisions.

The constant fear of terrorist acts influences the Israeli voter. In general, during times of terror and violence, Israeli voters will increase their support for right wing parties (Berrebi & Klor, 2006). Berrebi and Klor (2008) find that terror attacks within three months of the elections influence the support for each bloc. But this influence only reinforces preexisting preferences: While the support for right wing parties increases in localities with right leaning preferences, left leaning localities decrease their support for the right bloc. When examining this issue on voting for or against incumbents, the findings are interesting. Allegedly, right wing parties "own" security issues, meaning they are identified most with this area and they emphasize in their ideology the solutions to these issues. Therefore, voters can hold the right wing incumbent more accountable for terror acts. But surprisingly, the above electoral effect of terrorism is identical to either left or right wing incumbents (Ibid). In other words, the voter punishes the incumbents based on their security performance, regardless of the latter political affiliation.

However, there is also strong evidence of sectorial voting in Israel, especially among Arabs and ultra-orthodox Jews. The effect of this sectorial voting is independent of the dominance of the security issue and of demographic differences such as income, age and gender. Israeli-Arabs usually vote for Arab or Jewish-Arab parties either due to sectorial ideologies or sectorial instrumentalism. They used to vote for the Jewish-center-leftist party "Mapai" for instrumental reasons of gaining political rights. However, in the 1977 elections, more than 50% voted for the Arab-Jewish communist party "Hadash", due to ideological reasons of co-existence. Since then, most of their votes go to different Arab parties. In addition, over the years, the Israeli-Arab sector has become more hostile to Jewish parties in particular, and to the Israeli political system as a whole (Blander & Galnoor, 2013).

Similarly, the ultra-Orthodox also vote for sectorial parties. Like the Israeli-Arab population, the ultra-Orthodox are also different in culture, religion, politics and geography from the general population in Israel. The first Ashkenazi ultra-Orthodox party dates back to the first elections. During the 1984 elections a new Orthodox party was formed, the Sephardic Party (Shas). The main characteristics of ultra-orthodox voting behavior are electoral discipline, partisanship and high participation (Ibid).

Therefore, we can assume that a large part of the members in these two sectorial groups will keep on voting for sectorial parties no matter the changes in the political-economic environment.

2.4 Economic voting in Israel

There are two main obstacles for economic voting in Israel. First, it is difficult to shift the public's focus to issues other than security. In the 2006 elections, the Labor party tried to promote social-economic agenda, but as the campaign reached its final stages, the security issue was again the most dominant (Arian & Shamir, 2008). Furthermore, in the 2009 elections, despite the global economic crisis, the Israeli elections coverage, and parties' political agenda, focused on security and not on social-economic issues (Tsfati, Sheafer & Weimann, 2010).

A second obstacle is the Israeli multiparty parliamentary system, which is based on coalitions. This system hinders the task of identifying who holds the responsibility for economic conditions inside the government. Even if the economy is perceived as deteriorating, voters will have a hard time attributing the blame to the incumbent.

Even if the incumbent's prime minister's party is assigned the blame, it is still hard to distinguish between the different alternatives to that party. Talshir (2014) argues that the effects of the 2011 protest on the 2013 elections resulted in even more difficulty to distinguish between two clear ideological alternatives. This lack of ability to recognize a specific party which is a clear economic-ideological alternative to the incumbent party strengthens our belief that voters who were looking to punish the incumbent had two basic choices: the incumbent, or anyone else.

In spite of these difficulties, Sheafer (2008) found economic voting on both the aggregate and individual level between 1955-2003 election periods. At the individual level, voters' evaluation of the incumbent's economic performance affected voting decision[1]. We therefore expect to find retrospective economic voting in the 2013 elections.

> **_H1_**: _Thinking that the economy deteriorated in the term of the incumbent Prime Minister's party, will cause to vote against it in 2013._

By focusing on the dichotomous vote for or against the incumbent and on perceptions regarding the change in the economy in that incumbent's term, we focus on the retrospective and subjective punishment aspect of economic voting. This is a micro-level analysis; we base our study on voters' perceptions of the nation's economic state and not on "objective" economic parameters. We focus on sociotropic voting because, as mentioned, it is more influential than egocentric voting. Examining individual perceptions allows avoiding the problematic assumption that there is such a thing as objective economic information. Its interpretation can vary across different people (Anderson, 2007) and can be influenced by the media reports that provide it (Hetherington, 1996; Sheafer, 2008).

2.5 The influence of social protest movements

Social movements studies tend to concentrate on the reasons and characteristics of social protests, but rarely on their outcomes (Giugni, 1998). Those who do, examine the outcomes of social protest in various ways: influences on public opinion, legitimating the opponents or affecting voting behavior (Rucht, 2007). But most of

---

[1] Sheafer's individual-level analysis was performed only in the 1981-2003 elections since prior election periods did not contain individual-level data.

them focus on the impact on legislation or government policy. However, this is only a partial examination of the outcomes, since contemporary protest and social movements aim to influence not only the government but the public itself (Giugni, 1998). We argue that economic voting is a way to observe this influence.

Gamson's (1990) typology divides the success of social protests into two types: When the opponent accepts that the protesting group is a valid representative of specific interests (acceptance) and when there is a gain of new advantages to the constituency (policy change). Rochon and Mazmanian (1993) add a third dimension: Changes in social values. The protests "expand the range of ideas about what is possible. This ultimately has an effect on politics because it changes perceptions of what the most important political problems are" (Ibid, p. 77). Accordingly, we think that an examination of the Israeli electoral results (whether or not the incumbent was punished) two years after the social protest can show something about this third element of success. This way, even if the immediate results of the protest are vague, the public's electoral behavior can be a sign of a more broad and long-term success.

2.6 The 2011 protest movement in Israel

Although Sheafer (2008) found that economic voting does not vary significantly between election years, we argue that the 2011 social protest made a significant change in voting behavior. Large popular support for the 2011 protest movement and intense media coverage (Ram & Filc, 2013b) showed that economic issues can influence citizens' political evaluations. Sheafer and Weimann (2005) find that when the economy is the leading issue in public agenda, voters will emphasize the economic issue at the expense of security.

As mentioned, many scholars discuss the importance of the political context (Duch & Stevenson, 2008; Lewis-Beck, 1988; Powel & Whitten, 1993) and the economic context (i.e., exogenous shocks on the economy. See Duch & Stevenson, 2010). But we believe that short-term events can also be influential. Since formal institutions do not change, economic voting can grow stronger through the dynamics of the coalition (Anderson, 2007) or the dynamics inside society itself. Therefore, it is important to assess the importance of mass protests on voters' evaluations of incumbents, especially due to the fact that this connection is not well developed (Fisher, 2012; McAdam & Tarrow, 2010). Moreover, the connection to economic voting has not yet been studied.

One of the electoral consequences of the 2011 protest was an increase in voter turnout in the following elections (Ram & Filc, 2013a). Moreover, parties embraced a new political agenda in the spirit of the protest. Even parties such as Habait Hayehudi, which is generally identified with the settlements, emphasized economic and social issues (Ibid).

But what caused the comeback of the 2011 protest two years later in the elections? We believe, according to Downs' (1972) "issue-attention cycle" model, that since the security issue was not followed by any sign of solution[2], this caused it to temporarily "lose momentum". In contrast, this was the opportunity for citizens to punish the incumbent in the ballot for their economic performance either before or after the 2011 protest, a fact which brought back the economic issue into attention-cycle. We argue that the protest influenced both the economic issue's salience and its direction (dissatisfaction with the current economic state) and was translated into electoral outcomes that signaled discontent with the incumbent.

Moreover, although the protest was held two years before the elections, we believe that it strengthened the economic vote since citizens are cognitive misers and look for cognitive cues and information shortcuts (Popkin, 1994). Even if the 2011 protest did not raise a single-issue demand (rather than multiple demands) or was centralized and unfactionalized – a fact that can undermine its success (Gamson, 1990) – there was a major cue for voters that something is wrong with the socio-economic situation.

Talshir (2014) and Rosenhek and Shalev (2013) gave more specific explanations for the motivating factors of the 2011 protest movement in Israel. Talshir (2014) argues that the protest was a struggle to reshape Israeli democracy so that parties would more openly display their views and allow for a clear choice between different alternatives; the parliamentary system would be more focused on the public interest; and a more unified Israeli identity would be created, one that would transcend cleavages and communities. This change in definitions of politics and democracy could have opened up the possibility of requiring more government accountability.

Rosenhek and Shalev (2013) claim that there are some similarities between the 2011 protest in Israel and other recent protest movements in advanced capitalist states. The initiators and front-runners are young, educated and from the middle class.

---

[2] The military operation "Pillar of Defense" was not aimed to end the conflict but to end the rocket firing from Gaza on Israel. Therefore it can be seen as another step in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and not as a step toward solution.

They protest against a decrease in their economic opportunities and against the growth of inequality between the wealthiest and the rest of the population. Their protest also shows an alienation from institutional politics and its agents. The basic nature of their different claims is distributive: they demand that economic issues be decided on politically.

According to Rosenhek and Shalev (Ibid), because of the structure of the political economy in Israel, the young middle class generation could not maintain the living status to which they became accustomed to in their defining years, growing up in the homes of their parents. Economic liberalization contributed to a significant rise in the standard of living during the 1990s for the parents of this generation. However, the same liberalization made it difficult to reproduce this living standard for the next generation.

We believe that this connection between the economic situation and political decisions became central after the 2011 protest. Accordingly, we should see that voters after the 2011 protest were more inclined to punish the incumbent for deterioration in the economic situation than before.

> *H2*: *A perception of economic deterioration will lead to voting against the incumbent Prime Minister's party in the 2013 elections, more than in the 2009 elections.*

The two hypotheses examine *retrospective* voting at the individual level, since we believe that the public will punish the incumbent due to his or her bad economic performance. We also examine *sociotropic* voting and not egocentric voting since most studies, as mentioned, find that the former has a much stronger effect on economic voting.

3 Logistic model

The punishment aspect of economic voting that we examine is based on the assumption that the voter perceives the vote dichotomously, as voting for or against the incumbent's party. This voting decision is our dependent variable. Since the dependent variable in our individual-level analysis is dichotomous, we are unable to

use an OLS regression model. Our hypothesis is that each respondent's probability for voting for the incumbent is a function of her or his perceptions of the economy.

4 Data

4.1 Dataset and operative definitions

We used the Israel National Election Studies' surveys of 2009 and 2013 to operatively define our variables of interest and analyze them (Arian & Shamir, 2009; Shamir, 2013). The surveys are based on telephone interviews among eligible voters in Israel. The questions were on issues such as socio-economic policy; peace and security; evaluations of parties, candidates, and coalitions; vote intention and past electoral behavior; and detailed demographic information. The surveys employ a panel design. The pre-election survey of 2009 (N=1200) was conducted in three weekly waves between January 18 and February 5, 2009 (N1=386, N2=411, N3=413). Each wave consists of an independent representative sample of the electorate. The general elections were on February 10, 2009. The post-election survey was carried out in February 11-24, 2009. This survey returned to 878 respondents from the first panel wave. In the 2013 elections survey, 1,718 individuals responded in the four waves of the pre-election survey, between December 23, 2012 and January 21, 2013 (N1=288, N2=400, N3=468, N4=562). The elections were on January 22 and the post-elections survey returned to 1,292 respondents, between January 28 and February 17, 2013.

Each sample is a stratified sample of Jews and Arabs. In the 2009 sample there were 1,037 Jews and 173 Arabs. In the 2013 sample there were 1,457 Jews and 261 Arabs. According to Arian and Shamir, "The Jewish sample is a random sample of individuals from the Ministry of Interior's Listing of the population, to which mobile and fixed-line telephone numbers were fitted. The Arab sample is stratified by geographical areas with random sampling within each (stratum)" (Ibid). We limit our analysis to the Jewish sample, because one of the alternative explanations we would like to examine is the effect of security considerations on the vote, and we assume that these have different effects on the voting decisions of Arabs and Jews. We also limit the sample to those who do not define themselves as ultra-orthodox ("Hareidi"), because a large portion of this population (90% of our respondents – See Appendix 1) votes for small or medium religious parties that might participate in coalitions but do not lead them. Without these respondents and without those who did not answer some

of the questions we utilized, the sample for our model has 996 respondents (511 from the 2009 survey and 485 from 2013).

To examine our first hypothesis, we test this model on our 2013 survey data:

Voting for the Incumbent = β_0 + β_1*Economy + β_2*Security + β_3*Religion + β_4*Gender + β_5*Income + β_6*Education + β_7*Age + ε

Our dependent variable is voting for the incumbent Prime Minister's party. This measure is based on the post-election survey question: "Which list did you vote for in the last elections to Knesset?" If the answer is the party of the incumbent prime minister, the value is 1, if the answer is any other specific party, the value is 0. Other answers were defined as missing. The measures for the economic variable we wish to examine and for our control variables are based on items found in the first panel wave of the survey, which was conducted before the elections. According to our first hypothesis, the explanation for voting against the incumbent is a negative perception of the economic situation during the last term of the incumbent prime minister's party. In order to measure this variable, we use the following pre-election survey question: "In your opinion, has Israel's economic situation in the past three years improved, not changed, or become worse?" This measure utilizes a 5 point scale, which we rescaled to a scale of 0-1, so that: 0="Has improved a lot", 0.25="Has improved a little", 0.5= "Has not changed, 0.75= "Has deteriorated a little", 1= "Has deteriorated a lot".

We also examine an alternative explanation for the vote in Israel: Concern about security issues. Instead of looking at the views on security issues, which can influence the vote for parties regardless of their being incumbent or not, we focus on the level of concern for personal security. A better comparison between alternative explanations would have been to base this measure on perceptions of the national security conditions and not the personal ones, just as we based our economic measure. However, there was no such question in the 2013 survey. Therefore, we consider the following question as a proxy measure for being concerned about security issues: "To what degree are you worried or not worried that you or one of your family members are likely to be harmed from Arabs in your everyday life?" This measure receives the value "0" if the answer is "not worried" or "not worried at all" and the value "1" if the answer is "worried" or "worried a lot".

We will also examine socio-demographic attributes that Shamir and Arian (1999) reported affecting the vote: religion, education, gender, age, and socio-economic

class. The measure for level of religiosity is a combination of two different items, with 4 categories each, on a scale of 0-1. One is based on the question "To what degree do you observe religious traditions?" The possible answers were "1. Not at all 2. A little bit 3. A lot 4. I observe all of it". The second item is based on the question "Do you define yourself as: 1. Secular 2. Traditional 3. Religious 4. Hareidi" (α Kronbach is 0.88 in 2013 and 0.86 in 2009). As mentioned earlier, those who answered "Hareidi" to the latter question are not in the sample we analyzed.

Education is defined as years of schooling. Gender is dichotomously defined so that if a respondent reported being female, the answer receives the value "1" and if he reported being male, the value is "0". The age of the respondents in the sample is between 18 and 90. Socio-economic class is dichotomously defined as either belonging to the high or middle-high class (1) or to the low or middle-low class (0). Our summary statistics include data from two additional studies, conducted in the same way and by the same team, in 1999 and in 2006. This allows us to identify possible trends in economic voting. However, there are significant differences in the relevant items in the years prior to 2009. Therefore we could not include data from these years in the individual level analysis.

An additional variable we wanted to examine is partisanship. However, the surveys lack questions that could accurately capture partisanship. Furthermore, only 9% of the total respondents in 2013 support a party, and only 3% are members in a party (See Appendix 2). Therefore, we did not include a measure for this variable in our main model.

In order to examine our second hypothesis, that economic voting was stronger in 2013 than in 2009, we ran the same model on the 2009 survey data. This is possible due to the identical relevant questions for our study in each survey. To further examine our hypothesis, that the 2011 protest caused a rise in economic voting in Israel, we ran a third model. This model is based on the main model, with the addition of a measure for supporting the 2011 protest. The question that was used for this measure is: "Did you support or participate in the social protests of summer 2011". If the response is support or participation, than this measure has the value "1". If the answer is "Did not support" than the value is "0". If this effect is statistically significant, it could imply that the protest affected the vote. If the measure for economic voting remained significant even after this addition, then the effect of

economic voting on the vote is not fully explained by the effect of supporting the 2011 protest.

4.2 Trends in economic voting in the 1999, 2006, 2009 and 2013 elections

We use the survey data of 2009 and 2013 to examine our second hypothesis. In addition, for a better understanding of some more general trends in economic voting in Israel, we also look at descriptive statistics of our dependent variable and our main independent variable throughout the last 15 years. Israel has a parliamentary electoral system, which means that a party does not have to win the majority of seats in order to lead, but only to be strong enough to assemble a coalition. Through the years, voting for the incumbent has been around 20%: 15% in 1999, 22% in 2006, 25% in 2009 and 21% in 2013.

Figure 1 illustrates the trends in voting against the incumbent, by the perception of the general economic situation, in the last three election years (2006, 2009, and 2013) and in 1999[3]. We can see that many people who thought that the economic situation had deteriorated voted against the incumbent in 1999, less in 2006, and even less in 2009. It is interesting to see that this decrease in economic voting changed direction and rose in 2013. This might indicate that voters punished the incumbent in 1999, less so in 2006, even less so in 2009 but then in 2013 something changed this trend and the voters returned to punishing them again, based on economic issues. This gives a descriptive view of economic voting in Israel in the last 15 years.

---

[3] We do not present data from the 2001 and 2003 elections surveys because these surveys did not include the question through which we measure perception of the economic situation in the incumbent's latest term, which asks whether the economic situation improved or worsened in the last three or four years.

Figure 1.

Voting against the incubment, by perception of the general economic situation, by year (%)

4.3 Summary statistics for the regression sample; 2009 and 2013 survey data.

Table 1 presents our summary statistics for the 2009 (N = 511) and 2013 (N = 485) elections. As mentioned, the sample is limited to Jews who do not define themselves as ultra-orthodox. 28% of the respondents in our 2009 sample and 20% of the respondents in our 2013 sample voted for the incumbent prime minister's party. The average voter thought that the economic situation had deteriorated during the incumbent's last term. Moreover, the average voter is quite worried that Arabs might hurt her or her family in her daily life.

Table 1. Summary Statistics						
Variables						
	2009			**2013**		
	Obs.	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Obs.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Dependent Variable						
Voting for the incumbent	511	27.98%	-	485	20.21%	-
Independent variable						
Economy (0-1)	511	0.63	0.27	485	0.62	0.27
Control variables						
Security (0-1)	511	0.55	0.50	485	0.54	0.50
Religion (0-0.833)	511	0.27	0.22	485	0.28	0.23
Gender [female] (0-1)	511	0.49	0.50	485	0.48	0.50
Income [class] (0-1)	511	0.84	0.29	485	0.86	0.29
Education [school years] (0-28)	511	13.75	3.14	485	14.42	3.17
Age (18-90)	511	47.51	17.24	485	47.68	15.98
Supporting the 2011 protest (0-1)				494	0.723	0.448

5 Results

Table 2 presents the results of our logistic model. This model examines the correlations between the determinants of our independent variables and our dependent variable of voting for the incumbent prime minister's party. This determinant receives 0 for voting against the incumbent and 1 for voting for the incumbent. Model 1 examines the effect of several variables among the 2013 elections survey's respondents: The perception regarding the general situation of the economy [Economy], the degree of worrying about being personally attacked by Arabs [Security], religion, gender, income, education and age. In model 2 we examine the effect of the same variables, but among the respondents of the 2009 elections survey. In model 3 we add a control variable for the effect of supporting the public protest of 2011.

Since the models are nonlinear, it is hard to provide a substantive understanding of the coefficients. Thus, the logistic regression coefficients presented in Table 1 display changes in log odds of the outcome, for a one unit increase in the determinant.

These results lend full support for both of our hypotheses. H_1 posited that voters, who *think that the economy declined in the incumbent's term, will vote against the incumbent Prime Minister's party.* In model 1, which examined the 2013 elections, we found results that are consistent with H_1. The economy variable is negative and statistically significant (b=-1.229; p<0.01), which means that, when all other variables are held constant, for every degree of perceiving the economy as deteriorating, the chance to vote for the incumbent decreases by 87% (See Table 3).

To examine H_2, we tested the same model on the 2009 survey data. We compared the results of the 2013 elections data (model 1) with the results of the 2009 elections data (model 2). The results are consistent with our second hypothesis; economic voting was stronger in 2013 than in 2009. Economic voting has a statistically significant effect on the vote in 2013 but no such effect in 2009. In addition, we found that the security variable is negative and significant in 2009 election (b=-0.473; p<0.05), which means that, when all other variables are held constant, for every degree of worrying about being attacked by Arabs, the chance to vote for the incumbent decreases in 37.8% (See Table 3). In 2013, this effect is not statistically significant.

Moreover, the results of Model 3 show that supporting the protest decreases the odds of voting for the incumbent by 70% (b=-1.213; p<0.001) (See Table 3). More importantly, even when we control for this direct effect of the 2011 protest, economic voting remains strong and statistically significant (b=-1.124; p<0.05) (See Table 3); it decreases the odds to vote for the incumbent by 67.5%.

Table 2. Logit Analysis of Determinants for Voting for the incumbent in 2009, 2013

Variable	Model		
	(1) **2013**	**(2)** **2009**	**(3)** **2013 + protest**
Economy	-1.229 (.444)**	-.012 (.393)	-1.124 (.466)*
Security	.117 (.241)	-.473 (.208)*	.095 (.254)
Religion	.148 (.506)	-2.163 (.519)***	-.059 (.521)
Gender (female)	-.233 (.242)	.572 (.213)**	-.133 (.255)
Income (By Class)	-.328 (.303)	-.046 (.239)	-.438 (.320)
Education (years)	-.093 (.039)*	-.033 (.033)	-.106 (.041)**
Age	.010 (.007)	-.002 (.006)	.004 (.008)
2011 Protest			-1.213 (.251)***
Constant	.228 (.797)	.092 (.637)	1.485 (.855)
N	485	511	479
Pseudo R^2	0.0456	0.0511	0.1002
Lr chi2	22.25	30.93	48.08
*=P<0.05 **=P<0.01 ***=P<0.001			

Table 3. Predicted Odds ratio of voting for the incumbent in 2009, 2013, 2013 + protest

Variable	Model					
	1		**2**		**3**	
	2013	**Range 0→1**	**2009**	**Range 0→1**	**2013 + protest**	**Range 0→1**
Economy	0.29	-70.75	---	---	0.15	-84.84
Security	---	---	0.62	-37.72	---	---
Religion	---	---	0.12	-88.50	---	---
Gender (female)	---	---	1.77	77.14	---	---
Income (By Class)	---	---	---	---	---	---
Education (years)	0.91	-8.85	---	---	0.90	-10.05
Age	---	---	---	---		
2011 Protest					0.30	-70.26

The results are consistent with both hypotheses. In models 1 and 2 we can see that the economy coefficient in 2009 is not statistically significant whereas in 2013 it is. Furthermore, we can see the opposite results for the security variable; it is significant in 2009 but not in 2013. In model 3 we control for the direct effect of supporting the 2011 protest on voting decision. This effect does not cancel out the effect of a perception of economic deterioration. Economic voting being stronger in 2013 than in 2009, and not fully explained by supporting the protest, might indicate that the change was more widespread than just among supporters of the protest.

6 <u>Robustness check</u>

Some could say that those who supported the protest and tended to blame the government for economic deterioration might have been people who don't traditionally vote for the incumbent prime minister's party anyway. Therefore, we examined more closely the group of respondents who said in 2013 that they voted for the incumbent's party, Likud, in 2009. In consistence with our previous results, we found that both economic voting and supporting the protest decrease the chances of these respondents voting for Likud again in 2013, the former in 79% and the latter in 66%, and that they are both statistically significant (See Appendix 3). These results support our second hypothesis, that economic voting was stronger in 2013 than in 2009.

7 <u>Discussion</u>

There is a general feeling in Israeli politics that security issues, particularly the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, are at the top of the agenda of politicians, citizens and journalists. Our study suggests a different view. According to our analysis of the 2013 elections survey, there is economic voting in Israel today, as former studies have shown in earlier years (Sheafer, 2008). Furthermore, we find it even when we control for the direct effect of the 2011 protest. By contrast, we did not find statistically significant economic voting in the 2009 sample. This might suggest that something happened between 2009 and 2013 to cause this change in voting patterns in Israel. We argue that the cause for this change is related to the 2011 protest. This event may have been quickly removed from public agenda (Ram & Filc, 2013a), but the 2013 elections raised its momentum back again, perhaps due to a security status-quo.

A finding that strengthens this argument is a statistically significant correlation between supporting the protest and voting against the incumbent prime minister's party, even among the respondents who voted for the incumbent (Likud party) in the preceding elections. The strong direct influence of the protest on the vote, along with it not explaining all of the effect of economic voting on the vote, might suggest the existence of strong indirect effects of the protest or of other factors related to it. This kind of effect is difficult to statistically estimate, and would require a more in depth analysis of media coverage during the election period and of interviews with figures that were influential and highly involved in relevant processes.

Consequently, we can make another important inference. Informal political participation, such as a series of widely supported protests, may change patterns of formal participation, such as electoral decision. While previous studies tended to examine the connection between social movements and elections from the movement's point of view (transformation into political parties, organizational mobilization, framing etc. – see Amenta et al., 2010; Fisher, 2012; McAdam & Tarrow, 2010), we show a connection to voters' decision process, and in particular to economic voting.

Our findings demonstrate that in order to determine the success of a protest or a social movement, it is not enough to examine whether there were policy changes as a direct result of the movement. A thorough investigation must also look at the long term influence on the voters (Giugni, 1998; 2008). We argue that the most successful protests are the ones which change the public's agenda in future events, first and foremost in the traditional ways of democratic participation. Not only did the 2011 protest increase the voter turnout in the 2013 elections (Ram & Filc, 2013a), but our findings cautiously show that it has indeed influenced the public's decision process, even after two years had passed.

Based on Talshir (2014), we argued that Israeli citizens began to widen the issues they held the government accountable for. However, unlike Talshir, but in line with Dalton (2013), our results indicate that protests do not challenge the legitimacy of political institutions and the political order but are rather another way of influencing policy makers and public opinion. In the Israeli case, the protest was not a completely alternative way for political change, but a complementary one, followed by a specific change in voting behavior. Israeli citizens hold the government accountable in more forms of political participation: They first protest in order to make a political change. If this does not lead to a substantiate change, they punish the incumbent in the upcoming elections, thereby producing higher quality policy making.

Economic voting in the 2013 elections is even more meaningful if we consider the alternatives to the incumbent's party (Likud). Before the elections, the Israeli media declared, based on numerous surveys, that there is no chance of winning the prime ministry for parties other than the Likud party. These kinds of conditions seemingly have an influence on the reward-punishment model, since voters must perceive viable alternatives for leading the country in order to punish the incumbent (Anderson 2007).

However, in Israel, the perception of the deteriorating economy still had much influence on the voters' decision.

Further analysis of the 2009 elections could also answer questions about other effects on voting behavior in Israel. Our descriptive trends analysis shows signs of less economic voting in 2009 than in 2006 or 1999. This could have something to do with a military operation that took place just before the 2009 elections or the second Lebanon war before the 2006 elections. Another reason is the media's emphasis on security issues during the 2009 elections against a completely different coverage during the 2006 and 1999 elections, which focused on internal affairs such as crime, education and social justice (Tsfati, Sheafer & Weimann, 2010).

Despite the importance of security issues in the Israeli elections, our research did not fully explore the effects of security issues on the vote, but focused only on the more personal feeling of being worried about being attacked by Arabs in daily life. This can cause inaccurate results since the security issue is intertwined with identity dilemmas (Shamir & Arian, 1999), and not necessarily stems from a sense of personal security. However, this effect being statistically significant in the 2009 survey data strengthens our view that it is a good proxy for some of the issues related to security that might influence voting decision.

Another limitation is the absence of testing partisan effects on the Israeli voting behavior. This could add further distinctions, because partisans shape their evaluations of the economic status according to previous beliefs (Anderson, 2007). However, we could not examine these effects due to a lack of information from the INES surveys.

Our study carefully shows a two-year influence of a protest, but future research can analyze whether the protest indeed expanded the "range of ideas about what is possible" for the long run (Rochon & Mazmanian, 1993, p. 77). Future elections might shed more light and show whether the security issue became persistently less significant than before and the economic issue became persistently more significant in voting decision in Israel.

Moreover, there is a need to systematically explain the mechanisms of the indirect influence of the protest on electoral outcomes. For instance, what exactly caused the return of the social protest and its ascent to the top of the voting priority? How can other Israeli social movements achieve a similar result? The media has an important part of setting the agenda, just as in the previous elections (Tsfati, Sheafer &

Weimann, 2010), but so does the parties' agendas during elections campaigns. These questions are left unanswered in this study and others, which regard the elections as "black holes that absorb energy and attention away from non-institutionalized political activities" (Blee & Currier, 2006, p. 275).

<u>Bibliography</u>

Abu, O., Yuval, F., & Ben-Porat, G. (2010). "All that is left": The demise of the Zionist left parties, 1992-2009. In A. Arian & M. Shamir (Eds.), *The elections in Israel – 2009* (pp. 67-100). Jerusalem: Israel Democracy Institute [Hebrew].

Amenta, E., Caren, N., Chiarello, E., & Su, Y. (2010). The Political Consequences of Social Movements. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 36, 287-307.

Anderson, C.J. (2007). The end of economic voting? Contingency dilemmas and the limits of democratic accountability. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 10, 271-296.

Arian, A., & Shamir, M. (2008). A decade later, the world had changed, the cleavage structure remained: Israel 1996-2006. *Party Politics*, 14(6), 685-705.

Arian, A., & Shamir, M. (2009). Election Study 2009. Retrieved April 12, 2014, from http://www.ines.tau.ac.il/2009.html

Bagno, O. (2010). The price of fear: Israel beiteinu in 2009. In A. Arian & M. Shamir (Eds.), *The elections in Israel – 2009* (pp. 37-66). Jerusalem: Israel Democracy Institute [Hebrew].

Berrebi, C., & Klor, E.F. (2006). On terrorism and electoral outcomes: Theory and evidence from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 50(6), 899-925.

Berrebi, C., & Klor, E.F. (2008). Are voters sensitive to terrorism? Direct evidence from the Israeli electorate. *American Political Science Review*, 102(3), 279-301.

Blander, D., & Galnoor, I. (2013). *The Political System of Israel*. Tel Aviv: Am Oved Publishers [Hebrew].

Blee, K.M., & Currier, A. (2006). How local social movement groups handle a presidential election. *Qualitative Sociology*, 29(3), 261-280.

Chappell, H.W, & Veiga, L.G. (2000). Economics and elections in Western Europe: 1960-1997. *Electoral Studies*, 19(2-3), 183-197.

Dalton. R.J. (2013). *Citizen politics: Public opinion and political parties in advanced industrial democracies* (6th ed.). Thousand Oaks: CQ Press.

Dalton, R.J., & Wattenberg, M. (2000). *Parties without partisans: Political change in advanced industrial democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Downs, A. (1972). Up and down with Ecology: The "issue-attention cycle". *Public Interest*, 28, 38-50.

Duch, R.M., & Stevenson, R. (2008). *The economic vote: How political and economic institutions condition election results*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Duch, R.M., & Stevenson, R. (2010). The global economy, competency, and the economic vote. *Journal of Politics*, 72(1), 105-123.

Evans, G., & Andersen, R. (2006). The political conditioning of economic perceptions. *Journal of Politics*, 68(1), 194-207.

Fiorina, M.P. (1981). *Retrospective voting in American national elections*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Fisher, D.R. (2012). Youth political participation: Bridging activism and electoral politics. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 38, 119-137.

Gamson, W.A. (1990). *The strategy of social protest* (2nd ed.). Belmont: Wadsworth.

Gedalia, E., Herzog, H., & Shamir, M. (2010). Tzip(p)ing through the elections: Gender in the 2009 Elections. In A. Arian & M. Shamir (Eds.), *The elections in Israel – 2009* (pp. 67-100). Jerusalem: Israel Democracy Institute [Hebrew].

Giugni, M.G. (1998). Was it worth the effort? The outcomes and consequences of social movements. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 24, 371-393.

Giugni, M. (2008). Political, biographical, and cultural consequences of social movements. *Sociology Compass*, 2(5), 1582-1600.

Healy, A., & Malhotra, N. (2013). Retrospective voting reconsidered. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 16, 285-306.

Hellwig, T. (2011). Context, political information, and performance voting. In R.J. Dalton & C.J. Anderson (Eds.), *Citizens, context, and choice: How context shapes citizens' electoral choices* (pp. 149-175). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hetherington, M.J. (1996). The media's role in forming voters' national economic evaluations in 1992. *American Journal of Political Science*, 40(2), 372-395.

Kayser, M.A., & Wlezien, C. (2011). Performance pressure: Patterns of partisanship and the economic vote. *European Journal of Political Research*, 50(3), 365-394.

Kiewiet, D.R. (1983). *Macroeconomics & micropolitics: The electoral effects of economic issues*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Lewis-Beck, M.S. (1988). *Economics and elections: The major Western democracies*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Lewis-Beck, M.S., Nadeau, R., & Elias, A. (2008). Economics, party, and the vote: Causality issues and panel data. *American Journal of Political Science*, 52(1), 84-95.

Lewis-Beck, M.S., & Paldam, M. (2000). Economic voting: An introduction. *Electoral Studies*, 19(2-3), 113-121.

Lewis-Beck, M.S, & Stegmaier, M. (2000). Economic determinants of electoral outcomes. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 3, 183-219.

Lewis-Beck, M.S, & Stegmaier, M. (2007). Economic models of voting. In R.J. Dalton & H.D. Klingemann (Eds.), *The Oxford handbook of political behavior* (pp. 518-537). New York: Oxford University Press.

McAdam, D., & Tarrow, S. (2010). Ballots and barricades: On the reciprocal relationship between elections and social movements. *Perspectives on Politics*, 8(2), 529-542.

Paldam, M. (1991). How robust is the vote function? A study of seventeen nations over four decades. In H. Norpoth, M.S. Lewis-Beck & J.D. Lafay (Eds.), *Economics and politics: The calculus of support*. Ann Arbor: University of

Michigan Press.

Popkin, S.L. (1994). *The reasoning voter: Communication and persuasion in presidential campaigns* (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Powell, G.B., & Whitten, G.D. (1993). A cross-national analysis of economic voting: Taking account of the political context. *American Journal of Political Science*, 37(2), 391-414.

Ram, R., & Filc, D. (2013a). Introduction: The Social Protest Forum. *Theory & Criticism*, 41, 11-16 [Hebrew].

Ram, R., & Filc, D. (2013b). The 14th of July of Daphni Leef: The rise and fall of the social protest. *Theory & Criticism*, 41, 17-43 [Hebrew].

Rochon, T.R., & Mazmanian, D.A. (1993). Social movements and the policy process. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 528, 75-87.

Rosenhek, Z., & Shalev, M. (2013). The political economy of the 2011 protests: A class and generational analysis. *Theory & Criticism*, 41, 45-68 [Hebrew].

Royed, T.J, Leyden, K.M., & Borrelli, S.A. (2000). Is clarity of responsibility important for economic voting? Revisiting Powell and Whitten's hypothesis. *British Journal of Politics*, 30(4), 669-685.

Rucht, D. (2007). The spread of protest politics. In R.J. Dalton & H.D. Klingemann (Eds.), *The Oxford handbook of political behavior* (pp. 708-723). New York: Oxford University Press.

Shamir, M. (2013). Election Study 2013. Retrieved April 12, 2014, from http://www.ines.tau.ac.il/2013.html

Shamir, M., & Arian, A. (1999). Collective identity and electoral competition in Israel. *American Political Science Review*, 93(2), 265-277.

Sheafer, T. (2008). The media and economic voting in Israel. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, 20(1), 33-51.

Sheafer, T., & Weimann, G. (2005). Agenda building, agenda setting, priming, individual voting intentions, and the aggregate results: An analysis of four Israeli elections. *Journal of Communication*, 55(2), 347-365.

Talshir, G. (2014). The social protest in the eyes of the Israeli democracy crisis: Between economy, politics and identity. *Politika*, 23, 5-45 [Hebrew].

Tsfati, Y., Sheafer, T., & Weimann, G. (2010). War on the agenda: The Gaza conflict and communication in the 2009 elections. In A. Arian & M. Shamir (Eds.), *The elections in Israel – 2009* (pp. 301-332). Jerusalem: Israel Democracy Institute [Hebrew].

Appendix 1

Ultra-orthodox vote in 2013 and 2009

2. Who did you vote for in the last elections?

Vote	Freq.	Percent
Likud	3	2.63
Habayit Hayehudi	2	1.75
Shas	52	45.61
Yahaduth Hatorah	44	38.60
Meretz	1	0.88
Otzma LeIsrael	3	2.63
Green Leaf	1	0.88
Koach Lehashpia	2	1.75
Right-wing Party	1	0.88
Refusal to respond	5	4.39
Total	114	100.00

2013 only

2. Who did you vote for in the last elections?

Vote	Freq.	Percent
Likud - Israel Beitenu	3	4.29
Habayit Hayehudi	2	2.86
Yahaduth Hatorah	27	38.57
Shas	26	37.14
Otzma L'Israel	3	4.29
Green Leaf	1	1.43
Koach L'hashpia	2	2.86
Right wing party	1	1.43
Refusal to respond	5	7.14
Total	70	100.00

2009 only

3. Which list did you vote for in the last elections to Knesset?

Vote	Freq.	Percent
Yahaduth Hatorah	25	53.19
Shas	18	38.30
The new movement - meretz	1	2.27
Refusal to answer	3	6.38
Total	44	100.00

Appendix 2

93. Do you support any specific party, are you member, do you have a job in the party? (2013 data)	Freq.	Percent
1. no	639	37.19
2. support but not a member	148	8.61
3. member but no position	37	2.15
4. active member	11	0.64
5. active member with a position in the party	6	0.35
9. do not read: no answer/refuses to answer	9	0.52
.	868	50.52
Total	1,718	100.00

Appendix 3

Logit model only for the 2013 respondents who voted for the Likud party in 2009.

vote1	Odds Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P>z	[95% Conf.	Interval]
eco_worse2	.2104623	.1466564	-2.24	0.025	.0537071	.8247396
Worried	.7479271	.293295	-0.74	0.459	.3467894	1.613068
Relig	.2252656	.2097294	-1.60	0.109	.0363245	1.396981
Female	1.718317	.721679	1.29	0.197	.7544067	3.913821
upper_class	.7103371	.3412075	-0.71	0.476	.2770724	1.821108
Educ	.8790398	.0637127	-1.78	0.075	.7626295	1.013219
Age	1.004549	.0146333	0.31	0.755	.9762737	1.033643
support_pr~t	.3384646	.1356894	-2.70	0.007	.1542656	.7426042
N	147					
LR chi2	21.18					
Pseudo R2	0.1058					
Log likelihood	-89.498					