האוניברסיטה העברית בירושלים
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Faculty of Social Science

Department of Political Science

The 2011 Social Protests in Israel: the Political Response to an Emergent Social Discourse

By Bruno Lima, Naama Tridel, and Gilit Tal-Rubinstein

Jerusalem,

May, 2013.

The responsiveness of government policy to citizens' preferences is a central concern in normative democratic theory (Dahl 1956, Arrow 1963, Sen 1970) and there is no shortage of empirical theorizing about the extent to which policy does or does not respond to public opinion. Despite the great variety of works addressing this issue, the central question remains of what are the causal mechanisms by which ideas of various sorts affect policy making? Specifically, how does the emergence of new social discourses influence well-established political discourses? This question gains central relevance for the democratic debate mainly because democracy has been recognized not just as a method for choosing political leaders and organizing government, but also as a political system in which the citizenry has the ability to influence the political agenda, i.e. to deliberate about its main socio-economic and political concerns (Habermas 1994). It is against this theoretical background that the present research comes to examine the influence of the 2011 social protests in Israel on the political discourse prior to the 2013 national elections; in other words, it aims to bring an answer to the question of how exactly did the 2011 social protests affect the Israeli political discourse in the eve of the 2013 national elections? Unquestionably, this is a question of how responsive the Israeli regime is, i.e., a question on the Israeli citizenry's ability to create, change, and elaborate a social discourse that is able to influence the political discourse. It is hypothesized that the Israeli political discourse has not just adopted the terminology developed by the 2011 social protests, but also has framed its messages in such a way to adjust them to specific audiences that have taken part in the demonstrations. In order to test this hypothesis a qualitative analysis of both the Israeli political parties' platforms and their campaign promos prior to the 2013 national elections was made.

Theoretical Background

The present research relies on the participatory model of democracy, which maintains that what makes for good leaders also makes for good citizens – active participation in ruling and being ruled (i.e., in the exercise of power) and also in public will and opinion formation. In essence, it relies on the notion that without public spaces for the active participation of the citizenry in ruling and being ruled, without a decisive narrowing of the gap between rulers and ruled, to the point of its abolition, polities are democratic in name only (Cohen & Arato 1992). Nonetheless, the question arises of why should we rely on this particular model of democracy? The point is that this constructive view of democracy stays on diametrical opposition to the elitist model first proposed by Schumpeter. The latter, it must be said, is based on the assumption that the "democratic method is that institutional arrangement for

arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide via a competitive struggle for the people's vote". The theoretical preference for the participatory model of democracy is then based on some obvious shortcomings of the elitist model, namely that there is no pretense that voters either set the political agenda or make political decisions; they neither generate issues nor choose policies. For this reason, an investigation of the influences of the 2011 social protests on the Israeli political discourse must presuppose the participatory model of democracy.

The analysis of the 2011 social protests are relevant for the participatory model of democracy for two main reasons: (1) the support of the protests was really the widest possible, and reached at its peak some 88% of the population (Ram and Filc forthcoming); and (2) it brought socio-economic issues to the forefront of the Israeli public discourse. This second factor is even of more relevance due to the breach with the predominant national-security issue in the political and public discourses. Specifically, key terms such as 'social justice', 'affordable housing', and 'costs of living' constantly used during the demonstrations have established an emerging social discourse, which is supposed to shape the political discourse in the eve of the 2013 national elections. On the economic front, the idea of social justice the movement has come up with resembles to the common struggle for extending the welfare state. Particularly, it stressed the legal entitlements to state services and transfer payments that aid those who feel the negative effects of the market system. On the political front, the protests emphasized the very mechanisms introduced by welfare states to resolve conflicts and create greater equality of opportunity; in effect, they stressed the idea that the welfare state would finally deliver on the claim of liberal capitalist societies to be egalitarian and just, by creating the preconditions for a true equality of opportunity, which in the eyes of defenders of the welfare state is the only context in which civil and political rights can function in a universalistic manner.

It is important to note that the social movement's economic and political aspects resembles to the social-democratic model;[1] as Przeworski (1985) points out, this model is mostly based on reforms in the welfare state, thus claiming for a stable equilibrium between capitalist forces and state intervention in providing equal opportunities for public services. In this sense, the 2011 social movements in Israel have put two ideological discourses in face-to-face confrontation. On one side stays the current Israeli neoliberalism with its main concerns,

---

[1] The social-democratic model does not come in detriment of the participatory model of democracy; rather, the two supplement each other theoretically in explaining some of the social movement's nuances. In effect, this research found an overlap of the two models: the demands for extended welfare state and the demonstrations in the streets are but two common elements found in both the social democratic model and the participatory model.

3

i.e., the rule of the market, cutting public expenditure for social services, deregulation, and privatization (Martinez & Garcia 1996); on the other side there is the movement's social-democratic approach, which have been trying to bring the state back into the market dynamics for regulation and extension of the welfare state. In effect, the confrontation between these two ideologies was the hallmark of the 2011 social protests in Israel.

Nonetheless, to answer the question of what type of influence the 2011 social protests exerted on the political discourse prior to 2013 national election in Israel, methodological issues must also be addressed, mainly those that focus on different aspects of the relation between civil society and formal politics (e.g. state, political parties, parliament members, and so on). For instance, normative theorists argue that policy makers' value, norms, and principled beliefs may affect their position on public policies by helping them decide which policies are the most appropriate – a specially important consideration when, as is frequently the case, there is no conclusive evidence about which policy action is most likely to work best (Lipset 1996, Rein & Winship 1997, Schon & Rein 1994). In this sense, policy makers operate according to a logic of moral or social appropriateness, not a logic of consequentiality (March & Olsen 1989, Suchman 1997).

Two are the main problems of normative theory. First, scholars do not always specify clearly the causal mechanisms whereby normative frameworks affect policy making; and, second, studies do not always identify the sources of normative change. For these two reasons, some researchers, drawing concepts from discourse theory (e.g. Gamson 1992, Snow et al. 1986, Snow & Benford 1992, Swidler 1986, Tarrow 1994), become more concerned with explaining how policy makers frame and reframe their political discourses in order to make them politically acceptable. Rather than seeking a functionalist explanation for a policy decision in light of social demands, these theorists stress the process through which social and political discourses are constructed and reconstructed taking into consideration different contextual elements; it is important to note that by frame this scholar means normative and sometimes cognitive ideas that are located in the foreground of policy debates.

The adoption of discursive methods turns out, then, to be particularly appropriate for the present research; it does so, mainly because this scholar explores how the structure of social discourse and language shape how policy ideas are communicated and translated into practice. In effect, discourse theory maintains that pre-existing discursive structures (e.g. concepts, metaphors, linguistic codes, rules of logic, etc.) contain cognitive and normative elements that mediate which policy programs policy makers best perceive, understand, articulate, and as a result, which policy ideas they are likely to adopt (Alexander & Smith

1993, Block 1990, Bourdieu 1998, Go 1999, Hay 1996, 2001). In this sense, an investigation of the dialectical relation between the emergent social discourse following the 2001 wave of protests and the well-established political discourse in Israel requires a thorough analysis of how the latter has come to frame specific messages established by the former. Along with the participatory model of democracy, discourse theory provide us with methodological tools to examine informal channels through which social and political discourses dialogue; in effect, it allows us to better investigate bottom-up processes by which social discourses become able to influence or even to determine the predominant political discourse in Israel in the eve of its national elections.

Following the rationale of both discourse theory and participatory model of democracy, the present project addresses the question of how the 2011 social protests influence the Israeli political discourse by arguing that discourse shifts occur when policy makers suddenly find themselves faced with unusual political economic problems for which the current discourse offers no clear-cut solutions (Dobbin 1993, P. Hall 1993, and Hay 2001). When this economic crisis occurs in discursive terms, a search for new discourses that would otherwise appear logical to conform to the social normative expectations begins. Once identified new programs and policies are implemented and tested in light of the new political discourse (Goldstein 1993). This research assumes, then, that in order for policy programs to be adopted, political parties strategically craft frames and use them to legitimize their policies to the public and each other (Anthony et al. 1994, Fligstein & Mara-Drita 1996). In this sense, it becomes necessary to examine the way political parties[2] construct their political discourses, making them compatible to emerging social discourses. One way to examine this process is to take a close look at the parties' platforms and their campaign promos. In face of this theoretical perspective, it is hypothesized that the Israeli political discourse has not just adopted the terminology developed by the 2011 social protests, but has also framed its messages in such a way as to adjust them to specific audiences that have taken part in the demonstrations. Specifically, three hypotheses derive from the theoretical assumptions exposed here:

---

[2] Following Rod Hague and Martin Harrop's (2007) conception of political parties, this research understands them as fulfilling four main functions: (1) to offer directions to government; (2) to function as agents of political requirement; (3) to serve as devices of interest aggregation, filtering a multitude of specific demands into more manageable packages of proposals – parties select, reduce and combine policies; and (4) to serve as a brand for their supporters and voters, giving people a lens through which to interpret a complicated political world. For the purposes of the present investigation, the last two functions are of special relevance – they synthesize the notion of political parties as formal channels of social discourses.

H_1: There is more space dedicated to socio-economic issues in the 2013 parties' platforms.

H_2: Socio-economic issues will acquire central relevance in the 2013 campaign promos.

H_3: In the eve of the 2013 national elections, the political parties will address those audiences that have taken part in the 2011 protests.

To test these hypotheses this research develops a textual analysis of the Israeli political parties' platforms released in 2006, 2009, and in the eve of the 2013 national elections. In addition, it brings an interpretation of the political discourses used in the 2013 campaign promos. The selection of this corpus turns out to be particularly prominent for it explores the process by which frames not just functionally emerge (as normative theorists suggest), but also by which they are constructed, tested, transformed, and fit to the prevailing normative frameworks and cognitive discourses residing in the social domain. In fact, it is at the moment in which the formal politics most needs the social attention, that the truth of its discourse becomes most salient.

Method and Data

This study is based on qualitative methods. In order to understand the impact of the 2011 summer protests on the 2013 electoral campaign in Israel we selected two corpus of data - party platforms and campaign election promos; while the former is examined through quantitative analysis of key terms of the social protests, the latter is examined through purely qualitative interpretation.

Political Platforms

In developing the present research we collected 24 political platforms developed for the last three national elections (eight from 2013 – of Meretz, Hatnua, Habait Hayehudi, Hadash, Labor, Shas, Kadima and Yesh Atid; nine from 2009 – of Habait Hayeudi, Meretz, Hadash , HaIhud HaLeumi, Shas, Labor, Likud, Kadima and Israel Beiteinu; and 7 from 2006 – of Shas, Hadash, Likud, Meretz, Israel Beiteinu, Labor and Kadima). It is important to note that the selected political platforms come from parties that have passed the election threshold. Also, not every platform of every political party that passed the threshold is present; and there are parties that did not elaborate a platform at all (such as Likud in the election of 2013). The political platforms that compose the research corpus were examined using five parameters:
(1) Any reference to socio-economic issues made in two ways. The first way refers to the spatial percentage each platform devoted to these issues; the second way refers to the location

of this section in relation to the other platform's parts – the relevant question is does the party open its platform by addressing socio-economic issues? This study also takes into consideration whether the political platforms deals with requirements made by the 2011 social protest and whether they gain expression in the party platforms.

(2) Direct reference to the protest of 2011 (obviously, references made in the election platforms released in 2013). This parameter is useful for testing the direct impact of the protests on the political parties agenda. In this sense, political platforms that make explicit reference to the social protest itself or to the Trajtenberg report (which is a direct result of the protest) are considered as being directly affected; this analysis is developed in comparative terms, i.e. it is relative to those parties' platforms that do not even mention the events of 2011.

(3) The total number of times the words "social justice", "affordable housing" and "costs of living" appear in each platform. From the theoretical background arises the notion that these were the most important words/slogans used during the social protest of the summer 2011. Particularly, Alimi (2012: 404-405) notes that the protest focused on three key issues: cost of living, soaring housing prices and social justice. That is, these words reflect the terminology employed by the social protests.

(4) Audiences - the idea here is to examine the different publics that have participated in the protests and whether an explicit call for these specific publics can be found in any party's platform.

(5) Platform's concreteness – whether there can be found working principles, i.e., a plan for practical action, or whether things are phrased in general terms only.

For the data analysis a coding page was prepared (see table 1 in appendix). Two coders carried out the process of codification itself, and just afterwards a test of reliability of seven items was made for each of the five indices. For example, one can observe that for the first parameter the Krippendorff's alpha (interval) = 0.989 is strongly reliable. For the second parameter the Krippendorff's alpha (interval) = 0.71, which indicates moderate reliability, but still reasonably acceptable. For the third parameter the Krippendorff's alpha (interval) = 1 shows perfect reliability, and for the fourth parameter the Krippendorff's alpha (nominal) = 0.654 indicates moderate reliability.[3]

Promos

---

[3] Items 2 and 4 were retested by the 2 coders who reached an agreement on the different word counting in the parties' platforms; the procedure was then based on one of the two coder's data.

Unlike the political platforms, which were taken from the last three national elections, this corpus emerged from the 2013 election promos only. The idea was to examine whether there is a direct reference to the protest in the campaign promos, and, from that, to infer the centrality given to the 2011 summer protest as a major event in the elections in 2013. For this purpose, three promos were selected from each party that has passed the electoral threshold of 2013 (12 political parties – a total corpus of 36 promos). In relation to the sampling process, we selected those broadcast promos that have directly dealt with socio-economic issues; in cases of absolute lack of reference to these issues, the selection was based on the number of "views" on the website YouTube. It is important to note that unlike political platforms, which are detailed and include many pages referring to different courses of action, the broadcast promos have a high cost of production, which makes the parties produce one promo for each subject at length of 2:00 minutes maximum. Naturally, the messages are shorter, more concise, and marked by a visual representation in the form of images, videos, or both.

The study examined the content of promos that were released during the 2013 electoral propaganda. One encoder, who received precise instructions and was trained by another encoder, made the analysis of the propaganda material.[4] The process of promos codification has taken into consideration the visual elements such as "who is speaking", the background, and the images displayed. In so doing, a special emphasis on visual performance was given; in addition, we made a thorough search after pictures, mentions, and videos of the protests. Afterwards the findings were allocated along three of the five parameters used to examine the political platforms: (1) any reference to the socio-economic issues; (2) a direct reference to the 2011 social protests; and (3) promos that employed the terminology of "social justice", "affordable housing" and "costs of living." For obvious reasons, the last two parameters used in the platform analysis (audiences and concreteness) have not been used this time, since they cannot be found in broadcast promos.

Findings

The findings will be divided into four major parts; in each part we will present findings related to both the political platforms analysis and findings that refer to the examination of campaign promos. The first part addresses the findings regarding references to socio-economic issues. The second part explores the findings related to direct references to

---

[4] The qualitative analysis was similar to that made by Shefer(…) in 2009, in which they examine the coverage of the 2009 electoral system.

the 2011 social protests. The third part presents the findings in terms of treatment given to leading terms in the protests leading terms: "social justice," "affordable housing" and "costs of living. In the fourth section we present the findings related to the 'audience' parameter.

Reference to Socio-Economic Issues

In order to grasp the importance each political platform gave to socio-economic issues we explored both the relative space that socio-economic issues fill up in the platform and their extension in comparison to other topics. This "test location" of socio-economic issues relative to other subjects is designed to test whether the importance given to them has decreased, increased, or has remained the same over the different periods. For instance, we assume that whenever socio-economic issues are presented at the beginning of a political platform, this party gives considerable importance and centrality to these issues. It is important to point out that our purpose in checking mentions to socio-economic issues in the platforms is to test whether the space the political platforms give to socio-economic issues has increased between the two study periods. In a similar research on parties' platforms between 1949-1999, Canty and Pedatzur (2001) found that the parties very often begin by addressing issues of foreign policy and security, while usually locating social issues in the middle. Following this methodological rationale, from our analysis arises that in 2006 33.3% of the parties platforms began by addressing socio-economic issues; in 2009 just 14.3% opened with socio-economic issues, and in 2013 37% placed this issue at the beginning of the platform. The results are not statistically significant due to the small sample, which contains just 24 political platforms. Even so, in table 1 it must be observed that in 2009 there was a drop in the proportion of political parties that have located socio-economic issues at the beginning of their platforms; on the other hand, in 2013 there was a drastic increase. These findings are compatible with Shefer et al. (2010) results which show that in 2006 socio-economic issues has become the election center of gravity; in effect, the centrality of socio-economic issues in 2006 is due to Amir Peretz's success in putting social and economic issues on the media agenda in 2006. Labor's social democratic approach, which included promises to raise the minimum wage and to allocate a pension for every worker, stood in sharp contrast to the neo-liberal agenda promoted by Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu. The relative marginalization of socio-economic issues in 2009, on the other hand, is due to the lack of agency promoting social issues in the 2009 campaign (p. 232). The reason for the location of social-economic issues in the 2013 parties' platforms can be attributed to the juxtaposition of the election and the

protests which has undoubtedly gained additional value in the Israeli social and political discourse.

Location test of socio-economic issues in the parties' political platforms by year:

		1	2	3
elections 2006	Count	2	4	0
	% within period of time	33.3%	66.7%	.0%
	% within Location of socio-economic issue	33.3%	36.4%	.0%
	% of Total	9.5%	19.0%	.0%
elections 2009	Count	1	5	0
	% within period of time	14.3%	71.4%	.0%
	% within Location of socio-economic issue	16.7%	45.5%	.0%
	% of Total	4.8%	23.8%	.0%
elections 2013	Count	3	2	3
	% within period of time	37.5%	25.0%	37.5%
	% within Location of socio-economic issue	50.0%	18.2%	100.0%
	% of Total	14.3%	9.5%	14.3%
	Count	6	11	3
	% within period of time	28.6%	52.4%	14.3%
	% within Location of socio-economic issue	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	28.6%	52.4%	14.3%

Table 1. Location test of socio-economic issues in the parties' political platforms by year.

The political parties that have opened their 2013 platforms by addressing economic issues were Labor, Yesh Atid, and Hatnuah. Nonetheless, a general overview of the platforms' structure points to a more complex picture in terms of subjects disposition. For instance, Hadash's platform locates socio-economic issues in second place, but in a more rigorous examination one can easily perceive that among 10 topics seven are related to socio-economic issues. Another illustration of the platforms' complexity is Meretz; in its 2013 platform, socio-economic issues appear in the third place – before that, two topics are addressed, namely human rights and political process. However, it is important to note that while the human rights chapter contains just two pages and the political process part occupies four pages, the socio-economic part is, by far, the most detailed one – 15 pages are exclusively dedicated to it.

In respect to the scope of socio-economic issues in the platforms we found that they took on average the same extent in the two elections prior to the protest and that of 2013. In

2006 these issues occupied on average 35% of the parties' platforms, while in 2009 it filled up 37% of their spaces; in 2013 the issue was addressed on average within 35% of each platform. That is, the relative share of the socio-economic issues in each platform remained the same throughout the periods under evaluation. These results do not support our hypothesis of a spatial expansion of socio-economic issues in the 2013 parties' platforms; a possible explanation for the unchanged scope of socio-economic issues in the platforms may be the fact that the political parties preferred to focus on these issues in depth, i.e., to put them in more practical terms, bringing details of policy plans related to these issues, rather than in breadth. Obviously, this theoretical explanation requires further examination.

Another important element to be observed in the political platforms is the presence [or absence] of references to the requirements made by the social protests that took place in 2011. The aim was to examine whether the requirements of the movement's leading team were included or not in the political parties' agenda.[5] In this respect, from our analysis arise that in the parties' electoral platforms of 2013 it can be seen a sweeping reference to these requirements as part of both the parties' visions and their policy documents [as they appear in the political platforms]. All eight platforms written in 2013 have in some way or another referred to the reduction of costs of living, have shown some concern for the disadvantaged and for the need of investing in civil matters, including education, health and housing. For example, Hadash's party platform raised its demand for transferring money to social welfare policies – education, health and housing. Shas's platform show great concern for impaired populations and welfare policies that would otherwise enact proper education and housing for all. Another example is Yesh Atid's political platform, which emphasizes the need for protection of those socially and economically disadvantaged in Israel, and the need to establish a national housing program. References to socio-economic issues and similar requirements can also be found in the platforms of Hatnua, Kadima, Habait Hayehudi, and Labor.

---

[5] The protest leaders have incessantly delivered the message "in this tent"; the framework within which this message arose, concentrated the prostest's main demands. In this context, it is important to note that many groups and organizations joined the demonstrations, which sometimes gave the movement an aura of disorder, as if it was an unfocused scattered public noise; even so, the formal requirements that were made shed light on the needs for reducing social disparities in Israel, for creating social cohesion, addressing the change the economic system has to pass through in order to provide the citizens with the basic conditions for economic prosperity, reducing the cost of living, increasing government control on basic commodities, giving clear priority to social and geographic periphery, observing the essential needs of vulnerable populations, and investing in civil areas such as education, health, housing, infrastructure, etc. These requirements are certainly socio-economic.

Despite the similarities in terms of socio-economic issues, there are important disagreements on other issues. For example, Hatnua and Hadash present socio-economic issues in close ties with political [foreign] issues. These parties, along with Meretz, are fully engaged with the need to cut the defense budget for the transfer of funds to socio-economic sectors. Habait Hayehudi does not claim for cuts in the military budget in favor of socio-economic areas, although it does stress them as well. Overall, all parties have expressed some concern and have addressed the central issues that arouse from the 2011 social protests that took place in Israel. Notwithstanding there are some differences in the way each political party details these issues in their platforms, all the requirements made by the protests could be found in the eight platforms released in 2013 (those that were examined for the present research).

As previously explained, for the purposes of the present research the pre-sampling process was based just on campaign promos that addressed socio-economic issues. Nonetheless, it is important to point out that among all the promos produced by some parties there could not be found any reference to socio-economic issues. For example, the Likud-Beiteinu[6] election promos were endowed with a strong security message, emphasizing the importance of a strong prime minister for Israel; their promos stressed the security challenges facing the State of Israel, such as the Iranian threat, the southern border, the civil war in Syria, Iron Dome, and the like. To be accurate, one mention to socio-economic issues was made in just one of Likud-Beiteinu broadcast promos, which included a summary of the ruling party activities during the last four years. But, even in these promos it was first presented the party's activity on security issues and only then social and economic issues were addressed (e.g. job creation, lowering prices, free education from the age of three, etc.). Needless to say that these last issues were at the "heart of the protests messages"; it was exactly these messages that were included in the Trachtenberg Committee.[7] Unexpectedly, other parties did not even address socio-economic issues in their campaign promos; for instance, Habait Hayehudi has focused on security issues (the military past of the party leader Naftali Bennett), settlements and Zionist values. On the other pole of the political spectrum it could not be found in any of Balad's broadcast promos a reference to socio-economic issues, mainly due to its political focus on the preservation of the Arab minority in face of the "non-democratic laws" that

---

[6] The Likud Party and Israel Beiteinu run in a joint list for the 2013 national election.

[7] The Trachtenberg Committee was appointed by the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to examine and propose solutions to Israel's socio-economic problems. The committee was formed after the 2011 social protests.

Benjamin Netanyahu and Avigdor Lieberman's[8] government wants to pass. Also Kadima's campaign promos did not address socio-economic issues, thus opting for a major emphasis on the military character of Shaul Mofaz, the chairman of the list.

Despite the above cases of absolute lack of reference to socio-economic issues, most parties did produced promos dealing with these issues; Meretz, Labor, Hatnua, Shas, United Torah Judaism, Hadash and Yesh Atid are some examples. It is important to note, however, that there was not in any way a homogenous pattern of addressing these socio-economic topics; in fact, the way each party presented its ideas on this field varied greatly. For instance, Meretz, Labor and Yesh Atid addressed the middle class and stressed issues such as the costs of living and the social inequalities. In contrast, Shas and United Torah Judaism emphasized in their promos the expected state budgetary cuts in different sectors (e.g. social benefits). In addition, most of their promos focused on the protection of the poor, rather than of the middle class (as Yesh Atid, Labor and Meretz). Overall, four out of 12 parties did not address socio-economic issues in the promos under examination (Likud-Beiteinu, Habait Hayeudi, Balad and Kadima). Since our corpus was composed by campaign promos of 2013, the present research lacks a temporal comparative perspective in this respect. Even so, the fact that 66% (two thirds) of the parties produced one or more promos related to socio-economic issues provides a good indication for the emphasis given to them in the eve of the 2013 national elections. In this sense, our findings support the hypothesis that socio-economic issues have acquired central relevance in the 2013 campaign promos.

Direct Reference to the 2011 Social Protests

This parameter relates to any direct reference made to the social protest itself in either the parties' platforms or their 2013 election promos. By 'direct reference' we mean the explicit mention of the 2011 social protest, or references to the summer of 2011. The results of the thorough analysis made indicate that 75% of the 2013 political platforms directly referred to the social protests; in contrast, only two parties have not directly addressed the protests: Habait Hayehudi and Shas (see table 2 in the appendix).

Particularly, Shas has not explicitly referred to the protests while claiming that the party's platform "does not depend on one political situation or another, it does not change from election to election as we see in other parties." As previously said, the way each political

---

[8] Avigdor Liberman was the former foreign minister in the 18th Knesset. Additionally, he is the chairman of Israel-Beiteinu party.

party referred to the social protests varied greatly, as each one has linked and framed the protests in different ways within the platforms. For instance, Hadash has directly mentioned the protest three times in its 2013 electoral platform as the references fit the party's interests: "Hadash took an active and prominent part in the great social protest of the summer of 2011, and its slogan 'the people demands social justice' has become the slogan of the people's battle against the capital in the government". In the same way, the Labor Party's chairwoman Shelly Yachimovitz wrote in her opening remarks of the party's platform: "the true values and the origins of the Labor Party (…) lit up and woke (…) all over the country there is a new rising song". It is interesting to note that the two parties have directly employed the social protests discourse; in addition, both claim that the root of the protest lies in perceptions and values they promote in their ideologies. In contrast, a different approach to the social protest can be seen in Yesh Atid and Hatnua's platforms, which have opted for references to the conclusions of the Trachtenberg Committee in order to attack the ruling government during and after the protests – Netanyahu's government. For instance, Yesh Atid refers to the Trachtenberg Committee three times in terms of the Committee's recommendations on housing and on a longer day of studies in schools as well as in kindergartens. Among other things the platform addresses the conclusions of the Committee on housing issues: "(…) the report was adopted quickly by the Israeli government, but on reaching the implementation stage the main criterion was that of 'exhaustion of earning capacity' (…) the party future goal is to undo this criterion and to care that the committee's conclusions will be implemented in its own terms". In contrast to this view, the Hatnua party decided to attack the Trachtenberg Committee for it was founded by the Netanyahu government: "The Trachtenberg Committee, which could lead to a change of historic proportions in the health system, has chosen not to address the subject, ignoring the problems of the system (…) Unfortunately the truth is far from what has been described." It must be pointed out that these references made by Hatnua and Yesh Atid intended to both criticize the ruling government and its administrative measures while offering solutions that would otherwise meet the social protests main requirements.

The analysis of the parties' platforms revealed a broad reference to the protests. Similarly, the examination of political campaign promos also shows a vast reference to the demonstrations, though not to in the same extent. In examining 36 promos (about three for each party) it was found that eight promos (22.2%) refer directly to the protest. The parties that have directly addressed the social protest in their broadcasted promos were Yesh Atid, Labor, Hadash, Meretz, and Hatnua. It was interesting to note that these parties have either sat

in the opposition before the 2013 national elections or were new parties (e.g., Yesh Atid). Meanwhile, among the 12 parties that have passed the election threshold in 2013, five of them (41%) have directly referred to the protest. Direct mention of the social protests in the promos was made in two ways – (1) direct speech addressing the protest (e.g., Meretz's election promos in which the speaker says: "I'm going to vote because I remember what I did in the summer of 2011, what we yelled in the streets". Hatnua election promos: "We took the streets, protested, and believed that change is possible"). (2) Indirect reference to the protests, using images or videos during promos broadcast. Some examples of this indirect reference can be seen in Hadash's promos, in which the speaker convinces the viewers to cast their votes to the party while using images of the protest in the background; also in Labor's broadcast promos one can find pictures of the protests in the background of Stav Shaffir's speeches.

The data related to direct reference to the social protests in election promos suggest a great significance given to this event that took place a year and a half before the 2013 national election. In a survey conducted in 2012 by the Israel Democracy Institute it was found that 37.4 percent of the Israeli population believes that the protest was important for a significant part of the nation. Another interesting result may quite plausibly explain why almost only left-wing parties have directly addressed the protests in their promos – according to the 2012 Israeli Democracy Index, 54.3% of the protests participants were left-wing voters. Prof. Tamar Hermann even notes in the Democracy Index that the protests of summer 2011 was a dramatic event for the Israeli life; therefore it is not a surprise that 41% of the parties that sit in the current Israel's Knesset have chosen to make explicit mention to the protests in their broadcast campaign.

It must be said that the data provided by both the promos and the parties' platforms in relation to explicit reference to the social protests are consistent. Even though the referential scope in the platforms is wider, the broadcast promos also bring significant representation (almost one fourth of them) of the protest. Interestingly, we found a pattern of reference to the protests among the parties – the parties that have directly addressed the protests in their platforms have also widely used the protests in their electoral promos (e.g., Meretz Hatnua, Hadash, and Labor). Obviously, the parties that have directly explored the social demonstrations of 2011 in their platforms have not used them in the same way in their promos; basic differences stem from the importance each party gave to the issue, as the examination of the previous parameter shows. In effect, as each party has located socio-

economic issues in different places of their platforms, they have also emphasized other issues in their promos (Balad, Habait Hayehudi, Shas, United Torah Judaism, etc.).

Terminology: Reference to "Social Justice", "Affordable House", and "Costs of Living"

As previously mentioned, Alimi (2012: 404-405) argues that the social movement focused on three key issues: cost of living, affordable housing and social justice. In light of this analysis we examined the use of these terms in both the political platforms and the campaign promos. In the analysis of the platforms (see table 2 below) it was found that in 2006 there were nine direct references to these terms, while in 2009 there were 10 references. In a deep contrast, in 2013 there has been a significant increase in mentions to these terms – there were 32 references to them in the parties' platforms (three times more than the previous platforms). The fact is that the phrase "social justice" appeared several times in the 2009 platforms of Hadash, Meretz, Labor and Shas. The phrase "affordable housing" appeared just once before the 2013 elections in Meretz platform; surprisingly, the expression "cost of living" did not appear at all in any political platform examined before the 2013 national elections. It was also found that Kadima has made the most extensive use of these expressions; this finding is particularly interesting given that Kadima does not possess a clear ideology and does not offer a concrete policy plan that could otherwise cope with socio-economic issues.


Table 2. Use of the protest's terminology in the parties' platforms.

In addition, it was investigated whether the expression is accompanied by an explanation for its use or by a practical plan to implement the protest's requirements, or whether the expression is employed as a vague and amorphous slogan. As for the expression "social justice" only Hadash and Kadima explain what they mean by it. Hadash states: "(…) a just society, which is centered in care of man, in living conditions, personality development, environment, and future." Kadima has defined the following topics under social justice: share of burden, cost of living, human dignity, housing, welfare, and equal opportunities for minorities. Nonetheless, other parties have used the expression without any explanation. For example, even though Hatnua has stressed socio-economic issues in its platform – "portrait of the economy that allows social justice" – an explanation for what it means by social justice is lacking. By and large the term social justice was very often employed automatically without any explanation, thus indicating that the expression has been taken for granted in the political discourse in Israel. This finding points to the notion that political parties have framed key terms of the social protests in such a way to adjust themselves to an emergent social discourse; in face of these results one can plausibly assert that the Israeli political discourse has been shaped by the terminology the 2011 social movement has brought up.

As noted, the parties did not use the phrase "cost of living" before the 2013 national elections. It was interesting to find out that in the 2013 political platforms apart from Habait Hayehudi and Shas, all parties have made some reference to the issue "cost of living" and have offered concrete policies to handle this problem. One illustration appears in Yesh Atid's political platform, in which the party argues that "the purpose of the nine points program to deep socio-economic changes in Israel is to redefine the national priorities, lower the cost of living, and to bring a significant improvement in the daily life of Israeli citizens (…)". In the same way, Hatnua party suggests concrete policies to lower the cost of living: "a differential value added tax (VAT) will be defined when the VAT on basic goods, on essential goods, and on products for babies and children do not increase up to 5% while the VAT on luxury goods will reach 25%". These statements find support in the theoretical assumption that discourse shifts occur when policy makers suddenly find themselves faced with unusual political economic problems for which the current discourse offers no clear-cut solutions (Dobbin 1993, P. Hall 1993, and Hay 2001). In effect, the results point to an interesting phenomenon: When political discourses cannot adequately respond to socio-economic crisis, a search for new discourses that appear logical to conform to the social normative expectations begins. By

strategically translating the social discourse into policy programs Yesh Atid and Hatnua have explicitly attempt to legitimize their policies to the public.

Regarding the use of the term "affordable housing" it was found that all parties [with the exception of Habait Hayehudi] have employed this expression in their platforms, devoting a separate chapter to this subject, in which the parties bring details of their policy plans in dealing with this issue. For instance, at the beginning of the chapter "housing" in Kadima's platform, the party describes well the importance of this topic and its relation to the 2011 social protests; the party states that "the housing distress in Israel that has led to the outbreak of the social protests has demonstrated that many young people today feel insecure." In fact, in all the political platforms the issue of affordable housing was the most detailed subject and the one that has constantly been accompanied by concrete policies designed to change the current situation. One notable finding is that each party offers solutions for the housing issue to different target audiences – this point will be explored in depth in the next section in which it is examined how the political parties address these audiences.

In relation to the election promos we found that the term "social justice" was the most repeated term by the great majority of the political parties that have addressed socio-economic issues in their promos. For example, Meretz claimed in one of its campaign promos that "those who still believe in social justice will vote for Meretz – since this is a small effort to make a stronger left camp". In addition, in Hadash's promos the party stresses that "Hadash is the party that demands a true social justice". From a quantitative standpoint, seven out of 12 political parties currently in office at the Knesset referred in their promos to socio-economic issues. In respect to the use of this terminology, only four parties have used one of them (Labor, Meretz, Hadash and Hatnua); the other parties (Shas, United Torah Judaism, Balad) have mentioned socio-economic issues, but with a different concern for the poor, child allowances, help to minorities, and the like. As for the previous examinationa, this one shows that references to the protests' terminology were mostly made by leftist political parties. It is relevant to point out that this data somehow contradicts thay provided by the Israel Democracy Index which showed that 52.7% of respondents think that the demand for social justice is not a political requirement compared to 40.6% who think it is a political demand.

Since any analysis of previous electoral promos has been made, there is no room for a comparative interpretation. Even so, there definitely were some references to the social protest's terminology, i.e., mentions to its central concepts in the promos released in 2013.

These data are compatible with the results of the analysis of the parties' platforms, which showed a drastic increase in the use of these terms in the elections of 2006 and 2009 in comparison to the 2013 national election.[9] In effect, the compatibility refers to the extensive use of the protest's vocabulary in both the promos and the platforms. As predicted, the use of these terms has become more common in the eve of the 2013 national elections held one year and a half after the protests.

Audiences

This parameter refers to three cleavages: economic left and right cleavage, Jewish-Arab cleavage, and class cleavage. In 'Solidarity in the 2011 Summer's Protest' Herman and Haber (2012) explain that the demands for justice in its broadest sense has brought about an atmosphere of false solidarity; in effect, the protests' participants were predominantly young, secular, with a higher than average income and standing on the left side of the political spectrum. In light of this analysis we examined whether the parties' platforms made an explicit call for one or another public. In other words, we investigated the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion within the platforms; in so doing, a rigorous analysis of the way the parties addressed some groups in detriment of others in their platforms was made. In order to cope with the inherent complexity of the audiences that have been addressed we adopted the model proposed by Lissak and Horowitz (1990); the model conceptualize social division and social cohesion in terms of five cleavages: (1) the class divide; (2) the religious-secular divide; (3) the Jewish-Arab cleavage; the ethnic cleavage, and (5) the ideological divide [which takes into consideration the economic left and right].[10] To obtain more information about the parties' political discourses in terms of social cleavages see table 4 in the appendix.

Economic Left and Right

From the analysis of the political platforms it was found that Labor, Meretz, Shas and Hadash all hold economic leftist ideological tendencies and demonstrate support for both the adoption of a social-democratic political system and the enlargement of the welfare state. Nonetheless, despite the similarities there are also some differences between these parties; for instance, even though the Labor Party declares that it advocates a social-democratic political

---

[9] See Herman, Tamar, Yuval Lebel, Ella Heller and Nir Atmor. 2012. *The Israel Democracy Index 2012,* Jerusalem: The Israel Democracy Institute.

[10] We chose not to use neither the religious-secular cleavage nor the ethnic divide because from our analysis arise that both the political platforms and the campaign promos do not address these divides at all. For this basic reason, there is no theoretical or empirical purpose to discuss them here.

model it claims that "along with the existence of a prosperous free market, the Labor Party aims to renew the welfare state model and to adapt it to the new times, strengthening the public service and stopping the privatization process." Meretz, on the other hand, states that the party supports "reasonable economic policies, which are just and clean (…) it believes in the welfare state and in a strong public sector (…) in the reduction of inequalities and in regulation and supervision (…) struggle against concentration and [struggle] for stopping privatizations." Similarly, Shas demands "the basis of the State of Israel as a welfare state." The present analysis also found that Meretz and Hadash associate the socio-economic policies to foreign issues. For example, Hadash's platform states: "The people's quest for social justice can not be realized as long as the occupation continues." In Meretz's platform it is written: "Meretz believes that you cannot disconnect the economic from the civic and the political. For this reason, it claims for a political solution in the long run with real welfare for all Israeli citizens and with an economic growth that uses all full economic potential Israel possesses." It was interesting to note that in the Labor's platform of 2009 there was a clear association between economic and political issues; an association that does not appear in its 2013 election platform.

In contrast to the above parties, Hatnua, Yesh Atid, and Habait Hayehudi all share the same socio-economic ideology based on the existence of a free and competitive market alongside regulation. In Yesh Atid's platform the party states that the "debate currently taking place between the capitalist neo-liberalism represented by Likud, and the clear socialist positions taken by Labor, it is our perception that we face a debate between dogmatic and outdated visions (…) it is up to the Israeli economy to adapt itself to the Israeli DNA, thus compromising itself to the right combination between capitalism on the one hand (…) and regulation on the other." Habait Hayehudi declares that they will promote "free economy alongside social sensitivity by improving the educational system, strengthening competitiveness, breaking large monopolies, and lowering taxes". Hatnua's goal is to set "actualized view that comes against both the neo-conservative conception and the old political socialism." Nonetheless, it is important to note that unlike Yesh Atid and Habait Hayehudi, and like Meretz and Hadash, Hatnua bridges the changes in economic policy to that in political policies; as it states in its platform "only a political breakthrough will promote the progress of our economy and society."

This analysis establishes a theoretical dialogue with Talshir's findings (Talshir, 2013: 11) in her recent research on the 2011 social protests in Israel. The author argues that " (…)

two views almost contradictory in economic terms – on the one hand, the view of free market consumerism that seeks to remove the restrictions and to reduce taxation, supervision and government intervention, and, on the other hand, the view that seeks to restore state responsibility in areas of basic education, social work and health (…) were born and have been going a long way together in the protests of the summer of 2011." In essence, Talshir argues that the ability of these two opposing concepts to go a long way together was the protests' hallmark and its main strength. As has been shown throughout the present analysis of the ideological cleavage, one can reasonably assume that Yesh Atid, Hatnua, and Habait Hayehudi have combined in their platforms these two conceptions; this finding explains how the social protest has affected the political discourse – these parties, which show explicit support for neoliberal policies, have found a 'electoral balance' with the idea of bringing back the state responsibility for basic socio-economic areas.

In contrast to all the parties that have published a 2013 election platform, Kadima does not make any explicit reference to possible economic policies. In its political platform there is no part dedicated to economic policy exclusively; there is a chapter devoted to social issues under the title "social justice." The present research found just one sentence in Kadima's platform under the topic "budget principles" which says that these principles refers to "decreasing the volume of "black economy", changing tax policy, and encouraging employment." This finding teaches us that Kadima has opted for not detailing its economic ideology on the one hand, and for widely using the social protests' terminology on the other. Perhaps the decision for not presenting its economic identity along with its social identity [as if it supports the social justice protest requirements and deals with costs of living and affordable housing], is actually a political strategy to embrace as many social groups as possible in its popular appeal.

The Arab-Jewish Cleavage

It is important to note that not all the parties refer to this aspect; hence, the findings are related only to part of them. One of the most striking findings is that Labor and Yesh Atid direct their attentions to the Zionist public. For example, Labor's platform states that "Labor Party is a Zionist and social-democratic party." Interestingly, the party writes "Zionist" before "social-democratic", which points to the primary importance of positioning itself as a Zionist party. In contrast, Habait Hayehudi referred to the Jewish public rather than to the Zionist one; as it declares in its platform: "We will work to strengthen the Jewish character of the

state, and will fight against all those who are working to turn Israel into a state for all its citizens." This statement clearly shows that Habait Hayehudi excludes the Israeli Arabs from its public target. On the other hand, Hadash's platform states: "We call for all those who agree with the principles of Hadash, Jews and Arabs, men and women, to support the party in the upcoming election".

<u>The Class Cleavage – The Middle Class, Lower-Middle Classes, and Lowest Class</u>

In their political platforms, Yesh Atid, Labor, Meretz and Hatnua address mainly the middle class. Yesh Atid, for example, directly addresses the middle class population by saying that its proposed economic plan is designed to "improve the conditions of the middle class, the worker, and of those who serve and are not able to finish the month." Labor's leader wrote in the platform opening that

"(…) the disintegration of workers basic rights and the erosion of their abilities to enjoy a life with financial and emotional security, have not been a issue for a long time, and it runs down at an alarming rate to the shrinking and eroding middle class. The middle class (…) is the class that predominantly carries the burden (…) real growth is to strengthen and expand this class, and not to let it down. Without it there is no country."

Meretz refers to the middle class and low-income groups; in the opening remarks of its platform's socio-economic section Meretz states that "to the young Israelis there is no economic security and the middle class is getting weaker everyday. The main victims of the socio-economic policies implemented by the current Israeli government are the disadvantaged populations." In contrast, Shas and Hadash address primarily disadvantaged groups. For instance, Hadash addresses migrant workers, Arabs, women, the disabled, children and the elderly. On the other hand, Shas addresses the same groups with the exception of Arabs and migrant workers. It is important to point out that in all the 2013 political platforms we found some reference to disadvantaged groups; nonetheless, in a comparative vein, Meretz, Labor, Hatnua, Kadima, and Yesh Atid address specifically the middle class, while Habait Hayehudi, Shas and Hadash do not make any direct appeal to this audience. Table 3 shows the overall reference to the middle class.

How often refers to Middle Class

Yesh Atid	Hatnua	Hadash	Juwish Home	Meretz	Shas	Kadima	Labor
8	1			4		1	5

Table 3. References to the middle-class in the election promos.

	Ideological Cleavage	**Arab-Jewish Cleavage**	**Class Cleavage**
Kadima	-	-	-
Yesh Atid	Free Market	Zionist	Middle Class
Hatnua	Free Market (State Dependency)	-	Middle Class
Labor	Social-Democracy (State Dependency)	Zionist	Middle Class
Shas	Social-Democracy	Jewish	Lower Classes
Hadash	Social-Democracy (State Dependency)	Jewish and Arab	Lower Classes
Meretz	Social-Democracy (State Dependency)	-	Middle and Lower Classes
Habait Hayehudi	Free Market	Jewish	-

Table 4. Analysis of political parties' discourses by social cleavages (Lissak and Horowitz's model).

As predicted, each party has framed its messages in such a way as to address them to specific audiences; this finding becomes clear when considering the proposed policies on housing the parties have made in their political platform. While Hadash, Meretz, and Shas present solutions for the 'housing issue' for disadvantaged groups, Yesh Atid, Labor, and Hatnua do not bring any solution for this audience at all. Hadash refers to housing solutions for handicaps, Meretz for the homeless and the Arab minority, and Shas for the elderly, single mothers and handicaps. Furthermore, Labor and Yesh Atid clearly state that the housing solutions are designed for the middle class. Among other things, Labor's platform claims that there must be significant interference in the housing market in favor of the middle class.

As previously said, most of the participants in the protest were young, Jewish, secular, and members of the middle class. In light of this observation it was reasonable to expect the political parties to address this audience, as they actually did. Nonetheless, the present analysis shows with more accuracy the dynamics between the parties and the audiences. In effect, it enables a deeper understanding of the inherent complexity of the audiences the political parties addressed in their platforms and election promos in general, and of the link between the various publics present in the 2011 social protests and the appeal the different parties have made for them in particular. In this way it would be reasonable to make an analytical distinction between three different audiences that took part in the demonstrations in terms of the different audiences the parties addressed to. First, the central nucleus of the protest included people with leftist ideological positions, members of an economic middle-class – the political parties that addressed this audience were Labor and Meretz. Second, another public was composed by persons holding a leftist ideology, but who are members of lower economic classes – Shas and Hadash were the main parties particularly addressing to this audience. Third, there were protesters who stands on the right pole of the ideological-political spectrum (seeking to balance this concept by demanding the State to take responsibility for fundamental areas, while claiming for the reduction of the costs of living and demanding social justice); they were predominantly economic middle class members – Yesh Atid, Hatnua, and, in some way, Habait Hayehudi have specially focused on this audience.

By and large, the analysis developed here and the findings that emerge from it support our hypothesis that, in the eve of the 2013 national elections, the political parties addressed those audiences that have taken part of the 2011 protests.

Discussion

In this paper we brought an alternative analysis of government responsiveness to social demands; specifically, it examined the influence of the 2011 social protests that took place in Israel on the formal politics prior to the 2013 national elections. From the discursive analysis made throughout arise some explanations for the results of the 2013 national elections; in effect, the present research created a new political map made up of three new economic blocs. The first block consists of Likud Beiteinu (31 seats combined). In its electoral campaign, this party has emphasized neoliberal policies. The second block consists of Labor, Meretz, Hadash and Shas (33 seats combined); these parties have focused on the requirements for a more socio-democratic approach. Finally, the third block consists of three new parties, namely Yesh Atid, Hatnua, and Habait Hayehudi (37 seats combined). These parties were able to accomodate social democratic elements to neoliberal policies. This block, it must be said, was the winner of the 2013 national election by gaining the greatest number of seats in the current Knesset.

The perception of these three parties as winners finds support in Talshir (2013) analysis of the 2011 social protests. The author argues that participation in the protests must not be homogeneously conceived; instead, a close look at the participants shows that they must be divided into 'more activists', what Talshir calls the movement's inner circles, and 'less activists', the outer circles. In light of this perception, a theoretical parallel can be traced between the movement's participatory circles and the audiences described in this paper. The parallel applies if we assume that the 2013 national elections have been partially determined by the focus each party has given to the different audiences (circles) that have participated in the demonstrations; in addition, those parties that have addressed the audiences with an integrated approach have been the most successful. In fact, a more rigorous analysis of the election results in terms of the present findings related to discourse shifts and audience addressee shows that those parties with ambivalent discourses, i.e., composed by neoliberal and socio-democratic elements, have successfully reached the electorate. In this sense, it would be reasonable to assert that those who have identified with the protests and those who have taken part in some demonstrations (outer circles of protesters) have seen this ambivalence positively; in contrast, the movements leaders, the more assiduous participants,

and the organizers (inner circles of protesters) have seen this integrated approach negatively, thus flowing leftwards in the political spectrum. In this sense, Yesh Atid, Hatnua, and Habait Hayehudi's ambivalent discourse, which addressed 'less activist' participants, has apparently paid off; on the other hand, Labor, Meretz, Shas, and Hadash's social democratic claims have reached just the movement's core participants, thus being relatively less successful in the elections. This analysis points to the fact that most of the voters in 2013 have not fully challenged the current neoliberal ideology, but, rather, have wanted to make only small adjustments in it.

It is important to note that the main contribution of this study is its different perspective of the social protests. In effect, this study shows that the protest does not belong only to the social democratic stream, as it would intuitively been supposed; a more accurate analysis shows that the protests' discourse have been used differently by the political parties, being modified and adapted to their interests. In this sense, it turns out that the protests have been framed in such a way to address specific audiences the political parties conceived as important electorates; the success of Yesh Atid and Habait Hayehudi in the 2013 national elections is an illustration of the adaptive power of social discourses to political interests. Specifically, their ability to find a middle-point in between the 'leftist' social democratic claims and the 'rightist' neoliberal current policies were echoed in the social support given in the national elections.

Overall, the present research has filled an empirical lacuna in the literature; a lacuna related to bottom-up processes of political discourses formation. Nonetheless, this qualitative examination is far from definitive in describing the effects of the social protests on the Israeli formal politics; in fact, further research is necessary to investigate whether the social protests' requirement have been translated into practical policies or not. The results of this possible research would not just dialogue with the findings presented here, but also would more accurately picture the relationship between social and political discourses in Israel. The case of the 2011 social protest in Israel was certainly a turning point in the Israeli life in terms of the symbolical world that has been built upon its discourse; in this sense, an examination of its political implications remains an open question for further research.

References

Alexander, J. and P. Smith. 1993. The Discourse of American Civil Society: a New Proposal for Cultural Studies. *Theory Sociology* 22: pp. 151-207.

Alimi, E. 2012. Occupy Israel: A Tale of Startling Success and Hopeful Failure, *Social Movement Studies* 11: pp. 402-7.

Anthony, D. D. Heckathorn, and S. Maser. 1994. Rational Rhetoric in Politics: the Debate Over Ratifying the U.S. Constitution. *Rationality and Society* 6: pp. 489-518.

Arrow, K. 1963. *Social Choice and Individual Values*. New York: John Wiley and Sons.

Block, F. 1990. *Postindustrial Possibilities*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Bourdieu, P. 1998. *Acts of Resistance*. New York: New Press.

Cohen, J. and A. Arato. 1992. *Civil Society and Political Theory*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Dahl, R. 1956. *A Preface to Democratic Theory*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Dobbin, F. 1993. The Social Construction of the Great Depression: Industrial Policy During the 1930s in the United States, Britain, and France. *Sociological Theory* 22: pp. 1-56.

Fligstein, N. and I. Maria-Drita. 1996. How to Make a Market: Reflections on the Attempt to Create a Single Market in European Union. *American Journal of Sociology* 102: pp. 1-32.

Gamson, W. 1992. *Talking Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Go, J. 1999. Colonial Reception and Cultural Reproduction: Filipino Elites and United States Tutelary Rule. *Journal of Historical Sociology* 12: pp. 337-68.

Goldstein, J. 1993. *Ideas, Interests, and American Trade Policy*. New York: Cornell University Press.

Habermas, J. 1994. Three Normative Models of Democracy. *Constellations* 1: pp. 1-10.

Hall, P. 1993. Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: the Case of Economic Policy-Making in Britain. *Comparative Politics* 25: pp. 275-96.

Hall, P. 1989. *The Political Power of Economic Ideas*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Hay, C. Narrating Crisis: the Discursive Construction of the 'Winter of Discontent'. *Sociology* 30: pp. 253-77.

Hay, C. 2001. The 'Crisis' of Keynesianism and the Rise of Neoliberalism in Britain. In *The Rise of Neoliberalism and Institutional Analysis*, ed. J. Campbell, O. Pedersen, pp. 193-218. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Herman, T., Y. Lebel, E. Heller, and N. Atmor. 2012. *The Israel Democracy Index 2012,* Jerusalem: The Israel Democracy Institute.

Lipset, S. 1996. *American Exceptionalism.* New York: Norton.

March, J. and J. Olsen. 1989. *Rediscovering Institutions.* New York: Free Press.

Martinez, E., and A. Garcia. 1997. What is Neoliberalism? A Brief Definition for Activists. *National Network for Immigrants and Refugee Rights* 1: pp. 1-2.

Page, B. and R. Shapiro. 1983. Effects of Public Opinion on Policy. *The American Political Science Review* 77: pp. 175-90.

Przeworski, A. 1985. *Capitalism and Social Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ram, U. and D. Filc. The Rise and (so far) Demise of Social Protest in Israel (forthcoming).

Rein, M. and C. Winship. 1997. Policy Entrepreneurs and the Academic Establishment: Truth and Values in Social Controversies. In *Intelligence, Political Inequality and Public Policy*, ed. E. White, pp. 17-48. New York: Praeger.

Risse-Kappen, T. 1994. Ideas do not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War. *International Organization* 48: pp. 185-214.

Schon D., and M. Rein. 1994. *Frame Reflection*. New York: Basic.

Schumpeter, J. 1942. *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy.* New York: Harper & Row.

Sen, A. 1970. Simulation of Public Opinion: a Caveat. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 39: pp. 331-41.

Snow, D., B. Rochford, S. Worden and R. Benford. 1986. Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation. *American Sociology Review* 51: pp. 464-81.

Snow, D. and R. Benford. 1992. Master Frames and Cycles of Protest. In *Frontiers in Social Movements Theory*, ed. A. Morris and C. Muller, pp. 133-55. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Suchman, M. 1997. On Beyond Interest: Rational, Normative and Cognitive Perspectives in the Social Scientific Study of Law. *Wisconsin Law Review* 3: pp. 475-501.

Swidler, A. 1986. Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies. *American Sociology Review* 51: pp. 273-86.

Talshir, G. (Forthcoming). From Protests to Election.

Tarrow, S. 1994. *Power in Movement.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Weir, M. and T. Skocpol. 1985. State Structures and the Possibilities for 'Keynesian' Responses to the Great Depression in Sweden, Britain, and the United States. In *Bringing the State Back In*, ed. P. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer, and T. Skocpol, pp. 107-68. New York: Cambridge University Press.

הורוביץ, דן ומשה ליסק (1990) *מצוקות באוטופיה: ישראל-חברה בעומס יתר*, תל אביב: הוצאת עם עובד, תשי"ן.

הרמן, תמר וכרמית הבר (2012) *סולידריות במחאת קיץ 2011- בין דימוי למציאותג*, ירושלים: המכון הישראלי לדמוקרטיה.

פדהצור, עמי וקנאטי דפנה (2001) "מצעי בחירות כראי לתמורות בהיקף תפקודה של המפלגה הישראלית: הליכוד והעבודה בין מדינה לחברה", *פוליטיקה* 7, עי"מ 15 -31.

צפתי, י, שפר,ת. ווימן, ג. (2010) *המלחמה על סדר היום: המערכה בעזה ומערכת הבחירות 2009 בתקשורת, הבחירות בישראל- 2009* בערכית א. אריאן ומ.שמיר, עי"מ 301- 332.

Appendix

Direct reference to the protest in the parties' platforms of 2013

Table 2. Direct reference to the 2011 protests

Codebook.

הערות	סימון המשתנה	קטגוריות המשתנה	המשתנה
לפי מספר המפלגה שניתן לה	V1-	1.העבודה 2.הליכוד 3.קדימה 4.ש"ס 5.ישראל ביתנו 6.מרצ 7.הבית היהודי 8.יהדות התורה 9.חד"ש 10.בל"ד 11.התנועה 12.יש עתיד 13.איחוד לאומי	**כללי: לאיזו מפלגה שייך המצע?**
	V2- 0,1	0-תקופה א' (עד בחירות 2013) 1-תקופה ב' (בחירות 2013)	**1.בלתי-תלוי: זמן**
V10- פירוט בהמשך דף הקידוד לכל משתנה בנפרד. בניית סולם לכל ששת המדדים שנע	V10-	1-אחוז מתוך כל מצע המוקדש לנושא החברתי כלכלי 2-כמה פעמים מופיעות המילים:	**2.תלוי: סדר היום החברתי כלכלי של המפלגות**

פריט	קידוד/סולם	משתנה	אופן החישוב
"צדק-חברתי", "יוקר המחייה" ו"דיור בר השגה". 3. מה המיקום של הנושא החברתי-מדיני במצע ביחס לשאר הנושאים. 4.כמה פעמים מופיעות המילים: "מדינת רווחה", "מעמד ביניים" ו"פערים חברתיים". 5. האם קיימת תת כותרת במצע לנושא "חברתי כלכלי" 6. האם החינוך הוא חלק מהחברתי/כלכלי? 7. האם מופיעה התייחסות ברורה למחאה בקיץ 2011?			בין 0-התייחסות מינימאלית ל-1 התייחסות רבה
2.א'- אחוז מתוך כל מצע המוקדש לנושא החברתי כלכלי	משתנה רציף, אינטרוולי-המספר שיצוין יופיע באחוזים.	V3 -לדוגמא- 10% מתוך כלל המצע, 20% מתוך כלל המצע וכך הלאה.	האחוז יחושב לפי מספר השורות מתוך כלל המצע. לא נספר בחישוב: קבוצות מוחלשות (צעירים, נשים, גמלאים, נכים, בני מיעוטים, פריפריה, עולים), ספורט ותרבות,
2.ב'- כמה פעמים מופיעות המילים: "צדק חברתי", "יוקר מחיה" ו"דיור בר השגה"	משתנה רציף, אינטרוולי-המספר שיצויין יופיע באחוזים.	V4 -לדוגמא- 1 (פעם אחת), 2- (פעמיים) וכך הלאה.	חישוב סך כל המילים ביחד
2.ג'-מה המיקום של הנושא הכלכלי-חברתי במצע ביחס לשאר הנושאים.	משתנה רציף, אינטרוולי-המספר שיצויין יופיע באחוזים.	V5 -לדוגמא- 1 (ממוקם ראשון), 2 (ממוקם שני), 3 (ממוקם שלישי) וכך הלאה.	
2.ד'-כמה פעמים מופיעות המילים: "מדינת רווחה", "מעמד ביניים", "פערים חברתיים" (צמצום או סגירה)	משתנה רציף, אינטרוולי-המספר שיצויין יופיע באחוזים.	V6 -לדוגמא- 1 (פעם אחת), 2- (פעמיים) וכך הלאה.	חישוב סך כל המילים ביחד
2.ה'- האם קיימת תת כותרת במצע לנושא "חברתי כלכלי"	0-לא 1-כן	V7- 0,1	בחינת הכותרות בלבד. האם קיימת כותרת כזו.

בחינת היחס לחינוך. האם הוא מופיע כחלק מהנושא החברתי-כלכלי או כתת-נושא נפרד.	V8- 0,1	**2.ו'- האם החינוך הוא** 0-לא **חלק מהחברתי/כלכלי?** 1-כן
מוזכרת המילה מחאה בהקשר של מחאת קיץ 2011	V9- 0,1	**2.ז'- האם מופיעה** 0- לא **התייחסות ברורה** 1-כן **למחאה בקיץ 2011?**