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Voting for Extreme Right Wing Parties in Israel

Abstract:

Extreme right wing parties are no longer a marginal phenomenon in many democratic regimes. In Israel's most recent elections extreme right wing parties achieved considerable electoral success. Using the most recent Israel National Election Studies micro-data for the 2009 elections, we find evidence that political dissatisfaction and security issues significantly facilitate support for extreme right-wing parties. Contrary to our initial hypothesis however, our results suggest that economic views do not significantly increase one's support for extreme right wing parties.

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1) Introduction:

Extreme right wing parties are no longer a marginal phenomenon in many democratic regimes and extreme right wing parties have received considerable electoral support in Europe. For instance, in 2012, in the first round of the French political elections Marine Le-Pen from the French extreme right wing party achieved 18% of the French votes.¹ Accordingly, many scholars have tried to examine the factors that are attracting voters in many Western democracies to extreme right wing parties.

In this study, we sought out to determine which factors are responsible for the rising support in extreme right wing parties within the Israeli population. We propose three possible explanations for the escalation in followers of extreme right parties, through the use of current literature. Firstly, we posit that as the Israeli publics' level of dissatisfaction with their democratic political institutions and procedures increases, they become more likely to support extreme right-wing parties. Secondly, we propose that as economic conditions worsen, Israeli citizens are more likely to lend their support to extreme right-wing parties. Finally, we believe that if the Israeli public perceives that national security perspective is worsening, they will become more likely to support extreme right-wing parties.

We use a probit regressions model to check our hypotheses, using the most recent Israel National Election Studies micro-data for the 2009 elections. Our results show evidence that political dissatisfaction and security issues significantly facilitate support for extreme right-wing parties. Contrary to our initial hypothesis however, our

¹ See <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/26/world/europe/anger-at-sarkozy-fuels-far-right-party-in-france.html>

results suggest that economic views do not significantly increase one's support for extreme right wing parties.

The layout of the paper is as follows. Part 2 provides background on extreme right wing parties, and popular explanations for why people support extreme right wing parties. Part 3 describes our model. Part 4 discusses our data and operative definitions. Part 5 presents our results. Part 6 concludes.

2) Background:

In order to interpret the reasons for the rise in extreme right wing voting, it is important to clarify how to define extreme right wing parties. In addition, it is important to elucidate which explanations found in the literature for extreme right wing voting is most relevant for Israel. Accordingly, in this section, we discuss (1) extreme right wing parties (2) extreme right wing parties in Israel and (3) common explanations for why people support extreme right wing parties.

(A) Extreme Right Wing Parties

In the relevant literature, there are a variety of ways that scholars have defined extreme right wing parties. While some scholars have used a more 'general' definition, other scholars have tried identifying more 'particular' streams. One difficulty in finding an agreed upon definition is that political parties and movements that are considered to be extreme or radical right have emerged in many countries and on many occasions, since at least the early nineteenth century (Husbands 2001). Thus, a definition of extreme right wing parties and movements tends to be extensive since it encompasses a diverse variety of parties and movements. In terms of a general definition, the International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral sciences explains that when political scientists use the term, they mean to designate parties that are characterized by: (1) selective inclusion; (2) selective exclusion; (3) racism; (4)

and anti-pluralist political perspectives.² Similarly, the Manifesto Project maps out political parties on a left-right continuum using a Rile score which is a combination of a very wide range of variables.³

In terms of a more specific definition, Ignazi (1992) identifies an 'old' type of extreme right wing parties and a 'new' type. According to Ignazi (1992,) the vote for the 'new' West European extreme right wing parties can be explained by several clusters of attitudinal positions; anti-immigrant attitudes, favorable in-group attitudes, authoritarian attitudes, and political dissatisfaction. Similarly, Sprinzak (1991) identifies two disparate extreme right wing models: the European "classical" radical right and the American postwar radical right. Interestingly, while the European extreme right wing has been ideologically related to the model of revolutionary fascism, the American extreme right wing has been reactionary and conservative (Sprinzak 1991; Pedahzur 2001).

We found that in the Israeli context the 'particular' definitions were more helpful (and easier to operationalize) than the 'general' explanations. In the next section, we define extreme right wing parties in Israel.

(B) Extreme Right Wing Parties in Israel

²The encyclopedia defines selective inclusion as the consolidation process which builds up the first party members, accounting for the origin of an extreme right wing party. The inclusion is usually based upon imposed assumptions about ethnic and religious similarity. Selective exclusion is usually directed against "the others", who are not in the group. Usually it is against foreigners, indigenous peoples, immigrant ethnic minorities, or even homosexuals. Racism is based upon biological perspectives relying on ethnic and cultural boundaries. Finally, all these attitudes result in anti-pluralist political perspectives.

³The Manifesto project defines a Rile score as "a measure of party positions on the left-right axis. It ranges from -100 (extreme left) to 100 (extreme right) and is calculated by subtracting the added percentages of left scores from the added percentages of right scores. The formula was developed in Laver and Budge Party Policy and Government Coalitions (1992)." In addition, the method is subjected to an extensive analytical scrutiny, also known as the 'standard' method. It is used for a more specific cases analysis, built out of seven marker variables (consisting of 28 items) that are factor analyzed together with all the remaining items, known as the 'standard' L-R scale. Also it is important to mention, that Laver and Budge (1992, 22) agree that the 'major check' to the method should be 'the extent to which it generates results that make sense within countries'.

Traditionally, the definition of Israel's extreme right refers exclusively to issues of land and security, and more specifically, the future of the territories occupied in the Six Day War. However, Pedahzur (2001) argues that the extreme right in Israel should not be defined exclusively based upon "territorial maximalist" issues, but upon definitions found in many European political systems, as Ignazi(1992) claimed. Thus, Pedahzur (2001) defines two types of extreme right wing parties in Israel: "old" and "new".⁴ The "old" extreme right is based on hawkish positions on territorial issues, and includes parties such as Tsomet and Moledet. In addition, Pedahzur (2001) defines the "new" extreme right wing as parties which espouse views that are motivated by nationalism, racism, anti-democracy, xenophobia and the declining of pluralistic democracy. On this basis, Pedahzur defines "Shas" and "Yisrael Beiteinu" as extreme right wing parties since these parties espouse nondemocratic values and are doing their best to harm the Israeli democratic structure.⁵ We would like to use Pedahzur's definition and examine how it fits the contemporary Israeli reality.

In Figure 1, we show how extreme right wing parties have fared over the last 20 years in Israel. We define the "new" extreme right wing as Yisrael Beiteinu or Shas, and "old" as seats for Haichud Haleumi, Mafdal, Moledet, and Tzomet.⁶ The figure shows that while the "old" extreme right has declined in power over the last 20 years, the "new" extreme right has grown and flourished as already been shown by Ignazi(1992) at west European countries. According to the figure, the "new" extreme right wing has grown from 6 electoral seats in the 1992 elections to 26 seats in the

⁴Pedahzur (2001) notes that the "old" extreme right wing appeared in the late 70's, flourished in the 80's, but declined in the 90's (See also Figure 1).

⁵For example, Shas conducted an incitement campaign against the Israeli High Court of Justice after one of its party's senior parliament members was accused and found guilty in bribery.

⁶Definitions based upon Pedahzur (2001). It is also interesting to note that all of the parties (which passed the electoral threshold) received high right wing rile scores in the 1999 elections – a measurement for the ideological party platform – in the Manifesto Project <https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/countries/72-israel>. See also Table 3, which locates the parties in 2009 in ideological space.

2009 elections, while the "old" extreme right wing has declined from 17 seats in the 1992 elections to 7 seats in the 2009 elections. In total, the figure indicates that extreme right wing parties enjoyed considerable success in Israel's most recent elections, and that their combined electoral strength accounts for 33 seats—more than 25% percent of parliamentary seats.

In our model, we consider several different definitions: (a) the "old" definition defined by its hawkish views on the occupied territories and the Arab–Israeli conflict; (b) a "newer" definition similar to those of the European extreme right; (c) an "expansive" definition which includes both the "old" and "new" extreme right wing parties. The next section explores the possible reasons why voters are attracted in such large numbers to extreme right wing parties in Israel.

(C) Explanations for Supporting Extreme Right Wing Parties

Recent scholarship has analyzed extreme right-wing voting behavior, and offered many explanations for why extreme right-wing parties have become so popular in many Western countries. Several studies on Europe see the rise in extreme right wing voting as reflecting anti-immigration attitudes (Pettigrew 1998; Lubbers et al. 2002). Other studies emphasize economic factors (Kniegge 1998). Studies on the USA emphasize the role of religious fundamentalism (Woodberry and Smith 1998). These studies indicate that many factors may contribute to the escalation of extreme right wing parties. Consequently, we consider economic, political and cultural explanations for extreme right wing voting.

(i) Economic Factors

We propose that as perceptions of economic conditions worsen, Israeli citizens are more likely to lend their support to extreme right-wing parties. Support for an 'economic explanation' of right-wing extremism is noted by many scholars (Kitschelt

1995). However, while some scholars believe that regular economic interests or fears will cause extreme right wing voting, others maintain that only a severe and large-scale economic crisis will cause extreme right wing voting. According to the former view, regular economic fears drag the political system towards extremism. In this vein, some scholars have examined socio-economic reasons or even family background as explanations for extreme right wing voting (Knigge 1998), while others scholars have focused on economic interests (Lipset 1960; Falter & Klein 1994). According to the latter view, only a serious economic crisis will move voters towards the extreme right wing (Tuftte 1978; Lewis-Beck 1988; Kiewiet and Rivers 1984). In fact, Knigge (1998) finds that voters do not move towards the radical right wing due to a declining national economy.⁷

(ii) Political Dissatisfaction

We posit that as the Israeli publics' level of dissatisfaction with their democratic political institutions and procedures increases, they become more likely to support extreme right-wing parties. A vote for an extreme right-wing party is commonly viewed as a means of political protest, and several scholars have found that these parties appeal to disaffected and alienated voters (Westle and Niedermayer 1994, Betz 1992, Knigge, 1998). Dalton (1988) argues that many Western European voters have lost confidence in mainstream political parties and institutions due to political corruption, and the new extreme right has mobilized to attract these voters. According to Lipset and Raab (1978), extreme right wing voting increases in a time of political instability since people are motivated to preserve the status quo. Thus,

⁷Other research has noted that economic voting has an effect in both directions – left and right - and that the directional shift is dependent on a country's political context (Powell 1993). We believe that in the Israeli political context, an economic crisis will pull the electoral power towards the right. For instance, Shalev (1992) argues that because of Israel's social past - when the Labor party (identified with the left-wing) was hegemonic - the public will move more towards the right during an economic crisis.

extreme right wing voting might be a product of a split in one of the major political parties or an escalation in the political conflict.

(iii) Security and Peace

We believe that if the Israeli public perceives that national security perspective is worsening, they will become more likely to support extreme right-wing parties. Many scholars have noted in Israel that security issues have the biggest influence over the Israel voting patterns. Shalev and Levi (2003) note that security, peace, and the use of force against threats is one of the most embedded reasons that make Israeli voters give their trust towards a specific candidate. Herman (1992) notes that since the "Likud Revolution" in 1977, security reasons play the largest role in electoral politics. Finally, Arian and Shamir (1999) note that both sides of the political map (left and right) claim to be "experts" on security issues.⁸

To summarize, latent public support for extreme right-wing parties in Israel is hypothesized to be a function of three major determinants. First, rising support is expected to be linked to one's economic perspective. Second, rising levels of public dissatisfaction with the political regime is expected to be positively related to support for extreme right-wing parties. Finally, concerns for Israel's security, and peace, are expected to be positively correlated with extreme right wing views. In the next section, we outline the model used to check these hypotheses.

3) Probit model:

Since our outcome variable – extreme right wing voting – is dichotomous, and measures the tendency for right wing voting, we are unable to use an OLS regression

⁸For example, Benjamin Netanyahu's slogan in the 1999 election campaign was "A Strong leader for the future of Israel". Another noteworthy example of Israel's security discourse and its role as a leading element at the Israeli elections concerns Tzipi Livni -- a serious candidate for the prime minister position in the most recent elections. Toward the end of the political race, slogans emerged that the position was "Too big for her"; that this was not a job for a woman mainly because of her inability to understand and control security threats (Gadalia, Herzog and Shamir, 2009).

model. Instead, we use a Probit model.⁹ We denote extreme right wing political views by a latent underlying variable ξ_i , and describe its link to the subject's response Y_i as:

$$1. \quad \xi_i = \begin{cases} \xi_i \leq 0 & Y_i = 0 \\ \xi_i > 0 & Y_i = 1 \end{cases}$$

This means that when ξ_i crosses 0, a fresh hold that can be generalized to any value θ , using simple linear transformation, subject i states that they will vote for an extreme right party. Conversely, this means that once a subject right of a certain point on the continuum, they will vote for an extreme right party, indicating this vote by $Y_i = 1$. For the purpose of our research we model the latent variable ξ_i , which denotes each subject's attitudes toward an extreme right party, as the function of a set of ordinal explanatory variables $X_i = (X_{i1}, X_{i2}, X_{i3})$ that respectively represent their attitudes toward political, economic and security issues. Had we been able to estimate our latent variable it would be:

$$2. \quad \xi_i = \alpha + \beta_1 X_{i1} + \beta_2 X_{i2} + \beta_3 X_{i3} + \varepsilon_i$$

($\varepsilon_i \sim N(0,1)$ iid, where the normal CDF is denoted by $\Phi(\varepsilon_i)$)

Here the latent variable ξ_i is a function of a constant intercept, α , which we assume to be the same for all the subjects (it can be interpreted as an initial tendency toward voting for the extreme right); of the explanatory variables $X_i = (X_{i1}, X_{i2}, X_{i3})$, where each unit contributes the value of the corresponding coefficient $\beta = (\beta_1, \beta_2, \beta_3)$; and the independently, identically, normally distributed errors ε_i 's that represent the random deviation of subject i from her right wing views, as predicted by the model.¹⁰

⁹It should be noted that we do not use a logistic model since we consider extreme right wing views, as quantified by the tendency for extreme right wing voting, to be normally distributed; few people fiercely oppose all right wing views, most are indifferent or moderately inclined, some people hold right wing views, while few are right extremists. If extreme right wing voting was a dichotomous choice, a logistic model would have been more appropriate. We are greatly indebted to Dr. Pazit Ben-Nun Bloom for this insight.

¹⁰One may argue that the deviations do not necessary come from a standard normal distribution. However, provided a sufficiently large sample, this difficulty is resolved by the Central Limit Theorem.

Since ξ_i cannot be directly observed, we estimate the propensity for extreme right wing voting by modeling π_i , the propensity of subject i to place herself in the extreme right, by utilizing the assumption we made regarding the standard normality of ε_i 's:

$$3. \pi_i = P(Y_i = 1) = P(\xi_i > 0) = P(\alpha + X_i\beta + \varepsilon_i > 0) = P(\alpha + X_i\beta > -\varepsilon_i) = \Phi(\alpha + X_i\beta)$$

This is widely known as the “Probit” model.

The odds ratio can be presented as the ratio of the probability that subject i places herself in the extreme right $\pi_i = P(Y_i = 1)$, to the probability that she places herself elsewhere on the scale $1 - \pi_i = P(Y_i = 0)$:

$$4. P(Y_i = 1)/P(Y_i = 0) = \pi_i / (1 - \pi_i) = \frac{\Phi(\alpha + X_i\beta)}{1 - \Phi(\alpha + X_i\beta)} = \frac{\Phi(\alpha + X_i\beta)}{\Phi(-(\alpha + X_i\beta))}$$

It is important to note that the marginal effects of the independent variables are not fixed, but rather depend on where we are placed on the curve. Technically, computation of marginal effects at various points is possible; however, the theoretical reasons for choosing those points remain unclear. This complicates the interpretation of the Probit model, because when moving on the standard normal CDF curve, the marginal effects of the variables may change dramatically: adding 1 unit of the variable when we are placed around the middle gives very different marginal effect from adding the same unit 3 standard deviations to the right. Nevertheless, we choose the Probit model due to its superior theoretical foundations.

4. Data:

(A) Data Set and Operative Definitions:

We have in our possession the 2009 Israel National Election Study, whose principal investigators are Asher Arian and Michal Shamir. This data enables us to

define operatively our variables of interest since the election study addresses a wide range of attitudes towards various issues on the national agenda such as the peace process, socio-economic policy, state-religion relations; evaluation of parties, candidates, and coalitions; vote intention and past electoral behavior; and detailed demographic information. The study employs a panel design. The sample was divided in the pre-election survey into three weekly waves, where each wave consists of an independent representative sample of the electorate. The first wave was interviewed between January 18 and 25 (N=386); the second wave, between January 25-29 (N=411), and the third wave between February 1-5, 2009. The post-election second panel wave returned to 878 respondents. Interviews were conducted in Hebrew, Russian, and Arabic telephone interviews.

The overall sample has 1,210 respondents, and is a stratified sample of Jews and Arabs (1,037 Jews, 173 Arabs). The Jewish sample is a random sample of individuals from the Ministry of Interior's Listing of the population, to which mobile and fixed-line telephone numbers were fitted. The Arab sample is stratified by geographical areas with random sampling within each strata. We limit our analysis to non-Arabs since one would not expect the Arab community to support extreme right-wing parties for the same reasons as the Jewish community.

Our dependent variable, support for extreme right-wing parties, captures the percentage of electoral support for extreme right-wing parties in 2009. This measure is based on the post-election survey question which is worded as follows: "Which list did you vote for in the last elections to Knesset?"¹¹ As noted, we consider several

¹¹ We also considered using the pre-election survey question "If the elections for the Knesset were held today, for which list would you vote?" However, we found that 15% of the sample was undecided or debating which party to elect, and an additional 10 % of the sample did not intend to vote or refused to answer the question, which resulted in 741 observations. While the post-election survey measure has overall slightly fewer observations since fewer people responded to the post-election survey (N=638), we believe it is a more accurate measure since it reflects the actual vote choice, as opposed to the

different definitions: (a) the "old" definition, defined by its hawkish views on the occupied territories and the Arab–Israeli conflict (Haichud Haleumi); (b) a "newer" definition, similar to those of the European extreme right (Shas and Yisrael Beiteinu); (c) an "expansive" definition, which includes both the "old" and "new" extreme right wing parties.

Our independent variables measures are based on items found in the survey. Due to the format of the survey, we were unable to build measures built on several items, but relied on individual survey items. Political dissatisfaction is based on the pre-election survey question which is worded as follows: “What is your opinion on the way the government is handling the problems that exist in Israel today?” The item is on a 4 point scale (1-4), with higher scores representing a higher amount of dissatisfaction with the way that the government handles problems. One's perception of Israel's economy is based on the pre-election survey question which is worded as follows: “In your opinion, has Israel's economic situation in the past three years improved, not changed, or become worse?” The item is on a 5 point scale (1-5), with higher scores indicating that Israel's economic situation has worsened. Finally, one's perception of Israel's security situation and the possibility of a future peace are based on the pre-election survey question which is worded as follows: “In your opinion is it possible to reach a peace agreement with the Palestinians?” The item is on a 4 point scale (1-4), with higher scores indicating that there is no possibility for peace in the future.

The Israel National Election Studies also contains several types of demographic and social variables which should impact on extreme right wing voting: (1) age; (2) gender; (3) years of education; (4) religious observance; (5) social class;

predicted vote choice. In addition, the measure seemed to reflect better the actual electoral results. For results based on the pre-election survey question, see Appendix Table 3. Overall, the results were very similar to our main results, suggesting that the choice of dependent variable was not significant.

and (6) ethnicity. Education is defined as full-time years of education completed, including elementary school. Religious observance is defined as the extent that one observes their religious tradition. The item is on a 4 point scale (1-4), with higher scores representing a higher amount of religious observance. Social class is a proxy for income, and respondents are asked to place themselves in one of four categories (1-4), with higher scores corresponding to a lower class. Belief in Greater Israel is on a 4 point scale (1-4), with higher scores representing greater importance attached to the belief in Greater Israel relative to other important values.¹²

Finally, one's ethnicity is based on where one's Father was born. The Israel National Election Studies creates six categories (1) Israel (native-born); (2) North Africa; (3) Asia; (4) Eastern Europe; (5) Western and Central Europe; (6) America, Central and South Africa and Oceania. We create dummies for each of the six categories. In addition, we define Sephardim as being from North Africa and Asia (categories 2 and 3) and we define Ashkenazim as being from Europe and America (categories 4 to 6). The survey also identifies immigrants from the former USSR as respondents who came to Israel from the Former USSR from 1989 and on.

(B) Summary Statistics:

Table 1 presents our summary statistics (N=1037). In terms of our dependent variable – the percentage of voters who voted for an extreme right-wing party– the table shows that 20 percent of the sample voted for Shas or Yisrael Beiteinu ('new' extreme right wing parties). In contrast, 3 percent of the sample voted for Haichud Haleumi ('old' extreme right wing parties). These results indicate that extreme right

¹² The pre-election survey question asks "If we think of the possible directions of development of the state of Israel, there are four important values that conflict with each other to a certain extent, and are important to different people at different levels: 1. A state with a Jewish majority; 2. Greater Israel; 3. Democratic state (equal political rights for all); 4. A state of peace (low chance for war). Of these four values, which is the most important one for you? And which is the second? And the third? And the fourth?"

wing voters are well represented in the sample, and their sample share is roughly proportional to the number of electoral seats which the extreme right wing parties received in the most recent Israeli elections (See also Figure 1). In terms of our independent variables, the table indicates a mean value of 2.99 for political dissatisfaction with a standard deviation of 0.73. The table also shows a mean value of 3.61 for economic well-being with a standard deviation of 1.09. Finally, the table shows a mean value of 3.03 for security and peace, with a standard deviation of 0.91.

Appendix Table 1 shows the distribution for our main independent variables. This table is motivated by the recognition that when dealing with ordinal variables, such as those that measure opinion, one should not rely exclusively on descriptive statistics such as the mean and standard deviation, and the plot of the data-distribution is crucial for interpretation. Appendix Table 1 indicates that 75 percent of the sample believes that the government handles problems in not so good way or not at all good way. This implies that most Israelis are politically dissatisfied. The table also indicates that 17 percent of Israelis believe that Israel's economic situation has gotten better over the last three years while 56 percent of Israelis believe that Israel's economic situation has worsened over the last three years. This implies that most Israelis are unhappy with Israel's current economic growth. Finally the table indicates that 67 percent of the sample believes that it is not possible or definitely not possible to reach a peace agreement with the Palestinians. This implies that most Israelis are pessimistic about peace, and are likely concerned about security issues.

In terms of the demographic variables, Table 1 indicates that the survey sample was distributed mostly evenly among males and females, the average age was 45, and the average education of respondents was 13 years. In addition, the table

indicates that Israel's different ethnic groups are well represented in the sample, and their sample share is roughly proportional to Israel's actual population distribution.

In Table 2, we show the intercorrelations of our independent variables including our demographic and social variables. The table indicates that there is a correlation between many of our independent variables, which are statistically significant at the 5 percent level. For instance, political dissatisfaction is moderately correlated with one's economic, security views, and the belief in Greater Israel. As expected, there is a weak correlation between one's economic views and gender (women tend to be less favorably positioned than men). However, the more interesting findings concern the belief in Greater Israel; a correlation of 0.33 between security views and the belief in Greater Israel; a correlation of 0.17 between religious self-definition and the belief in Greater Israel; and a correlation of 0.14 between political dissatisfaction and the belief in Greater Israel—these links alerted us to further looking into this matter, since the belief in Greater Israel by itself does not seem to be a major issue of debate.

In terms of our demographic variables, religious observance is associated with a belief that peace cannot be achieved, and lower economic status, while years of education are associated with a belief that peace will be achieved, and naturally a higher economic status.

5) Results:

In Table 3, we locate the parties in ideological and social space.¹³ We characterize the parties of interest by the attributes of their actual voters, not their declared platforms or the groups which they made explicit efforts to mobilize. The table makes it possible to see whether parties are arrayed along a coherent left-right

¹³ The inspiration for this table is taken from (Shalev and Levy 2003), who conduct a similar analysis on the 2003 elections in a similar fashion.

dimension, and to identify the differences between the extreme right-wing parties. Panel A assesses extreme right wing attitudes, Panel B measures our key independent variables, and Panel C shows differences in the social and demographic composition of party constituencies.

Panel A refers to four attitudinal questions that tap the extreme right wing attitudes mentioned above: xenophobia and racism, anti-democratic beliefs. The table indicates that voters consistently adhere to a left-right spectrum that runs from Meretz to Yisrael Beiteinu, Shas, and Haichud Haleumi (all extreme right parties), with Labour (moderate left party), Kadima (central party), and Likud (moderate right party) occupying intermediate positions. For example, the table shows that a substantial 1.73 standard deviation separates Meretz and Yisrael Beiteinu voters on whether Arabs can be trusted. Additionally, the table indicates that the gaps between the extreme right wing parties are small, with the exception of whether the state should adopt Halacha. This implies that attitude gaps between the 'old' and 'new' extreme right wing voters may be smaller than previously claimed, with the real cleavage issue being attitudes towards Halacha. Interestingly, the table also indicates that Shas voters hold the most extreme right-wing views among the parties. This result further supports our classification as Shas as an extreme right wing party.

Regarding our independent variables, our Panel B results, consistent with the existing literature, indicate that extreme right wing party voters are more likely to be dissatisfied with government, and more hawkish regarding peace. In contrast, the table indicates moderate differences among the extreme right wing voters concerning one's satisfaction with economic growth, with only Shas voters exhibiting dissatisfaction with economic growth. These results hint that only political

dissatisfaction and one's security and peace outlook will be positively associated with extreme right wing voting.

Turning to the socio-demographic attributes of party supporters, our results show that the extreme right wing parties have fairly distinct demographic profiles. As expected, Shas voters in 2009 exhibited a strong Mizrahi bias, Yisrael Beiteinu a strong "Russian" bias, and Haichud Haleumi a weak Ashkenazi bias. In addition, extreme right wing party voters were strongly differentiated by religious class, with a substantial gap separating Yisrael Beiteinu and Shas. Interestingly, extreme right wing party voters were moderately differentiated by social class, with Yisrael Beitenu voters exhibiting a 0.43 standard deviation from the mean. Significantly, these results reinforce the importance of having control for key demographic variables in our model.

The results of our Probit regressions are reported in Table 4, where we estimate the relationship between extreme right wing voting and our independent variables. Our outcome variable is dichotomous, and we consider three different definitions for extreme right wing voting. The model also includes basic controls such as age, gender, social class, religious observance, belief in "Greater Israel", and ethnicity dummies; the results presented in Table 4 provide additional evidence for the importance of these controls. The table is divided into three sets of columns; the first columns labeled (1) and (2) examine the data concerning the all-inclusive definition of the extreme right, the second two columns (3) and (4) relate to the "new" definition of the extreme right, while the two last columns (5) and (6) relate to the traditional "old" definition of extreme right in Israel.

Column (1) summarizes the Probit results without controls, and indicates that an increase in political dissatisfaction increases the predicted probability of extreme

right wing voting (these results are significant at the 1% level). Our results further indicate that if political dissatisfaction increases by one unit, the probability of voting for an extreme right wing party will increase by 8.6 percentage points, if all initial values are held constant at their mean value.¹⁴ In addition, the table indicates that if security concerns increase by one unit, the probability of voting for an extreme right wing party will increase by 12.5 percentage points, if all other values are held constant at their mean value, and this result is significant at the 1% level. However, the table indicates that economic concerns do not significantly affect the predicted probability of extreme right wing voting. To summarize the model results (without controls):

$$\pi_i = \Phi(0.293X_{Political\ Dissatisfaction} + 0.425X_{Security\ and\ Peace})$$

Column 2 indicates that our results are affected by social class, and above all the belief in "Greater Israel", transforming the model to:

$$\pi_i = \Phi(0.227X_{Political\ Dissatisfaction} + 0.261X_{Security\ and\ Peace} - 0.236X_{Social\ Class} + 0.477X_{Belief\ in\ Greater\ Israel})$$

These results are not trivial; a simple comparison of columns (1) and (2) yields that the introduction of 'Social Class' and of 'Belief in Greater Israel' reduces the coefficient of 'Political Dissatisfaction' by about 20%, and the coefficient of 'Security and Peace' by nearly 40%, making the effects of the two variables almost the same (about 6 percentage points, if all other values are held constant at their mean value). The results also show that by far the largest effect is attributed to the 'Belief in Greater Israel' and it is in fact more important than security views or political

¹⁴As noted above it is difficult to interpret the coefficients of the independent variables (which are standard scores) and their relative contribution to the probability of voting for an extreme right wing party, since the marginal effects of the independent variables are not fixed, but rather depend on where they are placed on the curve. One strategy of dealing with this difficulty is to compute the marginal effects of an independent variable; which is the change in the probability of observing a certain outcome, if a single unit is added to the independent variable(which was previously held on a certain level) , whereas all the other variables remain constant. For the sake of convenience, we hold all other variables constant at their mean value.

dissatisfaction. The table indicates that the belief in Greater Israel increases by one unit, the probability of voting for an extreme right wing party will increase by 12.4percentage points, if all other values are held constant at their mean value. In addition, the effect of ‘Social Class’ turns out to be surprisingly significant, while the effect of economic wellbeing does not.

From columns (3)-(4) we infer that the model for the 'new extreme right' is quite similar to the model of the 'extreme right'(columns (1)-(2)); while most coefficients (Political Dissatisfaction, Security and Peace) are lower but similar to the inclusive model, preserving the trends and relative magnitudes. For ‘new’ extreme right the ‘Social Class’ seems to be the most important factor, whereas the literature on European extreme right wing voting predicts its decline. The ‘Belief in Greater Israel’ is still significant, but not as it was in the inclusive model; the causes can be traced perhaps to the secular majority of Yisrael Beiteinu on one hand, and to the moderate Halacha verdicts of Shas’ leaders regarding questions of war and peace, on the other hand. For the 'new extreme right' the model would be:

$$\pi_i = \Phi (0.228X_{Political\ Dissatisfaction} + 0.298X_{Security\ and\ Peace} - 0.334X_{Social\ Class} + 0.329X_{Belief\ in\ Greater\ Israel})$$

The relatively high effect of the "Belief in Greater Israel' coefficient in the inclusive model can be attributed to columns (5)-(6) that indicate that it is the only significant contribution to the vote for Haichud Haleumi, an 'old' extreme right wing party:

$$\pi_i = \Phi (0.653X_{Belief\ in\ Greater\ Israel}).$$

The coefficient of “Belief in Greater Israel”, a core concept unique to Israel’s traditional right, is almost double in this model than it was in the one fitted for the ‘new’ extreme right. In addition, the closely related security views appear to draw all their significance from the “Belief in Greater Israel”, highlighting the uniqueness of

the Israeli model from the European model. Another potential, purely statistical, cause may be the fact that the party has but very few voters, making most variables insignificant; this is an unlikely reason since, as shown in Table 4 there is no significant difference in the number of observations between parties and the model fits well the data (Chi squared of 40.4 df=15). Finally, these results indicate (and as indicated by the standard scores in Table 3) that voters for the Haichud Haleumi party hold relatively heterogeneous views, and are mostly unified by their shared belief in Greater Israel.¹⁵

In order to examine the robustness of our findings, we re-ran the regressions of Table 4 on a modified dependent variable, using OLS regressions. In place of our dichotomous variable, which measured extreme right wing voting on a (0-1) scale, we define a variable which captures the "left-right" continuum in Israeli politics, where "1" refers to left wing parties, "2" refers to center parties, "3" refers to right-wing parties, and "4" refers to extreme right wing parties. One advantage of using this modified variable is that since it has more categories, it allows us to use an OLS model. Another advantage is that it more generally explains movement among the left-right continuum in Israeli politics, and not just to the extreme right.

As shown in Table 5, the results using our modified variable are qualitatively similar to the results of Table 4, but in spite of the additional significant coefficients (such as age and intercept) the fit is quite poor; and the AIC in the OLS model ranges from 1919.99 (df=15) to 1142.57 (df=15) , whereas the Probit model, with its additional assumptions regarding the distribution of right wing voting, yields much better (though certainly not perfect) fit with AIC ranging from 624.26 (df=15) to

¹⁵ Another possible explanation for why our political, economic, and security variables were not statistically significant, is due to the relatively small pool of voters who support the HaichudHaleumi party. In fact, our Appendix Table 2 results – where there is a slightly larger pool of voters – indicate that an increase in security concerns increases the predicted probability of extreme right wing voting, and these results are statistically significant at the 5% level (column 6).

144.24 (df=15). We again find that the main factors which lead to rightward movement among the left-right continuum are political dissatisfaction and security concerns. The table indicates that a one unit increase in political dissatisfaction is associated with a 0.264 increase in a rightward movement, and this result is significant at the 1% level. Similarly, the table indicates that a one unit increase in security concerns is associated with a 0.360 increase in a rightward movement, and this result is significant at the 1% level. This suggests that our choice of outcome variable does not materially affect our conclusions.

6) Conclusion:

Returning to our initial hypotheses, we can now conclude that political dissatisfaction and security views regarding war and peace, but not economic well-being, contribute to the increase in right-wing voting in Israel. The most surprising finding turned out to be that Israel's traditional extreme right wing voters are motivated by the unique, semi-religious, notion of the "Greater Israel" which is not central to Israel's main political discourse; this finding becomes even more remarkable when religion by itself turns out to be statistically insignificant. It is possible that we have discovered the Israeli "Pandora's box"; the hidden combination of the belief in Greater Israel and dissatisfaction from liberal democracy. The fact that the growth in extreme right voters was not somehow marked by a period of terrorist attacks, but rather by an improvement of Israeli-Palestinian relations, points to a possible spring of belligerent attitudes among Israeli voters.

Another interesting finding is that economic well-being is not a significant predictor of extreme right wing voting while social class is. This finding appears to be somewhat anachronistic at the beginning of the 21st century, and we believe that a fuller explanation requires additional studies. At the same time, we believe that the

role of the economy in the Israeli democracy will increase, similar to Europe's experience. The summer protests of 2011 may indicate that in the next elections, economic factors may play a larger role. However, we fear the democratic dissatisfaction will turn out to be a major factor for the extreme right wing uprising; we do not believe that the Israeli democracy will be weakened, but it is important to emphasize that it does pose a threat to Israeli democracy. At the same time, this research suggests that policies which restore public confidence in the government, and policies which contribute to ending the conflict with the Palestinians, may stem the rise in extreme right wing voting.

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Table 1

Summary Statistics for Israel's National Election Study Data in 2009

Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max	Observations
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Dependent Variable: Percentage of voters who voted for an extreme right-wing party					
"New" Extreme Right (0- 1)	0.20	0.40	0.00	1.00	638
"Old" Extreme Right (0- 1)	0.03	0.18	0.00	1.00	638
Total Extreme Right (0- 1)	0.24	0.43	0.00	1.00	638
Independent Variables: Level of political dissatisfaction, economic well-being, and security outlook					
Political Dissatisfaction (1- 4)	2.99	0.73	1.00	4.00	1,013
Economic Well-Being (1- 5)	3.61	1.09	1.00	5.00	1,012
Security and Peace (1-4)	3.02	0.91	1.00	4.00	1,022
Control Variables:					
Percent Ashkenazim	0.56	0.50	0.00	1.00	0.00
Percent Mizrahim	0.44	0.50	0.00	1.00	0.00
Percent FSU Immigrants	0.15	0.36	0.00	1.00	0.00
Percent Female	0.53	0.50	0.00	1.00	0.00
Age	44.97	17.27	18.00	90.00	963
Belief in Greater Israel (1-4)	1.98	1.05	1.00	4.00	963
Religious Observance (1-4)	2.23	0.91	1.00	4.00	1,032
Social Class (1- 4)	2.23	0.69	1.00	4.00	997
Years of Education	13.63	3.27	0.00	30.00	1,037

Source: Israel's National Election Study Data (2009).

Note : N=1037. Israeli-Arabs are excluded from the analysis. Data for voting is only available in the post-election survey, resulting in fewer observations. "New" extreme right wing refers to voters who voted for Israel Beiteinu or Shas, while "Old" refers to voters who voted for Hauchud Haleumi (See also Pedahzur 2001).

Table 2**Correlation Matrix for the Independent Variables**

Variable	Political Dis.	Economic Out.	Security	Age	Gender	Religious Obs.	Education	Social Class	Greater Israel
Political Dissatisfaction	1								
Economic Outlook	0.2148*	1							
Security and Peace	0.1798*	0.0958*	1						
Age	-0.0480	-0.0680*	-0.1515*	1					
Gender	0.0730*	0.2112*	0.0125	-0.0172	1				
Religious Observance	0.0349	0.0378	0.1948*	-0.1291*	0.0084	1			
Years of Education	0.0772*	-0.0419	-0.1211*	0.0017	-0.0304	-0.0548	1		
Social Class	-0.0877*	-0.0849*	-0.0764*	-0.1935*	-0.0194	-0.0002	0.1042*	1	
Belief in Greater Israel	0.1388*	0.0646*	0.3300*	-0.0820*	-0.0148	0.1652*	-0.1264*	-0.1453*	1

* significant at 5% .

Source: See Table 1.

Table 3

Characteristics of Party Voters in 2009

Variable	Meretz (1)	Labour (2)	Kadima (3)	Likud (4)	Yisrael Beiteinu (5)	Shas (6)	Haichud Haleumi (7)
Panel A: Extreme right-wing attitudes (standard scores)							
Xenophobia and Racism							
Trust in Arabs	1.37	0.42	0.25	-0.07	-0.36	-0.33	-0.11
Anti-Democratic Beliefs							
Security Trumps Law	-1.11	-0.24	-0.05	0.07	0.06	0.47	0.32
State Should Adopt Halacha	-0.51	-0.36	-0.36	0.06	-0.11	1.11	0.46
Democracy as a form of Government	0.74	0.32	0.18	0.00	-0.21	-0.53	-0.22
Panel B: Independent Variable Attitudes (Standard Scores)							
Dissatisfied with the Government	0.13	-0.50	-0.29	0.03	0.27	0.35	0.28
Dissatisfied with Economic Growth	0.20	-0.22	-0.08	-0.10	-0.06	0.28	-0.01
There will Never be Peace	-1.17	-0.45	-0.36	0.07	0.38	0.60	0.44
Panel C: Socio-Demographic Characteristics (Means)							
Percent Ashkenazim	0.95	0.63	0.60	0.37	0.79	0.19	0.65
Percent Mizrahim	0.05	0.37	0.40	0.63	0.21	0.81	0.35
Percent FSU Immigrants	0.04	0.06	0.11	0.11	0.57	0.03	0.10
Percent Female	0.61	0.43	0.58	0.50	0.43	0.48	0.48
Percent 30 or Under	0.04	0.11	0.17	0.19	0.21	0.36	0.33
Percent 55 or Over	0.39	0.52	0.41	0.34	0.47	0.12	0.24
Percent with Academic Degree	0.82	0.47	0.44	0.34	0.46	0.27	0.44
Greater Israel (Standard Score)	-0.74	-0.67	-0.41	0.08	0.52	0.85	1.29
Religiosity (Standard Score)	-0.49	-0.32	-0.38	0.03	-0.45	1.25	0.64
Social Class (Standard Score)	0.29	0.23	0.02	-0.09	-0.43	-0.24	0.03

Source: See Table 1.

Note: Parties are arranged on a left to right continuum. Panels A and B list standard scores. Panel C lists the means, unless otherwise noted. The order of the scores on topics of personal opinion (such as religiosity or peace) are meaningful, while the exact differences are not very important.

Table 4

Predictors of Extreme Right Wing Voting

Variable	LHS: Extreme Right-Wing Voting (0-1)					
	All Extreme Right Wing Parties		Shas and Yisrael Beiteinu		Haichud Haleumi	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Political Dissatisfaction (1-4)	0.293*** (0.0854)	0.227** (0.107)	0.282*** (0.0877)	0.228** (0.110)	0.123 (0.150)	0.0168 (0.181)
Economic Well-Being (1-5)	-0.0298 (0.0556)	0.00193 (0.0711)	-0.0275 (0.0572)	0.0219 (0.0723)	-0.0162 (0.0961)	0.00824 (0.129)
Security and Peace (1-4)	0.425*** (0.0693)	0.261*** (0.0928)	0.402*** (0.0715)	0.298*** (0.0967)	0.240* (0.125)	-0.0715 (0.170)
Religious Observance		-0.000788 (0.0835)		-0.0546 (0.0845)		0.187 (0.145)
Social Class		-0.236** (0.119)		-0.334*** (0.124)		0.315 (0.208)
Belief in Greater Israel		0.477*** (0.0719)		0.329*** (0.0730)		0.653*** (0.149)
Observations	611	495	611	469	611	495
Degrees of Freedom	4	15	4	14	4	15
Chi-squared	62.55	140.1	53.09	96.89	5.668	40.40
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)	624.26	435.89	584.79	419.78	178.44	144.24
Pseudo R ²	0.09	0.25	0.08	0.19	0.03	0.26
Demographic Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

* significant at 10% ** significant at 5%. *** significant at 1%.

Source: See Table 1.

Notes : Probit regression model. Standard errors are listed in parentheses. The dependent variable in all regressions is voting for an extreme right wing party, and we consider 3 definitions: (1) all extreme right wing parties (columns 1-2); (2) Shas and Yisrael Beiteinu (columns 3-4); (3) Haichud Haleumi (columns 5-6). Columns 1, 3, and 5 are our basic model without additional controls, and columns 2, 4, and 6 is our full model with controls. Our demographic controls include age, gender, years of education, religious observance, social class, one's belief in Greater Israel, and ethnicity dummies. For space considerations, we only display the results of the more integral controls. See Appendix Table 2 for the full results.

Table 5

Predictors of Extreme Right Wing Voting (OLS Results)

Variable	LHS: Right Wing Voting (1-4)					
	All Extreme Right Wing Parties		Shas and Yisrael Beiteinu		Haichud Haleumi	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Political Dissatisfaction (1-4)	0.264*** (0.0519)	0.209*** (0.0540)	0.254*** (0.0512)	0.208*** (0.0537)	0.175*** (0.0402)	0.145*** (0.0411)
Economic Well-Being (1-5)	-0.00405 (0.0346)	0.00160 (0.0357)	0.00602 (0.0341)	0.00679 (0.0355)	-0.000239 (0.0268)	0.00552 (0.0271)
Security and Peace (1-4)	0.360*** (0.0407)	0.206*** (0.0460)	0.336*** (0.0400)	0.192*** (0.0457)	0.311*** (0.0315)	0.185*** (0.0349)
Religious Observance		0.176*** (0.0441)		0.147*** (0.0438)		0.168*** (0.0335)
Social Class		-0.127** (0.0572)		-0.136** (0.0568)		-0.0394 (0.0435)
Belief in Greater Israel		0.256*** (0.0379)		0.230*** (0.0376)		0.217*** (0.0288)
Mean of Dependent Variable	2.65	2.65	2.62	2.62	2.43	2.43
Observations	694	564	694	564	694	564
Degrees of Freedom	4	15	4	15	4	15
Chi-squared	4.23	6.06	5.82	4.9	13.28	19.16
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)	1919.99	1452.36	1898.60	1444.67	1564.36	1142.57
R ²	0.155	0.312	0.145	0.292	0.168	0.349
Demographic Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes


* significant at 10% ** significant at 5%. *** significant at 1%.

Source: See Table 1.

Notes : See Table 4. OLS regression model. The dependent variable in all regressions is voting for an extreme right wing party, along a left-right continuum where "1" refers to left wing parties (Meretz and Labour), "2" refers to center parties (Kadima), "3" refers to right-wing parties (Likud, Agudah, and Mafdal), and "4" refers to extreme right wing parties.

Figure 1

Extreme Right Wing Seats in Israel, 1992-2009



Source: Knesset web site: http://www.knesset.gov.il/description/heb/heb_nimshal_res.htm

Notes: Total extreme right wing seats is the sum of the "new" and "old" extreme right. "New" extreme right wing refers electoral seats for Yisrael Beiteinu or Shas, while "Old" refers to seats for Haichud Haleumi, Mafdal, Moledet, and Tzomet. (See also Pedahzur 2001). Note that the seats for 2003, when Haichud Haleumi and Yisrael Beiteinu ran together, are counted as seats for the "old" extreme right wing.

Appendix Table 1

Result Frequencies for Main Independent Variables

Variable Label	Value	Frequency	Percentage	Cumulative
Political Dissatisfaction Measure: Government handles problems in a				
very good way	1	24	2.31	2.31
a good way	2	203	19.58	21.89
not so good way	3	546	52.65	74.54
not at all a good way	4	240	23.14	97.69
.	.	24	2.31	100
Economic Well-Being Measure: Israel' economic situation in the past three years has...				
improved a lot	1	29	2.8	2.8
improved a bit	2	154	14.85	17.65
has not changed	3	238	22.95	40.6
became a bit worse	4	356	34.33	74.93
became much worse	5	235	22.66	97.59
.	.	25	2.41	100
Security and Peace Measure: Is it possible to reach a peace agreement with the Palestinians				
de finitely it is	1	49	4.73	4.73
I think it is	2	269	25.94	30.67
I think not	3	314	30.28	60.95
de finitely not	4	390	37.61	98.55
.	.	15	1.45	100

Appendix Table 2

Predictors of Extreme Right Wing Voting

LHS: Extreme Right-Wing Voting (0-1)

Variable	All Extreme Right Wing Parties		Shas and Yisrael Beiteinu		Haichud Haleumi	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Political Dissatisfaction (1-4)	0.293*** (0.0854)	0.227** (0.107)	0.282*** (0.0877)	0.228** (0.110)	0.123 (0.150)	0.0168 (0.181)
Economic Well-Being (1-5)	-0.0298 (0.0556)	0.00193 (0.0711)	-0.0275 (0.0572)	0.0219 (0.0723)	-0.0162 (0.0961)	0.00824 (0.129)
Security and Peace (1-4)	0.425*** (0.0693)	0.261*** (0.0928)	0.402*** (0.0715)	0.298*** (0.0967)	0.240* (0.125)	-0.0715 (0.170)
Religious Observance		-0.000788 (0.0835)		-0.0546 (0.0845)		0.187 (0.145)
Social Class		-0.236** (0.119)		-0.334*** (0.124)		0.315 (0.208)
Belief in Greater Israel		0.477*** (0.0719)		0.329*** (0.0730)		0.653*** (0.149)
Age		-0.0119** (0.00487)		-0.00959* (0.00492)		-0.0150 (0.00928)
Female		-0.299** (0.148)		-0.266* (0.151)		-0.233 (0.270)
Years of Education		0.0319 (0.0280)		0.0352 (0.0286)		-0.0205 (0.0588)
Father Born in North Africa		-0.205 (0.242)		-0.265 (0.247)		0.529 (0.498)
Father Born in Asia		0.0637 (0.243)		-0.0332 (0.246)		0.665 (0.501)
Father Born in Eastern Europe		0.458** (0.220)		0.287 (0.220)		0.924* (0.497)
Father Born in Western Europe		-0.847 (0.562)		. (0.513)		0.967 (0.728)
Father Born in America		0.221 (0.508)		-0.0410 (0.513)		0.857 (0.827)
Observations	611	495	611	469	611	495
Degrees of Freedom	4	15	4	14	4	15
Chi-squared	62.55	140.1	53.09	96.89	5.668	40.40
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)	624.26	435.89	584.79	419.78	178.44	144.24
Pseudo R ²	0.09	0.25	0.08	0.19	0.03	0.26
Demographic Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

* significant at 10% ** significant at 5%. *** significant at 1%.

Source: See Table 1.

Notes : See Table 4

Appendix Table 3

Predictors of Extreme Right Wing Voting

LHS: Extreme Right-Wing Voting (0-1) in the Pre-election Survey

Variable	All Extreme Right Wing Parties		Shas and Yisrael Beiteinu		Haichud Haleumi	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Political Dissatisfaction (1-4)	0.316*** (0.0776)	0.215** (0.0911)	0.301*** (0.0789)	0.226** (0.0928)	0.141 (0.160)	-0.0228 (0.263)
Economic Well-Being (1-5)	-0.0419 (0.0500)	-0.0198 (0.0596)	-0.0109 (0.0510)	-0.00817 (0.0607)	-0.172* (0.0991)	-0.0499 (0.171)
Security and Peace (1-4)	0.253*** (0.0607)	0.158** (0.0790)	0.184*** (0.0613)	0.101 (0.0798)	0.576*** (0.181)	0.824** (0.377)
Religious Observance		0.134* (0.0732)		0.0428 (0.0747)		0.644*** (0.212)
Social Class		-0.277*** (0.0995)		-0.328*** (0.102)		0.153 (0.254)
Belief in Greater Israel		0.208*** (0.0612)		0.133** (0.0629)		0.700*** (0.216)
Observations	706	573	706	559	706	573
Degrees of Freedom	4	15	4	14	4	15
Chi-squared	41.90	76.33	29.45	53.96	19.46	64.44
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)	624.26	435.89	584.79	419.78	178.44	144.24
Pseudo R ²	0.05	0.12	0.04	0.09	0.11	0.48
Demographic Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

* significant at 10% ** significant at 5%. *** significant at 1%.

Source: See Table 1.

Notes : Probit regression model. Standard errors are listed in parentheses. The dependent variable in all regressions is support for an extreme right wing party in the pre-election survey, and we consider 3 definitions: (1) all extreme right wing parties (columns 1-2); (2) Shas and Yisrael Beiteinu (columns 3-4); (3) Haichud Haleumi (columns 5-6). Columns 1, 3, and 5 are our basic model without additional controls, and columns 2, 4, and 6 is our full model with controls. Our demographic controls include age, gender, years of education, religious observance, social class, and one's belief in Greater Israel.