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Incentivizing Aliya

A Quantitative Analysis of the Central Motivating Factors Behind the
Desire of Young North Americans Jews to Make Aliyah
and the Efficacy of Financial Subsidies

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Introduction

How effective is the government policy of incentivizing Aliyah from the young North American Jewish Community? The Israeli government represents the ideal of a national Jewish and democratic country. As such, Israel regards the maintenance of a clear demographic majority of Jews within its borders as a central policy goal, and a large part of this policy includes the encouragement of Aliyah. Aliyah from North America is particularly significant both because it is the second largest pool of Jewish communities (Israel being the first), but also and in particular because of the economic and social capital North Americans can contribute to the market.

Olim from North America make up only 1.5 percent of the Israeli Jewish population, relatively lower than in other European countries, both Western as well as Eastern. On the other hand, American immigrants have higher levels of educational attainment, as well as an over-representation of professionals, as compared to their Jewish counterparts in the US. This status appears even more prominently in relation to the Israeli Jewish population, establishing these immigrants as an educational and occupational elite (Rebhun and Waxman 2002). What motivates these North Americans to make the drastic move and emigrate across the globe to a small and relatively new democracy, bordered on all sides by enemy states?

Immigration studies on Israel's historical "waves" of Aliya have demonstrated the wide array of motives which have characterized each wave, including the ideological immigration from the Soviet Union in the 1970's, the pragmatic immigration considerations of the citizens from the FSU in the 90's and the religious motives characteristic of the Ethiopian immigration (Horowitz, 1996).

Currently, Israel seeks to incentivize Jewish immigration through a comprehensive economic policy, including numerous subsidies, tax rebates and reductions, as well as a variety of economic incentives. Between 2005-2012 Israel transferred over 95% of its Aliyah budget, 106 million Shekels, to a private organization, Nefesh B'Nefesh, which focuses on incentivizing Aliyah from North America (Levinson, 2014). Yet how effective is it concerning a young, and relatively wealthy demographic such as North American Jewish youth? Would economic factors play a singular role in motivating these youth to move to Israel, or would ideological factors be more effective, through strategic investment in youth groups and Zionist education programs in the diaspora, and are these factors in any way complementary?

This paper investigates the efficacy of the strategies used to incentivize aliyah, focusing both on economic as well as ideological incentives, as well as control factors, such as personality

disposition and strength of the Israeli economy. Young North American living abroad yet eligible for Aliyah were invited to take a short online survey which asked these specific question. The results ratified previous qualitative assertions that ideology played a larger role than economic incentives, yet most interestingly, job market and economic strength was a much larger factor of consideration than any financial incentives the government could offer. Furthermore, if one self-identifies as interested in promoting individual welfare, as opposed to group or universal success, one is also less likely to make the decisions to make Aliyah.

Theoretical Background

Approaches to emigration include primarily the rational choice approach of cost-benefit analysis, and the behavioural approach which evaluates the motivations behind rational choice calculations, yet neither provides sufficient theoretical explanation for young aliyah from North America.

Rational Choice Approach

Immigration to other countries in the modern age has, until recently, been viewed primarily through the neoclassical model which based on economic incentives, which have been attributed to either a poor and oppressive economic climate in one's home country or alternatively the opportunity to better one's economic conditions.

Rational choice theory argues that the individual makes a cost benefit analysis based on subjective utility models. The initial "deficiency model" explaining migration argued that potential emigrants have fewer personal and social resources than the general population (Littlewood & Lipsedge, 1989), and that the migrant felt "insecure and inadequate" in his own country prior to moving (Eisenstadt, 1954, pp. 1–2). Historically, emigration was usually the result of poor living conditions, violence and armed conflicts, environmental problems, a lack of economic perspectives and the growing gap between rich and poor countries. Emigration as an escape from poor conditions in one's home country characterizes a large percentage of the 175 million people currently living far away from their native countries; 19.2 million people are considered to be "refugees" or "displaced persons". Yet economic incentives cannot fully explain the immigration process for North American jews, who on the whole are more financially well-off than Israeli Jews. Those make Aliyah from North America are primarily due to "aliya of choice", rather than escaping the push of poverty or anti-semitism (Dashefsy and Lazerwitz,1983).

Modern international migration trends suggest that migration is not necessary to escape poor conditions, but rather now we “move to improve”, based particularly on wage differentials (Hatton and Williamson, 1998) and employment opportunities (Swiss Federal Office of Immigration; Bartel, 1979; Bartel and Borjas, 1981). Immigrants will decide, based crucially on the degree of transferability of their unobservable skills, on the relative income inequality, and on the comparative levels of mean earnings, between the origin and destination countries (Cebula, 1981; Ghatak, Levine, Wheatly-Price: 1996; Boheim & Taylor, 2007). Yet even this is inapplicable to Israel’s North American Olim, many if not most of whom take a wage cut when they move to Israel, and some, after a time, feel obliged to leave Israel due to extremely inhospitable economic conditions.

In the current era of globalization, there is widespread agreement in industrialized societies that economic competitiveness is increasingly linked to the quality and quantity of skilled human resources available for any given economy. Consequently, countries compete among themselves by adjusting their admission policies in order to attract highly skilled immigrants, thereby increasing their “brain-gain”. The Roy theory of selection bias, as well as empirical evidence, suggests that positive self selection, or “brain gain” in favor of the country emigrating to occurs if there is a sufficient degree of transferability between the two labor markets (Borjas, 1991). Unfortunately, this is again seldom the case for North American Jews who although highly skilled, and often taking elite positions in Israel’s economy, more often than not find themselves with non-transferable skills and language deficiencies when attempting to compete in Israel’s market.

Social-Welfare Benefits

Whats is particularly interesting in that Israel is a welfare system, which offers many social benefits that Americans have until very recently only dreamed of, including a robust universal healthcare system. Welfare interests are certainly demonstrated as a immigration factor among lower income emigrants to wealthier welfare states (Borjas, 1999) although the welfare magnet “pull” is weaker than the push of domestic poverty (Frey, Liaw, Xie, Carlson, 1996). It is possible that these welfare type government incentives play a significant role in attracting Aliyah. This may explain part of the attraction for Olim to Israel, particularly among the lower income American Jews, however it does not explain Aliyah from Canada, which has a wide social-welfare net.

The Behaviourist Approach

The behaviorist approach of political science attempts to analyze the motivating factors

behind specific political behavior beyond simply cost-benefit analysis. Behaviorists are quick to point out that although jobs and income may be the single biggest factor to affect the decision to make long distance moves, there are many additional and competing non-economic factors (Winchie and Carment; 1988). These considerations include family and social networks, personality and personal identity, as well as lifestyle, religion, culture and ideology (Chen and Rosenthal, 2008; Haug, 2012; Maas, Clark, 2013;). Israel as an emigration destination is further weighted with ideological, religious and cultural significance and provides additional motives which could be uniquely influential in contributing to a young student's decision to to Israel, or particular to the Jewish experience.

Social Networks and Ties

Sophisticated structural ties may be essential in providing incentive to make Aliyah, beyond economic considerations, particularly concerning considerations of family, community and lifestyle. Concerning those intending to emigrate, there is evidence that social networks are influential incentives to emigrate to Israel, specifically among highly trained North Americans (Amit, Riss, 2007). For example, the majority of North American Olim are Orthodox. The attraction of Aliyah among the Orthodox may be partially due to the structural network which is highly effective in providing a strong social support for new Olim (Waxman, 1995). Although social networks may be a necessary factor, it is not a sufficient condition for Aliya, because one must still leave much stronger social ties behind. New social ties are not necessarily a persuasive enough reason to do so.

Personality and Personal Values

Apart from social considerations, broad theories attempt to explain emigration, using both personality models (Winter-Ebner, 1994), as well as as part of an interdependent motivation based on values (2001). For example, there may be a self-selection bias based on personality and personal values, as well as age, education and unobserved ability (Pekkala & Tervo, 2002; Bill & Mitchell, 2006). There is some evidence for personality influencing domestic migration patterns, such as extroversion, agreeableness and openness (Jokela, 2009).

Aliyah involves the emigration to a nation-state rather than a purely neutral republican state, and may attract a certain type of person who is naturally disposed to idealism and other-centered benefit, but within one's own identity circle or "in-group". Self-identification runs along the continuum between the individual and the community or the group one identifies with - where one is motivated to act "in terms of self" or "in terms of group" (Tajfel, 1974; Turner, Reynolds: 2001: 134).

A further widening of this identity definition includes a person as “a human being”, which is a universal aspect of one’s identity, in addition to “social identity” and “personal identity” (Turner, 1987; Hornsey, 2008). Group identity perceived as a core part of one’s identity may incline the individual to move to Israel, as a move in accord with one’s personal identity and motivated by personal values.

Yet Aliyah on the basis of a self-selected personal disposition of self-identification with a group is problematic, being that in the modern era, each person is a member of many groups, including virtual communities, professional, religious and values-based. This theory does not explain which group will be one’s core identity, nor why it would motivate one to move based on this identity, rather than, perhaps, donate money.

Ideology

Ideological migration may be the most applicable migration model for North American Aliyah. The ideological migration hypothesis suggests that individuals choose to live in communities with ideologies similar to their own to satisfy their need to belong (Motyl, Iyer, Oishi, Trawalter, Nosek, 2014: Abstract). This includes people who have similar racial and ethnic backgrounds, lifestyles and personalities, as well as political and religious creeds, as part of a basic psychological, religious or value needs (Motyl, et al. 2014: 1). Ideologically based migration reduces the effect that economic considerations usually have on emigration considerations, which is applicable to North American Olim (Chiswick, 1999).

In a certain sense this approach has been ratified; those who have moved from North America have historically been characterized as recipients of strong Jewish and Zionist education, the overwhelming majority being Orthodox. Furthermore, those who self-identified as more Jewish than Israeli, were liable to remain in Israel despite dissatisfaction with Israeli society and promised government Aliyah assistance (Heim, 2007). In a combination of ideological and economic calculations, Olim cited free Jewish education as an important factor for making Aliyah (Zonszein, 2011).

Yet even ideology cannot really explain why committed North American Jewry move to Israel. American Aliyah has never been high on the list of priorities of the American Jewish establishment. Although ideologically willing to contribute millions of dollars to Israel to aide in the absorption of Olim for them, Aliyah was primarily seen as something reserved for Jews in distress or from developing countries (Heim 2007: 1-4).

Combining two theoretical models, economist Espign-Anderson (1990) argues that there are three types of welfare state transfer payments, intended for the poorest, for the entire society, or for republican or national interests. Emigrating to Israel involves aspects of ideological motivations, both as national identification to the Jewish people, as well as secular Zionism (Tartakovsky, 2011). Israel's unique budget for encouraging aliyah abroad through educational programs, as well as absorption costs once they have arrived is a form of republican welfare (Shalev, 2004). Both the economic incentives as well as the educational programs intended to reinforce the identity and cohesiveness of a Jewish and Zionist society fall within the republican welfare transfer program.

Yet incentive programs of this sort pose a challenge of their own. Israel is interested in incentivizing Aliya for particular demographic purposes according to a national ideology which is at its core Zionist, as well as to encourage "brain-gain" and fight the brain drain of those who were born in Israel, which is reducing Israel's economic competitiveness. Yet economic incentives and ideological incentives do not necessarily encourage the same types of people to make Aliya, and could act as competitive rather than complementary incentives, perhaps reflecting the ambivalent attitude of the Israeli government to attract all Jews, ideologically committed Zionists and economically competitive elites.

One example of potentially contradictory effects of economic and ideological incentives in public policy issues is around blood and organ donors. Replacing the "gifting" of blood with commercialization of the blood donor represses civic ethics and social norms including altruism and sense of community. Government-provided economic incentives for Aliyah, like economic recompense for giving blood, may appeal to those who are less educated, and whose options are more limited, rather than either those who are economically competitive, or those committed to Zionism (Arrow, 1972). On the other hand, economic incentives may open doors to those previously committed but not financially able, increasing freedom of choice (Singer, 1973; . and quite apart from the blood donor example, ideological incentives may reduce the favorable positive self-selection brain-gain bias which is usually predominant among emigrants who seek to "move to improve", only partially true in our case (Chiswick, 1999).

Deciding to make aliyah, like all migration, is the result of an amalgamation of many factors, but even more so. Ideological factors play a prominent and significant role, yet most North American olim need to know that they will have plentiful economic opportunities and opportunities to contribute to Israel before they are willing to make the final step of actually moving to Israel. (Avila

2005; Amit, Riss, 2007). Lack of jobs and a truly well-taught Hebrew has been cited as the number one reason why retention rates among Western immigrants are so low (Portner, 2013). Social ties, health benefits, and personal disposition also play a significant part.

Israel, as a Jewish state, considers Jewish immigration to Israel as a top priority, and the North American community, numbering 45% of world Jewry, is an obvious target. Israel's policy to incentivize Aliyah takes into account these ideological as well as economic factors, providing absorption aid and ease of Aliyah integration, as well as ideological attraction through subsidizing Taglit visits to Israel, as well as youth groups and summer camps in North America geared to affinity towards Israel and Zionism. Even so, Aliyah from North America is low in comparison to other countries, a disproportionate number of whom are Orthodox, although they number only a fraction of the total North American Jewish Community. To maintain a strong Jewish demography in Israel, new methods and policies of incentivizing Aliyah will have to be designed, yet how to go about this? This study focuses specifically on measuring both the economic and ideological motives for Aliyah, and to what extent do these two factors complement each other.

Research Question

What motivates individuals to make migrate, specifically in the context of Aliyah to Israel? A 1979 study investigated the motives of making Aaliyah found economic conditions of the country of origin, as well as the conditions of the Jews (anti-antisemitism, and the effects of the Six Day War) as two key motives. Although ideological and identity based motives were not the primary focus of the study, a strong positive correlation was found between Jewish identity and making Aaliyah to Israel, as well as a preference for the ideological dimension over the material dimension (Herman, 1979: pp.123-137), Amit and Riss (2007) used exploratory, qualitative research confirming ideology as playing a more significant role than economic factors.. That study was done about 24 years ago, and it seems to us that new data should be collected and analyzed¹

This paper evaluates four key factors; economic incentives, ideological motivations, social ties and personality, and investigates whether it is in fact the case that ideology is a stronger factor than economic interests. It further investigates whether there is a personality disposition which self-selects in favor of Aliya. Finally, it seeks seek to establish if economic and ideological incentives complement each other in encouraging Aliya, or if they unwittingly compete or detract from the

1 The Pew Research Center conducted a large scale study on American Jews, which included 70,000 respondents and has almost no statistical error. We partly relied on this study in writing our paper (Smith, et al, 2013).

others.

Hypotheses

1. The increase in identification with Israel and Judaism will correlate positively with the intention to make Aliyah.
2. People motivated by self-transcendence, such as those motivated by a commitment to group or global values will correlate positively with the intention to make Aliyah, and those committed to individualist values will correlate negatively with the intention to make Aliyah.
3. Increases in economic and ideological incentives will positively correlate with increasing incentives to move to Israel, suggesting these are complementary incentives.

Research Structure

Methodology

This paper used quantitative regression analysis to evaluate data gathered, using the survey method, using a questionnaire constructed online, around 6 sections, the independent variable (likelihood of making Aliyah) as well as five other sections: ideology divided into Jewish and Zionist identity, personal identity/values, economic incentives and the Israeli economy, as well as control variables (See Questionnaire, appendix 2).

The survey was distributed using the snowball method, by way of social media, to friends, relatives, and online student communities. The survey was made available over a fifteen day period, between April 15th and April 30th. The population sample was targeted towards young people between the ages of 17 and 30, from the US, Canada and Mexico, and was closed after 205 respondents. We chose to focus specifically on a younger population (18-30) in North America, based on the Israeli Ministry of Immigrant absorption's policy to focus efforts on educated young people from countries that put a high emphasis on the welfare of their citizens (2002, 2003, 2009, Protocol of Absorption Committee).

Independent and Dependent Variables:
Definition, Operationalization, Distribution

The dependent variable was the likelihood of making Aliyah – immigrating to Israel. This was measured combining three questions which asked the respondents intent to make Aliyah (a yes, no question), the probability of it happening and their opinion of Aliyah in general, both on a 0-9 scale². In addition, respondent was asked to write a short response about what the most important factor for them personally is in making Aaliyah.

Of the respondents, 50% of respondents did not plan on making Aaliyah, but including the undecided-possible factor, the mean was .32 out of 204 observations, the average answer indicating an overall tendency toward “No”. The likelihood of making aliyah on the 0-9 scale indicated a slightly higher but still under 50% likelihood, with a mean of .39. On the other hand, importance placed on making Aaliyah in general yielded a mean of .53, an overall positive attitude toward Aaliyah as a concept. Reliability of .69, as measured by Alpha's Cronbach, indicated an acceptable measure of internal consistency.

The first independent variable is ideology, divided into two variables, Jewish identity and Zionist identity. Although "identity" is among the more difficult concepts to define (Phinney, 1996)³. Our questionnaire combines the “who I am” with the “what I am”, a relationship which is strengthened in the diaspora⁴. The variable is based on questions which consider both the personal definition as well as the Jewish practices constitutive of a stronger or weaker religious Jewish identity

2 The high number of questions was intended to release some of the "fear" that the respondent may have felt regarding Aliyah (since the decision to change one's place of residence is not an easy decision to make), because the questions take the respondent's mind off of himself, and asks for his opinions on making Aliyah in general, allowing him an element of distance.

3 According to Phinney, personal identity consists of "the sense of belonging and commitment to one's ethnic group, which affects the thinking, perceptions, emotions and behavior of that individual" (1996: 13). That is to say, it is a combination of the individual's "sense of belonging" and "actual behavior". Similarly, Bauman wrote that identity is a combination of a sense of "who I am" and of "what I do" (1998: 25-35) .

4 In “Jewish Identity from a Psychological-Educational Perspective”, Herman writes "in the Diaspora, religious institutions, such as synagogues, have a bigger role than just fulfilling a purely religious function for the Jewish community, and attending them is often an expression of one's Jewish identity, rather than a religious identity (1979)".

such as synagogue attendance, Jewish education⁵, stance on mixed marriage⁶, and kashrut⁷. Jewish self definition included the classical "Orthodox, Conservative and Reform", as well as "Humanist" (Cohn, Sherbok: 1996) and "other"⁸.

As a scale variable combining Jewish education, level of intermarriage support, yearly synagogue attendance, and level of adherence to laws of Kashrut, the inner reliability⁹ was .6695 (using Cronbach's alpha), indicating acceptable reliability¹⁰. The mean of the aggregated data is approximately .40. This means that on average the level of Jewish Identity among the respondents on a scale of 1-10 is roughly 4, a relatively low measure of Jewish Identity, with a relatively narrow distribution around the mean (standard deviation of 0.12) indicating that 99% of the population will find identify themselves as ranking under 5 out of 10 in their Jewish identity.

The second measurement of ideology, Zionist identity, was differentiated from Jewish Identity due to its ambivalent relationship with Jewish identity in the diaspora over the previous century¹¹.

5 Jewish education is a central dimension of Jewish identity (Herman, 1979). A study conducted in the 1970's found that 63 percent of American Jews who made Aliyah had received a Jewish education for six years or more (Wertheimer, 1993).

6 In general, the question of mixed marriages contrasts the liberal value of freedom (the freedom to love, universalism) and the conservative values of community and tradition. A number of studies [13] found the attitude of American Jews to mixed marriages as constituting a central feature of their religious/national/communal identity (Lipsett, 1995; Pew Report, 2010).

7 This article constructed these questions using similar phraseology to that which was used in the "Gutman Report" (2002) and in the DellaPergola questionnaire (2004), and is based, among other things, on Ben-Raphael's definition of Jewish identity as a combination of personal identity and religious praxis (2006).

8 Precise Data on the internal division of the religious factions among American Jews can be found in the 2010 pew survey, which included 70,000 American Jews

9 Level of Jewish Education was omitted from the final variable as it is a nominal concept and thus incapable of being scaled and implemented as it has no inherent rank orientation.

10 The measurement of intermarriage support correlated negatively with the rest of the variables measuring Jewish Identity. This may be due to the fact that "mixed marriage" questions have more to do with national rather than religious identity (Wertheimer, 1993). Being that it reduced the reliability of the variable significantly, it was removed from the final scale.

11 In the early 1980's, researchers noticed that identification with the state of Israel is a key element of the Jewish identity of American Jews, as Sidorsky wrote in 1972: "Targeting the energy of the Diaspora in support of Israel... has filled Jewish American life with a sense of responsibility towards Israel, and often turned Israel into the heart of the Jewish activities and plans" (66), and similarly, Rottenstreich wrote: "not only has this component (Israel) become dominant, but it overtook the place of religion for Jews of the Diaspora" (1972). Alongside this statement, it is important to remember that the relationship between Jewish identity and an identification with Israel is a complex relationship. For example, in the annual Remarks of the JPPI in 2010, researchers examined the decline of identification with Israel, alongside changes in the Jewish identity among U.S. Jews, and concluded that there is no direct correlation between decreasing identification with Israel and decreasing identification with the Jewish people.

Equally, this separation accurately reflects two ideological motifs incentivizing Aliya in the Jewish world; religious affiliation with Israel, and secular Zionist aspirations, and permits evaluate of their relative impact. This variable was measured through membership in a youth movement¹², amount of visits to Israel¹³, celebration of Israeli holidays¹⁴, as self-assessment of the importance of Zionism in their own personal identity¹⁵.

Following an attempt at constructing a scale variable, a low alpha suggested low internal reliability, so each of the four variables were measured separately¹⁶. Membership in a youth group had a mean of .31, out of 202 observations, meaning on average only 31% of respondents belonged to a Zionist/Religious Youth Group at some point in their lifetime, a relatively small number, and it was kept separate, as a dummy variable. Degree of personal Zionist identification had a .71, or 7 on a 1-10 scale, out of 201 total observations, so that most people self identified as relatively strong Zionists. Celebration of Israeli holidays had a mean of .54 indicating that the majority of respondents celebrate Israeli holidays at least periodically with their families and/or local communities.

The third dependent variable is the effect of one's own own values, a endogenous variable which may impact self selection for Aliyah¹⁷. This was measured in a broad way by asking

12 Both Jewish and Zionist youth movements are a major source of Jewish identity building among American Jews[(Lamm, 1991)

13 An independent study found that the probability of people who participated in the Taglit-Birthright program would feel very connected to Israel was 46% higher, compared to candidates who did not participate. Similarly, the probability that Taglit-Birthright graduates would marry Jews was 51% higher (the effect of the Taglit-Birthright on choosing a spouse was correlated with age, but not with an educational background in Judaism) (The Impact of Taglit-Birthright Israel: 2010)

14 The question of the celebration of Israel's Independence Day in the Diaspora is a practical indication of the respondent's attitude toward Zionism. This question reflects the feelings of the individual (his relationship to Israel) but also has a communal dimension, examining the type of community in which the respondent lives .

15 Self definition is based on an entirely subjective scale, phrased according to the theory of "personal identity" (Baron, RA, & Byrne, D., 2000)

16 This has some advantage, being as it is now easier to identify the correlation of each separate question to Aliya directly, so that given one unit of change in each variable, we can see how much the incentive to Aliya rises or falls.

17 Every person has their own personality structure and different values which they represent broad objectives, which are expressed over time in a variety of contexts (Rokeach, 1973[21]; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987). Values can operate outside of awareness, but still be accessible for retrieval from memory (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003[22]). One of the prevailing theories on the conceptualization ??and measurement of values is Schwartz's theory on the universal content and structure of basic values ??(Schwartz, 1992; 1995). Explicit values were initially doubted to be important criteria for judgments, preferences and choices and influencing influence behavior (Williams, 1979). However, more recently, a study found that values in fact act as motives, reliably translating into corresponding actions (Feather, 1995). based on the the use of the Shwartz's values?? questionnaire (1992), and However, there are

respondents to pinpoint their values based on self definition. These values were then translated into motives which promote the interests of three core value sets: (financial success, publicity, power) group-communal (Zionism, Judaism) and universal (human rights, social justice, individual liberty, equality) ^{18 19}. These three general non-ordered categories were coded as 2 dummy-variables, 0 being “everyone else” and “1” being the specific category of response, with individual success as the baseline. This accounts for the weight of the three groups by respondent and not by their frequency. Keeping in mind that given the research structure, individuals could fall into more than one category, 82/204 coded values which advance personal success, 104/204 coded group-communal success-oriented values, while 111/204 coded universal values.

The fourth dependent variable evaluated the economic incentives of migration to Israel. This variable was divided into two categories, Aliya incentives, and the Israeli economy. Government sponsored Aliyah incentives included eleven questions measuring the financial allure of each of the government-offered Aaliyah incentive on a scale of 0-9. Those 11 incentives/questions being an absorption basket, rent subsidy, health coverage, ulpan, customs benefits, Israeli tax breaks, foreign tax breaks, municipal tax, mortgage discount, free one-way ticket to Israel, and university breaks (Davidovitch, 2011).

The summaries of the eleven questions provide us with a clear understanding of which incentives are the most important to the respondent population. In fact, they can be organized in the following way: health coverage (.64), ulpan (.61), absorption basket (.58), rent subsidy (.55), free one way ticket (.55), university breaks (.52), mortgage discount (.51), Israeli tax breaks (.51), municipal tax breaks (.50), foreign tax breaks (.50), and finally customs benefits (.48). These were combined into a scale variable, with a Cronbach’s Alpha measuring a staggering .95, a very high degree of reliability of internal consistency.

The Israeli Economy was measured the respondent's perception of the job market and the

differences of opinion regarding the strength of values in directing behavior (eg, Kristiansen & Hotte, 1996; McClelland, 1985[26]).

18 There are elements of tension and mutual influence between the three dimensions (on the tension between universalism and community values for American Jews, see Ofer Schiff’s “Assimilation in Pride”(2001); On the relationship between self-interested, particularist values and Zionist values ??in young American Jews, see Shmuel Rosner (2012).

19 This variable was initially designed to include questions 16-18, however only a broad evaluation of responses to question 18 was viable, and the remainder of the data was not included in the regression analysis. When, in question 18, to choose four values of primary importance from a larger list, most respondents indicated "family" (165), "Friends" (123), and "Love" (113), therefore these responses were not included in the regression analysis.

health of Israel's economy in general. After each set of economic incentives, respondents recorded the impact these factors have on their aliyah decision. The Israeli economy section consists of three questions, each of which are measured on a scale from 0-9 relating to the strength of the economy, and the strength of the job market and how much these two perceptions affect their decision in making Aaliyah. With an average of .61 for strength of Israel economy, the average answer ranges around a 5 on the 0-9 scale, indicating a reasonable perception of strength. The Israeli job market is perceived to be slightly lower, with a mean of .53, which would indicate that respondents viewed the job market to be slightly above median. Whether these perception affect respondent's decision in making Aaliyah received a mean of (Table 14) .55, indicating a positive (albeit weak) tendency for those perceptions to influence Aaliyah. The first two variables were combined into a scale, with internal consistency at a high Cronbach's Alpha of .88.

Control variables measured education, gender, nationality²⁰, as well as income, permitting segmentation of the data. Control variables also permit a clearer evaluation of the impact of alternative factors apart from economic and ideological considerations. Education level was assessed by asking respondents to indicate their most recently completed level of education; the majority of respondents hold a Bachelor's Degree from a university. Income was measured by one's perceived relative economic position in their society²¹ along 3-point scale from lower to top tier; the majority of respondents identify with the middle class in their respective society.

(See tables 1-6)

Results and Analysis

Hypothesis 1

In order to accurately test our hypothesis that stronger ideological identification with Israel and Judaism correlates positively with intention to make Aliyah, we ran two regressions, one with the

20 . Nationality, apart from personal nationality, was also evaluated in relation to one's Jewish Identity, specifically if one defined oneself as Jewish-"American" (or other nationality) or "American"-Jewish. This question was used in a large number of studies examining Jews in America, and around the world, including a study conducted by Shimon herman, appearing word-for-word. appeared, word for word, used to examine Jewish students from 5 different countries (1979: 52).

21 We chose to phrase the question specifically in this way because people prefer not to discuss the amount of money they earn every month (Ariely, 2013). In addition, the choice of a young population (18-30) means that a large portion of the respondents don't yet have regular jobs, so we chose to phrase the question in a way that doesn't refer to the respondents' salary, but their relative economic position in society.

variable “Strength of Economy in Decision Making” and one without (Table 19). The first regression had a R-squared of .29, accounting for 29% of the Aliyah motives among respondents, and was statistically significant (P-value < F = 0.00), so that we may reject the Null Hypothesis (with a degree of over 99% certainty) that our sample results do not represent the population.

The Y-constant was not statistically significant, therefore although our sample population was initially disposed to a very low extent in intention to make Aliyah, holding all other variables constant, at 0.12, these results are only applicable to our sample. Level of education, income tier, and the perceived strength of the Israeli economy correlated negatively with intent to make Aliyah, but only education level yielded statistically significant results, so that the coefficient can be considered a reliable representation of the population by 95% (p value < 0.05). Holding all other variables constant, an increase in one unit of “education level” correlates negatively with intention to make aliyah by 0.18 of a unit. This means that the higher the level of education, the less likely is ones intention to make Aliyah.

In addition, the two variables measuring Zionist identity were statistically significant – celebrating Israeli holidays and personal Zionist identification, as was the economic incentives scale variable, all within a 99% of being representative of the greater population (p. value < 0.05). A change in one unit of celebrating Israeli Holidays correlates positively with a change of .23 units of intention to make Aliyah, while Zionist identity correlates positively by a change of .24 units, and government provided economic incentives correlates positively by a change of .18 units. Using the beta coefficients to compare their relative impact on intention to make Aliyah, economic incentives and celebrating Israeli holidays both impact equally (0.06) while Zionist identity correlates 30% more (0.09). This confirms that North American youth will be more likely to be motivated to make aliyah due to the economic incentives offered by the Israeli government, as well as Zionist ideology, through self-identification and practice. On the other hand, there is a neutralizing effect of slightly below half of this positive correlation of desire to make aliyah, with each additional year of education, comparing beta coefficients (0.09).

Although not statistically significant, it is interesting to note that the strongest positive correlation is that of the Jewish Identity variable, with a beta coefficient of 0.15. Jewish identity correlated strongly with desire to make aliyah in our sample - an increase in one unit of Jewish identity correlates positively with an increase of .27 units in intention to make aliyah . These results, although telling, ought to be re-tested using other population samples before they can be applied to

the general population with any degree of reliability.

After running the second regression model, including the variable “Aliyah decision based on the strength of the Israeli Economy”, the R-squared increased from 0.29 to 0.33, which indicates that the addition of the new variable can now account for 33% of all respondent motives concerning Aliyah. Jewish identity, both variables of Zionist identity, and decision to make aliyah based on economic incentives all correlate positively with desire to make Aliyah, while income and education level correlate negatively, all with a 95% statistically significant likelihood of representing the population, although Zionist identity is at 99% likely of being statistically significant. Holding all other variables equal, a change in one unit of Jewish identity will correlate positively with a change of 0.34 units, celebrating Israeli holidays by 0.18, and Zionist self-identity by .3, as well as decision to make aliyah based on economic incentives by 0.16 of a unit, per unit of intention to make Aliyah. In comparing the beta coefficients, Jewish identity is by far the strongest correlation, at (0.13), although combining both Zionist ideology variables, falls just under their combined correlation of (0.15). The negative correlation of education (-0.9) and income level (-0.06) combined are less than 50% of the rest of the positive correlations at a combined beta coefficient of (0.34).

Finally, although not statistically significant, the correlation of the beta coefficient of economic incentives(0.07) was only slightly stronger than the statistically significant beta coefficient of “Aliyah decisions based on perception of the Israeli economy by the respondents” (0.06).

The results confirmed our hypothesis that economic incentives and ideology correlate positively with intention to make Aliya, yet found ideology to be far more so; a stronger Jewish and Zionist identity is about twice as likely to intend to make Aliyah than Government-sponsored economic incentives. Within ideology, Jewish identity is almost twice as strong a correlation over Zionist identity, confirming that those who are most religiously committed are the most likely to make Aliyah, confirming Heim's preliminary findings (2007).

The negative correlation between income, education and intention to make Aliyah suggest that the attempt to improve Israel's market through “brain gain” of highly educated and successful migrants using economic incentives is unlikely to be effective - the negative correlation is twice as strong as the positive effect of incentives. The ideal way to target highly educated people may not be through incentives alone or even primarily, but rather through a strengthening of the what seems to have more of an impact – Jewish and Zionist ideology. On the other hand, using government incentives may help to encourage those who already identify as strongly Zionist and Jewish by

providing for their economic needs which may be all that is holding them back from Aliyah. These preliminary conclusions can be further evaluated using interaction regression models, to test for interactions between Ideological identity (both religious and Zionist), income and education.

Interesting, if not statistically significant, is the comparison of beta coefficients between economic incentives and the decision to make Aliyah based on perception of the Israeli economy - all of the economic incentives are only slightly more influential a factor when considering aliyah than the strength of the Israeli economy. This surprising result partially confirms Heim’s hypothesis, which argues that the most important thing the Israeli Government can do to encourage Aaliyah is build and sustain a very strong and competitive job market (2007).

Hypothesis 2

The third model ran a regression analysis including all previous variables, and included the values promoting personal success as a baseline, and values promoting group-communal success, and universal success as dummy variables. Contrary to hypotheses, there was a slight negative correlation between values promoting group-communal success (coefficient of -0.02) as well as promoting the success of universal values (Coefficient of -0.01), and intention to make Aliyah. Holding all other variables constant, initial disposition to make Aliyah (Y constant) for individuals focused on values promoting personal success was 0.15, those focused on values promoting group success was 0.13 and those focused on universal values was 0.14. These results, although surprising, were also very very slight, and not statistically significant, therefore we cannot reject the null hypothesis by 95% that these sample results do not reflect the greater population. Further research to establish a correlation between personal values and intention to make Aliyah is necessary prior to making even preliminary conclusions.

Variable	Hypothesis 1 Model 1 <i>(Without “Aliya decision based on perception of Israel Economy”)</i>	Hypothesis 1 Model 2 <i>(With “Aliya decision based on perception of Israel Economy”)</i>	Hypothesis 2 Model 3 <i>(With “Aliyah decision based on perception of Israel Economy”, + dummy variables: group-communal success; universal success)</i>
Jewish Identity	0.27 (0.15) 0.27	0.34* (0.13) 0.34	0.35* (.015) 0.35
Youth Group	-0.07 (0.04) -0.07	-0.06 (0.04) -0.06	-0.06 (0.04) -0.06

Israeli Holidays	0.21** (0.06) <i>0.20</i>	0.18** (0.06) <i>0.18</i>	0.19** (0.06) <i>0.19</i>
Degree of Zionist Identification	0.23** (0.09) <i>0.20</i>	0.3** (0.09) <i>0.24</i>	0.24** (0.09) <i>0.24</i>
Aaliyah Incentives	0.18** (0.06) <i>0.18</i>	0.09 (0.07) <i>0.08</i>	0.08 (0.08) <i>0.08</i>
Education Level	-0.18* (0.09) <i>-0.18</i>	-0.19* (0.09) <i>-0.19</i>	-0.2* (0.09) <i>-0.2</i>
Income Tier	-0.08 (0.06) <i>-0.08</i>	-0.13* (.06) <i>-0.13</i>	-0.13* (0.06) <i>-0.13</i>
Perceived Strength of Israel Economy	-0.09 (0.16) <i>-0.09</i>	-0.08 (0.16) <i>-0.08</i>	-0.08 (0.16) <i>-0.08</i>
Job Market	0.01 (0.14) <i>0.01</i>	-0.02 (0.13) <i>-0.02</i>	-0.02 (0.14) <i>-0.02</i>
Aliya decision based on strength of Israel Economy	-	0.16* (0.06) <i>0.16</i>	0.16* (0.07) <i>0.16</i>
Personal Success	-	-	
Group Success	-	-	-0.02 (0.04) <i>-0.02</i>
Universal Success	-	-	-0.01 (0.04) <i>-0.01</i>
Y - Constant	0.16 (.12) <i>0.16</i>	0.14 (0.12) <i>0.14</i>	0.15 (0.12) <i>0.15</i>
N	143	143	
R Squared	0.29**	0.33**	

Note: Table lists variable coefficient, with standard error in parentheses, followed by beta coefficient, p value 0.05; ** p value 0.01

Hypothesis 3

Both ideological and economic incentives positively affect Aliyah, therefore, we wish to find out the degree of multicollinearity between the variables, to find out if one variable acts as a control variable on the other, reducing the effect the other would have. Testing for multicollinearity between Jewish Identity, Zionist identity and Aaliyah Incentives, with a VIF value of less than 10 (the mean VIF value for all variables is 1.17) and a tolerance value greater than 0.1. These results allow us to reject multicollenearity, and offer preliminary conclusions suggesting that each variable and their corresponding values and effects do not overlap, but rather add a percentage of the explanation for Aaliyah. In layman's terms, economic incentives and ideological incentives are complementary elements, not competitive.

Conclusion

The decision to make Aaliyah is an exceptionally convoluted process which takes into consideration a seemingly insurmountable amount of information, regardless of the country of origin of the prospective immigrant. However, this study attempted to view Aaliyah through the lens of North American youth, which has no doubt different considerations than other Jewish populations scattered across the world.

This study confirmed that the most significant factor in considering Aliyah is ideological incentives, primarily a strong Jewish identity, followed by Zionist ideology, with economic considerations trailing behind, as third. In addition, economic incentives and ideological incentives were confirmed as complimentary rather than competitive, both incentivizing different aspects of the aliyah process. On the other hand, increasing income and education are actually negative factors affecting the intention to make Aliyah. This paper did not reach any conclusive correlation between the endogenous effect personal-identity as defined by one's own values and intention to make Aliyah. This does not disprove the “self-selection” theory of migration, but could be chalked up to research design, and would benefit from further research.

These results seem to confirm Chiswick's suggestion that ideological migrants tend to reduce the “brain gain” aspect of self-selection which usually typifies the economic considerations of modern migration from wealthy countries (1999). Wealthy, educated North American Jews who are secular and non-Zionist, tend to be less attracted to the rather weaker performance of Israel's economy, and the less attractive job-opportunities. Only a combination of strong economic

performance combined with government-provided economic incentives is likely to provide sufficient incentive to migrate, in the absence of ideological motivations. Further research into this area would include using interaction models of regression analysis to identify how those who are wealthy, educated, yet ideologically committed to Judaism and Zionism differentiate in relation to economic incentives and disposition to make Aliyah in comparison with their equally educated and wealthy yet non-ideological counterparts.

Concerning policy for incentivizing Aliyah, highly ideological people may only need a little push, provided by economic incentives and a more competitive economy, to decide to make Aliyah. On the other hand, economic incentives must be much larger and combined with a better performing economy before those who are not-ideologically committed to observant Judaism (the vast majority) or Zionism (slightly less influential) will consider making Aliyah. Although the correlation between personal values and self-selection in making aliyah turned up no definitive conclusions, further research in this areas through a restructuring of key survey questions could yield more fruitful results. Particularly useful may be using a combination of weighted questions more aptly evaluating personal values, such as the Schwartz value survey.

This research model used quantitative analysis to confirm several key theories of Aliyah among young people from North America. Further research would evaluate other areas of consideration, such as marital status, family expenses (including health care and Jewish education), exposure to Antisemitism, mandatory military service, converts to Judaism as well as domestic political situation (and personal political orientation)which could yield even more telling and interesting results.

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Statistic Table of Distribution of Variables:

Table1. Intention to make Aliyah.

Variable	Observations	Means	Standard deviation
Aliyah Plans	200	0.41	0.29

Table2. Ideology

Variable	Observations	Mean	Standard deviation
Jewish Identity	199	0.4	0.13
Zionist self-identification	201	0.7	0.25
Celebrate Israeli Holidays	202	0.54	0.3
Youth Group membership	202	77 = no 125 = yes	-

Table3. Significance of Government-Provided financial Incentives

Variable	Observations	Mean	Standard deviation
Government Subsidies	190	0.6	0.3

Table4. Distribution of Personal Values by Category

Variable	Frequency - 0	Frequency - 1
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Personal values-oriented	122 59.8%	82 40.2%
Group-Communal values-oriented	100 49.02%	104 50.98%
Universal values-oriented	93 45.59%	111 54.41%

Table 5. Distribution of perception of Israel's Economy/job market, and whether this affects one's incentive to make Aliyah

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.
Perceived Strength of Israel Economy	201	0.61	0.19
Job Market	201	0.53	0.2
Strength of Economy in Decision Making	202	0.55	0.34

Table 6. Income Tier and Education Level

Variable	Observations	Mean	Standard deviation
Income	180	0.49	0.3
Education level	181	0.56	0.23

Questionnaire

Description and Disclaimer

Dear Participants:

First of all, thank you very much for considering participation in this survey!

Second of all, a quick explanation of the survey. The survey is part of a wider study being conducted by a small research team made up of 3 members (Sarah Leah Rodin, Yair Tiktin, and Fred Goldberg) who are currently pursuing advanced degrees at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. The goal of the study is to better understand what motivates Jewish young people from North American countries (Canada, the United States of America, and Mexico) to make Aaliyah. As such, we are gathering data from as many people in North America as we can who are eligible to make Aaliyah in order to get a clear picture of the dominant forces affecting such a life changing decision (you may even learn a little about yourself, especially your priorities in life and your self-identity!). Following the completion of the study, we plan on submitting a copy of the report to the Israel Foreign Ministry so that they may investigate policy and strategy for promoting Aaliyah in North America. Meaning, you can have a direct effect on policy!

Finally, for your peace of mind, we would like to remind you that your answers and any other information will be anonymous. In addition, you may close your browser and leave the survey at any time or choose not to answer any question that you find too invasive or personal. However, we would ask (for purposes of good and reliable data) that all questions you do choose to answer be answered carefully, thoughtfully, and honestly. There aren't many questions and the survey should take between

15-20 minutes.

Should you have any questions, feel free to get in contact with us!

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Sarah Leah Rodin- sarahleahcanada@gmail.com

Yair Tiktin- yairtiktin@gmail.com

Age*RequiredWhat is your age?

Gender*RequiredWhat is your gender?

- Male
- Female
- Other

Nationality*RequiredWhat is your nationality?

- Canada
- United States of America
- Mexico

Education*RequiredWhat is your most recent level of education completed?

- Primary School
- Secondary School
- Associate Degree or Professional/Vocational Certification
- Bachelor's Degree (BA or BS)
- Master's Degree (MA or MS)
- Doctoral Degree (PhD, MD, DO, JD, etc.)
- Currently Studying (If so, please enter what degree in the 'other' section)
- Other:

Income*RequiredWhere would you place yourself economically in the society in which you live?

- Top Tier
- Middle Tier
- Lower Tier

- I would prefer not to answer

Jewish Identity

The following questions are concerning your identity as a Jew and are necessary for us to compile our data. Thank you very much!

Religious Label How do you identify yourself?

- Ultra Orthodox
- Orthodox
- Modern Orthodox
- Conservative
- Reform
- Reconstructionist
- Humanist
- Other:

Jewish Education What is your level of Jewish Education?

- None
- Hebrew School
- Sunday School
- Jewish Day School
- Post Secondary (Yeshiva or Seminary)
- Home Education

Level of Intermarriage Support Please rate the importance you would give to intermarriage

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Opposed to my views

Completely acceptable

Yearly Synagogue Attendance About how many times in a given year do you attend synagogue, (NOT including special events such as weddings, funerals, Bar/Bat Mitvah, etc.)?

- None

- High Holidays Only (Rosh HaShana and/or Yom Kippur)
- Between 3 and 11 times a year
- Every Month
- Every Week
- Everyday

Level of Kashrut What is your level of adherence to the laws of Kashrut

- None
- I don't eat certain things (e.g., pork, milk with meat, shellfish, etc.)
- Fully Kosher at home
- Fully Kosher at home and away
- Strict (Glatt)

Zionist Identity

The following questions concern your personal level of Zionist beliefs

Youth Group Have you ever been a member in a Zionist youth group? If yes, please specify which group and how many years in the 'other' section.

- Yes
- No
- Other:

Israel Visitation Using only numbers, please indicate how many times you have visited Israel

Degree of Zionist Identification Please rate the importance of Zionism for you personally

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Opposed to my principles

Of supreme importance

Israeli Holidays Do you celebrate Israeli holidays (Yom HaAtzmaut, Yom HaZiqaron, Yom Yerushalayim, etc.)

- Never

- Periodically (with family and/or local community)
- All the time

The following section of questions concern how you personally identify yourself

American/Canadian/Mexican Jew or Jewish (A/C/M)How do you identify personally?

- American Jew
- Canadian Jew
- Mexican Jew
- Jewish American
- Jewish Canadian
- Jewish Mexican

Ideological ActionTaking action based on ideology is important to me (examples: voting, joining a protest, writing to an elected official, etc.)

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Not important to me
at all

Of supreme
importance to me

Defining CharacteristicsPlease choose 4 elements that most define you from the list below

- Gender
- Sexuality
- Religious Identity
- Jewish
- American
- Canadian
- Mexican
- Political Identity
- Zionist
- Patriotic
- Idealist

- Spiritual

Personal Importance Please choose 4 elements from the list below that are most important to you

- Financial Success
- Fame
- Power
- Family
- Zionism
- Judaism
- Political Action
- Human Rights
- Social Justice
- Individual Liberty
- Peace
- Equality
- Friends
- Security
- Love
- Spirituality

Aaliyah

Aaliyah Plans Do you actively plan on making Aaliyah?

- Yes
- No
- Undecided/Possibly in the future

Aaliyah importance Please indicate the importance you give to making Aaliyah in general

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Opposed to my Of supreme

principles

importance

Likelihood of Aaliyah How likely is it that you will make Aaliyah?

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Opposed to my principles

Extremely likely

Deciding Factor What would the most important factor be, for you, in making Aaliyah?

Aaliyah Incentives

Please indicate the level of importance the following incentives would have (or do have) on your chances of making Aaliyah

Absorption Basket (Sak Klita) Cash/Bank payments every month for 6 months following Aaliyah (18,000 NIS for singles and 35,000 NIS for couples)

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

No importance at all

Of supreme importance

Rent Subsidy Rent subsidies of 223 NIS per month for singles until the 5th year, when it decreases to 89 NIS/month. 402 NIS/month for families, 322 NIS/month in 3rd year, 223 NIS/month in 4th year, and 99 NIS/month in the 5th year.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

No importance at all

Of supreme importance

Health Coverage Full coverage in any Kupat Cholim (Health Fund); free coverage for those who are unemployed

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

No importance at all

Of supreme importance

Ulpan Free Hebrew Instruction courses available all over Israel

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

No importance at all Of supreme importance

Customs Benefits Reduced tax for purchase or importation of a vehicle and tax free importation of household goods and appliances from any country

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

No importance at all Of supreme importance

Israeli Tax Israeli Income Tax breaks (for all income earned in Israel)

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

No importance at all Of supreme importance

Foreign Tax Tax breaks on passive and active income earned overseas

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

No importance at all Of supreme importance

Municipal Tax Decreased property tax of 70-90%

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

No importance at all Of supreme importance

Mortgage Discount Low interest rates, for up to roughly 150,000 NIS

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

No importance at all Of supreme importance

Ticket Free one-way ticket to Israel

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

No importance at all Of supreme importance

University Tuition Break Assistance for year preparatory course, assistance for candidates seeking BA up the age of 23, and assistance for candidates seeking MA up to the age of 27

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

No importance at all

Of supreme importance

Israeli Economy

Strength of Israeli Economy How strong of an economy do you think Israel has?

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Extremely weak

Exceptionally strong

Job Market How strong of a job market do you think Israel has?

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Extremely weak

Exceptionally strong

Decision How much does your perception of the strength of the Israeli economy and it's job market affect your decision to make Aaliyah?

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

No importance at all

Of supreme importance
