

Indoctrinating Intolerance: The Cases **of Hamas and Sinn Fein**

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13/6/10

Throughout the 20th century and the first decade of the 21st century, there have been lots of groups which challenge different states, demanding recognition of separation. Most of these groups begin with a political grievance against a certain power in the region, and are usually categorized as ‘extremist’ – due to their desire to break the current political situation and replace it with another one. However, little attention has been given to the nature of the extreme political outlook after the groups have achieved power. This article focuses on two groups, Sinn Fein at the beginning of the 20th century and Hamas at the beginning of the 21st century, and examines the manifestation and indoctrination of political intolerant factors after the movements were in positions of power. The conclusions suggest that several intervening factors, including level of religious orientation, surrounding international circumstances, and relative extremism of the initial political intolerance can all play key factors in the party’s desire and ability to indoctrinate or refrain from indoctrinating extreme political intolerance after achieving power.

Researchers studying the transmission of intolerance have generally examined how prejudice is passed from one individual to another. The former is usually a parent, teacher or other figure of authority in an instructive position, while the latter is a child or individual with still unformulated opinions and beliefs. This paper complements previous research by examining how institutions, specifically government and political movements, can transmit intolerances to future generations. It asks the questions of how, what kind, and to what extent are political intolerance factors, codified in a party’s original platform, later transferred to their educational policies? Why do some groups attempt to indoctrinate intolerance after gaining power and some not? Using qualitative methodology, this research applies the psychological factors indicative of intolerance in individuals to the platforms and mission statements of two political parties, who are or were each classified as extremist groups: Sinn Fein in 1922 and Hamas in 2006. Following that, the research traces how these factors manifest themselves in the parties’ educational policies. The answers found in this study can assist in predicting what kind of youth a government will produce, as well as contribute to policy decisions and evaluation of extremist groups striving for power.

The study of the transference of political beliefs usually focuses on psychological analysis, as well as the nature of the beliefs, and the relational environment in which they are conveyed. The research on tolerance also focuses on other personality traits that can lead to intolerance or tolerance. The current study does not focus on the individual aspect of personality traits or psychological factors, but rather examines manifestations of beliefs and attitudes that

lead to intolerance, applying the research to political movements. Additionally, we do not examine actual transition; rather we look at the manifestations in educational policy. While this policy will in turn affect the children of the next generations, it is important to note that we do not measure the actual successful transfer of intolerant beliefs. Rather, we examine the attempt at such a transfer. Thus, the study focuses on the transference of political intolerance from a movement's original party line to its educational policies, examining manifestations of such political intolerant factors. Following the analysis, the paper will conclude with an exploration into possible explanations of the findings.

Methodology

This research employs on a qualitative analysis of political intolerance within the movements Sinn Fein and Hamas, and examines how these political intolerance factors manifested themselves in educational policies of the two groups following their rise to power.

The groups were chosen for comparison for several reasons. Both groups began with demands for national ethnic-separatism against an occupying power, and were elected to lead their peoples in democratic elections following partial achievements of their goals. This alone forms the basis of a good comparison, as both extreme groups had the opportunity to become political powers and lead an elected government – dictating educational policies as well. In addition, beyond these similarities, a comparison between the groups can contribute much information also due to their differences. Sinn Fein led a political campaign (affiliated with the IRA which supplemented the campaign with violence) against Britain under the banner of political freedom. Following a partial success, the group turned their efforts inward and worked to construct a functional modern society in Ireland.¹ Contrary to that, Hamas led a mixed political-religious violent campaign against Israel. Following Hamas' rise to power the group continued to lead a war against Israel, while focusing their internal efforts on this cause.² It is due to these similar initial conditions but different development trajectories that these two groups have been chosen for comparison in this paper.

The first part of the paper discusses the scholarly work on identified indicators of intolerance, laying out the theoretical framework for analysis. Following that each organization, Sinn Fein and Hamas, will be analyzed in the following manner: first, the founding documents of the organizations will be examined, as these documents represent the initial ideas and ideological background each movement built upon. Each movement rose to power under the banners of these founding documents, and therefore such a qualitative examination can provide insight into what kinds of political intolerances each group contained. Having established what manifestations of political intolerances each organization built upon, the educational policies enacted by each group within a four year span from when they came to power will be analyzed, pinpointing manifestations of political intolerances – or lack thereof.¹ Finally, the results will be discussed and some explanations offered regarding the different manifestations of political intolerance each group presented.

Literature review: political intolerance

The literature on political tolerance identifies several factors indicative of intolerant attitudes. The most essential of these factors are **perceived threat**, **group identity**, and **world view**. This research also explores religious intolerance, and as such it is necessary to discuss other indicators identified as political intolerance, namely **right wing authoritarianism** (RWA), which is associated with religious intolerance, and the **content of religious beliefs**. Moreover, because this project pertains to the realm of education it is important to also look at encouragement of **freedom of expression versus conformity**, as this has great influence on how young children are socialized and eventually develop tolerant or intolerant attitudes. These indicators are elaborated below.

Perceived threat is defined as both socio-tropic and egocentric. Socio-tropic refers to “a generalized anxiety and sense of threat to society, the country as a whole or the regions where one lives and a threat to one’s community, group, or way of life”; egocentric threat is a “threat to oneself or one’s family.”³ Perceived threat can also be classified along the dimensions of

¹ A four year term has been chosen to match Hamas' time in office until today: January 2006 – 2010.

symbolic threat versus realistic threat. As implied by the title, symbolic threat is essentially a psychological phenomenon where one feels as if his or her values and way of life are in danger. By contrast, realistic threat centers on the real competition over limited resources.⁴ Thus we have two spectrums of perceived threat: one where the threat is viewed to be either generalized (sociotropic) or specific (egocentric); and another where the threat is perceived as actual (realistic) or psychological (symbolic).

Group identity is qualitatively different from perceived threat. Strong positive in-group identity or strong in-group ties do not necessarily lead to intolerance. It is only when the content of the group identity is discriminatory that prejudice arises, leading to political intolerance. Therefore, we examine if negative out group attitudes are expressed as part of group identity.⁵

In relation to political tolerance/intolerance, the literature defines **worldview** as being comprised of three attitude spectrums: trust versus mistrust, optimism versus pessimism, and altruism versus self-centeredness. Mistrust, pessimism, and self-centeredness are associated with intolerance, while trust, optimism, and altruism are associated with tolerance.⁶

As noted, because of the religious factors involved in our research we also examine **Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA)** and the **content of religious beliefs**. Studies examining fundamentalism, which is traditionally associated with intolerance, have found that it consists of two parts: “Christian Orthodoxy” and right wing authoritarianism. While the former does not necessarily correlate with intolerance and actually has been found to correspond positively with tolerance, the latter is an indicator of intolerance.⁷ Hunsberger characterizes RWA qualities as embodying authoritarian aggression, authoritarian submission, and conventionalism. Likewise, in general people or groups who exhibit RWA are characterized as “glorifying power, admiring authoritative figures, submitting to demands, and having contempt for weakness, sentimentality, or compassion.”⁸ Even within “Christian Orthodoxy” the **content of religious beliefs** can be significant in predicting intolerance. Researchers find that religion is associated with intolerance in the case of specific beliefs: when someone believes a holy book is the true word of God; where they perceive God as a wrathful figure; or where they “belong to a powerful yet embattled religious group.”⁹ Thus, while religion in itself does not automatically correlate with intolerance, several factors embedded in religion are tied to intolerant beliefs.

Lastly, research tells us that the encouragement of **freedom of expression**, instead of **conformity**, encourages tolerance, and vice-versa. Studies show that groups which allow freedom of expression within them also support freedom of expression for out-groups as well. In contrast, groups which encourage conformity within their group, meaning they do not let even those who hold the same or relatively similar opinions express themselves freely, also prevent members of out-groups from expressing themselves.¹⁰ Thus, encouragement of freedom of expression within the in-group tends to promote tolerance, while encouragement of conformity promotes intolerance.

In conclusion, the indicators of political intolerance examined in this study include: perceived threat; discriminatory or prejudiced group identity; a world view comprised of mistrust, pessimism, and self-centeredness; right wing authoritarianism and elements within religious beliefs; and the group attitude towards freedom of expression. Following, we review a brief history of each group, and proceed to analyze the group charters and manifestations of political intolerances within their educational policies.

Historical background

Hamas, Harakat al-Muqawammah al-Islammiyya – "the Islamic Resistance Movement", was formed in the Gaza Strip in December, 1987. The founding circle of seven people came together under the banner of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gaza Strip,² and set forth on a mission to address the Palestinian national issue through a religious interpretation.¹¹ The movement was formally elected to lead the Palestinian Authority in 2006; however in July 2007 it staged a violent political coup in the Gaza Strip. The Hamas government was subsequently disbanded by Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas, which effectively left a Hamas-run dictatorship in control of the Gaza Strip.

² The Muslim Brotherhood is an Islamic organization dedicated to cultural and educational reform within the Muslim world in order to restore the core principles of Islam, including the Shari'a, to their dominant role. For further reading see: Dore Gold, Hatred's Kingdom (The United States: Rangery Publishing Inc., 2003), pp. 60-65, 90-93; Benjamin Daniel and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (New-York: Random House Inc., 2002), pp. 57-59.

Around 80 years earlier in Ireland, Sinn Fein emerged. Sinn Fein, "we ourselves" or "self reliance" in Gaelic – a name which exemplifies to a large extent what the party stood for at its inception, was the most important of many political movements in the early twentieth century in Ireland, led by Arthur Griffith. The basis of Sinn Fein's establishment was that only the Irish people had the ability to rescue themselves from what they considered a foreign occupation of Ireland by the British. The party demanded of the Irish people to cultivate a regeneration of the Irish nation politically, linguistically, industrially, educationally, morally and socially.¹² The Sinn Fein party was committed to sovereign independence for Ireland, and there were those in the party who advocated reaching this goal through violence against the British while others called simply for political organization and passive resistance.¹³ Sinn Fein won the majority of seats in the 1918 election and from this point on the party played a key role in controlling Ireland's government.

Thus, even from a brief history of both movements, we can already see some essential similarities and differences. While both were willing to use violence in order to advance ethno-nationalism, a willingness which earned them the title of extremists, Hamas's identity is based much more on religion, while Sinn Fein founded their group based on a national and political identity.

We now turn to an analysis of each group, its founding documents and its educational policies, respectively.

Sinn Fein

Founding Documents

Within Sinn Fein's founding documents, perceived threat appears to be the dominant intolerance factor, while others also appear to some degree. The perceived threat that appears in Sinn Fein's documents is of socio-tropic nature, namely it expresses a sense of threat towards Ireland and Irish culture as an entire collective. While Sinn Fein also espouses a strong group identity, most examples of it are of positive in-group identity, rather than negative or

discriminatory sentiment directed at an out-group. Though positive group identity is not in itself an example of political intolerance, the existence of positive group identity signifies the possibility of a manifestation of negative group identity in future policies.

In the discussions of the Dail Eireann (Assembly of Ireland), the parliament of the unilaterally declared Irish Republic which existed from 1919-1922, it was declared that “the Irish people are locked in a life and death struggle with their traditional enemy... all our energies must be directed towards the clearing out... [of] the foreign invader of our country.”¹⁴ This is a clear example of the perceived threat sentiment that the Sinn Fein party harbored towards the British. The use of the phrase “life and death struggle” indicates the severity with which they viewed the British threat. Another clear example of Sinn Fein’s perceived threat is stated in their Declaration of Independence: “English rule in this country is, and always has been, based upon force and fraud and maintained by military occupation against the declared will of the people.” The Declaration goes on to state, “We solemnly declare foreign government in Ireland to be an invasion of our national right which we will never tolerate, and we demand the evacuation of our country by the English Garrison.”¹⁵ Both of these quotes exemplify the threat that Sinn Fein perceived from any English presence in Ireland.

As Mentioned, Sinn Fein also displayed a positive in-group identity, which can be seen in language describing a “free and Gaelic Ireland,”¹⁶ and the “right of the people of Ireland to the ownership of Ireland, and to the unfettered control of Irish destinies to be indefeasible.”¹⁷ The Message to the Free Nations of the World describes Ireland as “one of the most ancient nations in Europe”, and explains that Ireland has “preserved her national integrity, vigorous and intact, through seven centuries of foreign oppression: she has never relinquished her national rights.”¹⁸ This language exhibits Sinn Fein’s strong in-group identity because it emphasizes Irish nationalism and a desire to perpetuate Irish culture in the Irish homeland.

In addition to perceived threat and positive group identity, there is some religious language articulated in the Sinn Fein founding documents. The Declaration of Independence uses the phrase “Almighty God”, and the writers of the Declaration “ask His divine blessing on this, the last stage of the struggle we have pledged ourselves to carry through to Freedom.”¹⁹ The religious language used in the Sinn Fein founding documents shows that the political party felt it

was important to mention the role of religion in their documents, however it must be noted that the God mentioned in the Sinn Fein documents is not described as a wrathful God, who might take action against Sinn Fein's enemies, but rather one who will help the party in their struggle for freedom.

Thus, perceived threat remains the main intolerant indicator identified within Sinn Fein's founding documents. While other indicators may appear, they do not exhibit the usual tenants which lead to political intolerance.

Educational Policies

Though the intolerance indicator of perceived threat appears many times in the founding documents of Sinn Fein in the form of statements against the British nation and the British government, this political intolerance does not appear to manifest itself in the educational system implemented after Sinn Fein came to power. The only manifestation of what might be linked to perceived threat appears in Sinn Fein's educational policies in the context of strengthening the Irish identity. Michael Laffan explains that many of those who supported a linguistic revolution believed this was a necessary aspect of both a military and a cultural struggle against England.²⁰ Perceived threat was not an intolerance that made its way into the educational system in a significant way.

It is possible to see manifestations of the positive group identity found in Sinn Fein's founding documents, enacted in the educational policies after Sinn Fein took power in the government. With the strong push by the government to alter the national culture of Ireland to be "more Irish," the educational system was widely affected on all levels. The infusion of the Gaelic language into Irish schools is a strong manifestation of the positive group identity because the government felt the need to strengthen the unique culture of the country once it gained independence. "Tragically for the history of independent Ireland,...over many decades it subordinated the educational needs of Irish children to the dictates of linguistic nationalism."²¹ Laffan goes on to explain that during the time period of Sinn Fein's power in Ireland, a mood emerged that was intolerant to the English language, and there was a determination that Irish would be necessary for success in school and in life in Ireland. John Coolahan echoes this

sentiment by explaining that following Sinn Fein's election, a period inspired by the idea of cultural nationalism took over and the schools were used as the agents of change in this Irish and Gaelic revolution. Through Sinn Fein's policy changes to the educational system, the subjects of Irish and Gaelic culture were given top priority in the schools, while other subjects were focused on much less or abandoned.²²

It is obvious that a strong group identity was intentionally developed and cultivated in Sinn Fein's educational policies. This trend continued far beyond the scope of research covered in this paper, and is seen in the Higher Education Authority Act of 1971 which states that "An tÚdarás (Higher Education Authority) shall bear constantly in mind the national aims of restoring the Irish language and preserving and developing the national culture and shall endeavor to promote the attainment of those aims."²³ It is clear that this strong in-group identity was passed along to Ireland's children.

The religious language that was expressed in some of Sinn Fein's founding statements also did not manifest itself in Sinn Fein's educational policies. Despite the religious split that existed between Ireland and England, Ireland being more tied to Catholicism and England more to Protestantism,²⁴ religious intolerance was still not manifested in the educational policies of Sinn Fein.

Therefore, in examining Sinn Fein's educational policies, there does not appear to be a transmission of political intolerances from the group's original platform to its educational policies. It is significant that contrary to perceived threat, which is not found in Ireland's educational policies under Sinn Fein, strong in-group identity – which was indoctrinated to the educational system under Sinn Fein, does not necessarily correlate with political intolerance. Next, Hamas' covenant and educational policies are explored.

Hamas

Founding Documents

Contrary to Sinn Fein, Hamas, as a religious terror movement devoted to the violent destruction of Israel, exhibits many forms of political intolerance in its original covenant, which were enacted and carried out following their ascent to power.

Firstly, Hamas was built out of a sense of perceived threat which, like Sinn Fein, was particularly of the socio-tropic nature. Their outlook consists of perceived threat to the entire society from the Jews and Zionism and from secular culture and Westernism.²⁵ It is precisely this sense of threat which led the movement to establish itself "out of the midst of troubles and the sea of suffering... out of the sense of duty, and in response to Allah's command" (Hamas covenant: introduction).

Secondly, the group identity builds upon an intolerant out-group image, and is established by dictating that Muslims who embrace the worldview of the Islamic Resistance Movement are a part of a group, while others, anyone in "the Communist East and the Capitalist West", are enemies.²⁶ Furthermore, the covenant completely demonizes Zionism and Jews throughout history, placing Islam against other religions and embracing "the Islamic nature of Palestine is part of our religion".²⁷

Thirdly, the world view of the group correlates with indicators of political intolerance as well. The movement is highly mistrusting of world forces, and asserts that "World Zionism, together with imperialistic powers, try through a studied plan and an intelligent strategy to remove one Arab state after another from the circle of struggle against Zionism",²⁸ and that peace conferences supported by powers around the world are in fact "only ways of setting the infidels in the land of the Moslems as arbitrators".²⁹ Due to their bleak outlook of the world and the dangers to Moslems in it it is difficult to characterize the group as optimistic, however the religious nature of the group does lead to a certain measure of optimism, as the religious outlook foretells that eventually the group will "conquer the enemy and realize the victory of Allah".³⁰

Right Wing Authoritarianism is displayed throughout the Movement's covenant and history. The covenant explains that "it is necessary that scientists, educators and teachers, information and media people, as well as the educated masses, especially the youth and sheikhs of the Islamic movements, should take part in the operation of awakening (the masses). It is important that basic changes be made in the school curriculum",³¹ and states that "the day Islam is in control of guiding the affairs of life, these organizations, hostile to humanity and Islam, will be obliterated".³² This call to conformity is extended when women are called to be placed in their traditional role at home raising the children under the banner of Islam,³³ and the totalitarian image of society is exemplified as the people themselves are called to ban together as "a single body which if one member of it should complain, the rest of the body would respond by feeling the same pains".³⁴ Under Hamas, the authoritative power demands that "it is the duty of the followers of other religions to stop disputing the sovereignty of Islam in this region."³⁵

Finally, Hamas' religious outlook portrays a wrathful God, who will defeat the enemy and judge between the righteous Muslims and the infidels, for "the time [Judgment Day] will not come until Muslims fight the Jews and kill them."³⁶

In sum, it is clear that there are many more indicators of intolerance in Hamas's founding documents and philosophy, than in Sinn Fein's. We now turn to examining the manifestations of these indicators in Hamas's educational policies.

Educational policies

First, it should be stated that much in the way Sinn Fein used education as a vehicle for cultivating Irish identity, Hamas always saw education as being the corner stone of the Islamic revolution. The Hamas covenant states that "it is important that basic changes be made in the school curriculum,"³⁷ and that "it is necessary to follow Islamic orientation in educating the Islamic generations in our region by teaching the religious duties, comprehensive study of the Quran, the study of the Prophet's Sunna..."³⁸ Moreover, the "List of Change and Reform" – the party which Hamas ran as in the 2006 elections, calls "for the implementation of the foundations that underpin the philosophies of education in Palestine. The first of these is that Islam is a comprehensive system..."³⁹ A week after Hamas' victory in the elections, number two on the

party candidate list, Mohammed Abu Teir, stated "that one way Hamas planned to encourage the next generation to follow sharia was to revamp the Palestinian education system, separating girls' and boys' classes and introducing a more Islamic curriculum."⁴⁰ A month later, Mahmoud a-Zahar, one of the founders of Hamas, reinforced this plan, stating that "we will turn every facet of life into resistance. Education will deal with the culture of resistance."⁴¹ And indeed, Hamas set out to implement their political intolerances in the education of the future generations.

Beginning with their political victory in January 2006 and more so since the violent takeover of the Gaza Strip in 2007, Hamas has worked intensively to ensure complete authoritarian control over the educational system. First, exhibiting their demand for conformity and authoritarian rule, Hamas transferred out of the school system teachers whom did not align themselves with the Hamas program, filling their slots with alternative "appropriate" teachers.⁴² These teachers received their educational instructions directly from the Hamas administration.

Complementing these moves, Hamas began to challenge the UNRWA school system – the only major contender to Hamas in providing education in Gaza. Echoing Hamas' negative out-group identity, the movement confronted UNRWA's plan to teach human rights in their schools under the premise that such a subject is inappropriate as it calls for dialog with Israel as opposed to "resistance" (i.e. terror activity).⁴³ Hamas also exhibited mistrust and their sense of perceived threat as the group confronted UNRWA's attempt to teach Holocaust studies in their schools, due to the fear of what developing sympathy for Jews would do to the minds of future generations.⁴⁴ In addition, Hamas rejected UNRWA's plan to send 45 exemplary students in human rights abroad to the US, Holland, Germany and France, due to a fear stemming from the same weakening of the children's perceived threat and group identity.⁴⁵ To counter that, children who presented exemplary skills in religious studies were awarded with a trip to Mecca.⁴⁶ In 2009, girls in the Gaza Strip were given orders by school principles that they were to wear traditional Islamic head scarves and gowns to school or face expulsion.⁴⁷ The administration demanded a complete segregation between boys and girls in school, and issued many political threats towards UNRWA for not completely adhering to this demand.⁴⁸

Hamas ensured conformity by placing its people in educational establishments and positions supposedly not controlled by the administration, such as committees and university boards. This

has always been a strategy of Hamas, and facilitated their influence on Islamic and political extremism within the educational system.⁴⁹

To further extend indoctrination beyond the official school system, Hamas took great lengths to influence Gaza children also in outer-school activities.

Hamas runs an extensive network of summer camps for children, in which over 100,000 children throughout the Gaza Strip take part. These camps, under the banner of "victory for Gaza, glory for Jerusalem", teach the children a radical interpretation of Islam blended with a fostering of the perceived threat and negative out-group attitudes towards Israel. In addition, paramilitary training takes place within the camps, including education on suicide terror activity and the glorification of dying for the cause of Hamas. These activities foster the "glorification of power, admiration of authoritative figures, submission to demands, and contempt for weakness, sentimentality, or compassion"⁵⁰ that are characteristic of right wing authoritarianism. In continuing Hamas' attempt to be the sole influence on the youth in Gaza, Hamas attacked the UNRWA camps for having mixed boy-girl activities, and warned parents not to send their children to camps run by UNRWA, due to that fact that in addition to moral violations, these camps held "activities to promote reconciliation between the Palestinians and Israel".⁵¹ Again, these actions foster conformity, an authoritarian perspective, and negative out-group attitudes.

In addition, Hamas broadcasted on the al-Aqsa channel (set up in 2006 and controlled solely by Hamas) children's television shows designed specifically to indoctrinate all of their political intolerances. Perceived threat from western society and culture and extreme mistrust are transmitted as the Mickey Mouse character, named Farfur, explains to his audience – the children of Gaza, that "we will liberate al-Aqsa with Allah's will, we will liberate Iraq with Allah's will, and we will liberate the Muslims of all countries invaded by murderers..."⁵² The show replaced its main character, Farfur – the Mickey Mouse actor, after he was seen trying to protect his land in Tel-Aviv, Palestine, from being bought by Jews. Due to his refusal to surrender the land, he is subsequently beaten to death by the Jews on screen.⁵³ The Hamas administration continued to foster the religious notion that radical Islam and political violence, characteristics of right wing authoritarianism as noted above, were the proper path in life, as the character of Farfur was replaced by Nahool, a bee who introduces himself as the cousin of Farfur and vows to "continue

the path of Farfur; the path of 'Islam is the solution'; the path of heroism, the path of martyrdom; the path of the Jihad warriors... and in his name we shall avenge the enemies of Allah, the murderers of the Prophet [a slander of Hamas for the Jews], the murderers of innocent children, until al-Aqsa will be liberated from their filth..."⁵⁴ This description of God as desiring vengeance also inculcates the image of a wrathful God, another predictor of intolerance. In a third example exhibiting the fostering of group identity based on extreme out-group threat, following Nahool's death because he couldn't receive medical attention in Gaza, his friend – a bunny named Assud, explains to the Gaza children that "Allah willing, we are the soldiers of tomorrow", and asking his co-host, a young girl dressed in Islamic garments if "we are all martyrdom-seekers, are we not Saara?", the answer of "of course we are... and we will take al-Aqsa. We will liberate al-Aqsa from the filth of those Zionists" is culminated with the bunny proclaiming "I, Assud, will get rid of the Jews, Allah willing..."⁵⁵

It is apparent, therefore, that – contrary to Sinn Fein, almost all of the many variations of political intolerances expressed in Hamas' original covenant manifested themselves, in some cases to an even more extreme nature, in their educational policies following their ascension to power.

Analysis and discussion

The stark differences between the natures of intolerance within each group's original charter are obvious. Hamas' covenant contains articles that display a sense of perceived threat, negative out-group attitudes, mistrust, right wing authoritarianism, and a view of an extreme wrathful God. It should be noted that Hamas also displayed positive in-group attitudes, which is not a factor for intolerance but is important for forming a strong subculture and identity. Additionally, Hamas also showed optimism in predicting their eventual victory. By contrast, Sinn Fein displayed fewer factors of intolerance – both originally, and in their educational policies. Like Hamas, Sinn Fein spoke about a sense of perceived threat from the English, but no other factors of intolerance can be found in their founding documents. Both Sinn Fein and

Hamas described positive in-group attitudes, but Sinn Fein did not supplement this with negative out-group attitudes seen in Hamas.

How did these differences transfer into educational policy? Hamas implemented educational policies that displayed their sense of perceived threat, mistrust, RWA, wrathful God image, negative out-group attitudes, positive in-group attitudes and religious optimism. Moreover, Hamas's educational policy enforces conformity in a more extreme and forceful manner than exhibited in their founding document. By contrast, Sinn Fein's perceived threat did not transmit to their educational policy. A strong positive in-group identity did, but that is not proven to correlate with political intolerance. Thus, of the many factors of intolerance that Hamas displayed, virtually all were manifested within Hamas' educational policies. By contrast, the one factor of intolerance that Sinn Fein displayed did not appear in its educational policy at all.

We now turn to suggesting several possible explanations of the differences between the intolerance factors of Hamas and Sinn Fein, both in their original charters and in their educational policies.

First, one can point to the difference between the nationalist political nature of Sinn Fein vs. the religious framework of Hamas. While Sinn Fein perceived their conflict with Britain as political in nature, Hamas seems to view the political war with Israel one stemming from religious orientation. This would lead to very different trajectories after assuming power. Groups motivated by religious extremism do not operate according to the same rationale as purely political movements. The group knows by virtue of divine inspiration that their goals are the correct moral ones which will ultimately be fully achieved, as their battle is an apocalyptic one perceived as part of a greater divine war.⁵⁶ In addition, contrary to political-separatist groups which perceive conflict-victory on a more political cost-effective basis and will therefore limit their level of intolerance – both in their foundation and in their indoctrination, the religious extremist group perceives itself in an all-out war against the targeted population, and therefore operates on a much more extreme level of intolerance and persistence.⁵⁷ While both groups achieved political power, it is apparent from their founding documents that Sinn Fein followed a political separatist path, whereas Hamas followed a religiously inspired mission.

Due to these differences between the two groups, it can be suggested that the reasons Hamas exhibited far more intolerant factors than Sinn Fein, and the reason that Hamas persisted to attempt to pass on these intolerances in their educational systems, stems from their different ideological backgrounds. As a political separatist group, Sinn Fein did not have anything to gain – neither materialistically nor ideologically, from amplifying their intolerance towards Britain, or from attempting to pass down those feelings in their educational policies. The efforts, as far as Sinn Fein was concerned, could be turned towards internal growth rather than to fostering the conflict. Hamas, in turn, saw advantages both in material human resources and in ideological framework to cultivate, and ultimately indoctrinate, the political intolerance towards Israel. A religious enemy cannot be transformed and the conflict cannot be abandoned, but rather political intolerant factors must be passed on.⁵⁸

Another possible explanation lies in the initial relative extremism of each group. Each intolerance factor does not operate on its own; it works in tandem with other factors of intolerance and tolerance. It could be therefore suggested that because Hamas displayed so many more aspects of intolerance than Sinn Fein, it also changed the way the factors manifested themselves. Intolerant factors, which by themselves may not have been transmitted, could have thus been strengthened and amplified. Not only did Hamas exhibit far more indicators of political intolerance than Sinn Fein, but the level of the indicators present was also different. Both Hamas and Sinn Fein spoke about perceived threat and both at least mentioned religion, but Hamas's sense of threat and perception of God as wrathful was far stronger. It should not come as a surprise, therefore, that such levels of intolerance are far harder to subdue.

Finally, one must consider the different time periods and political surroundings in which each group acted. The time period examined for Sinn Fein was 1921-1925, a time of mass decolonialization on the one hand, and a non-functioning international support system for weaker-sides of conflicts on the other. Additionally, while Sinn Fein and the IRA were politically supported by a limited number of governments throughout the world, they were to a great extent an independent actor.⁵⁹ By contrast, the time period in which Hamas is examined is 2006-2010, in which there is an extremely strong international support for 'underdogs' in conflicts. That, coupled with the fact that Hamas is completely funded, supported, and allied with

exterior forces in the Middle East (Iran, Sudan, Saudi Arabia and more),⁶⁰ leads to striking differences both in capability and motivation of the groups to withhold indoctrinating intolerance to further generations.

Both groups displayed perceived threat – an indicator of political intolerance, and positive in-group attitudes, which is not identified as part of political intolerance. Both of these elements appeared in the original group charters, however perceived threat only manifested itself in education in the case of Hamas. As suggested above, it is possible that the overall nature of Hamas and the fact that it had so many factors of intolerance changes how each individual aspect manifested itself. It may be that perceived threat alone is not powerful enough to carry on to further generations once a group has other political opportunities open to them, as was the case with Sinn Fein. If a group's goal is to build a strong nationalist identity it is somewhat counterproductive to encourage children to fear the other and thus, be afraid to display their own identity. Also, as mentioned earlier, the difference in findings could be because of the relative level of the perceived threat itself within each group. Previous studies have shown that when perceived threat is extreme, it behaves differently than in normal circumstances, and this could be the key factor in the different educational policies between Hamas and Sinn Fein.⁶¹

This paper set out to examine how, to what extent and in what circumstances does political intolerance in extreme movements' philosophy manifest itself in the party's educational policies. We find that, in our sample, there is not necessarily a uniform model for how political intolerances transfer. While Hamas exhibited multiple and extreme examples of intolerance in their original charters and all indicators of intolerance were found in its educational policy, Sinn Fein displayed only one significant factor originally, which did not transfer. This indicates that just because a party has some forms of intolerance, it is not necessarily indoctrinated within their later policies. We suggest several explanations for the stark differences between the findings of Hamas and Sinn Fein. We posit that the differences in the way the intolerances were manifested may be based on differences in religious versus political intolerance; the relative extremism of each group; the blending of several other intolerant factors; or the difference in time period. These possibilities each require further research in order to fully understand how, when. And to what extent political parties attempt to indoctrinate political intolerance.

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- ³ Nancy Isserman, "Identifying Individual Determinants of Intolerance in Holocaust Survivors", in (Johannes-Dieter Steinert and Inge Weber-Newth,eds), Beyond Camps and Forced Labour (Osnabrueck, Germany. Secolo Verlag, 2005), 5.
- ⁴ Donald K. Kinder & David O. Sears. "Prejudice and Politics: Symbolic Racism Versus Racial Threats to the Good Life." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, Vol. 80, no. 3 (1981), p. 414.
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- ⁶ Ibid., 7.
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- ¹³ Michael Laffan. The resurrection of Ireland: the Sinn Féin Party, 1916-1923 (Cambridge University Press 1999), p. 4.
- ¹⁴ Farrell op. cit., p. 76
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- ¹⁶ Farrell op. cit., p. 87
- ¹⁷ Ibid.
- ¹⁸ *Parliamentary Debates: Dáil Éireann - Volume 1 - 21 January, 1919 Message to the Free Nations of the World* (n.d.). Retrieved from <http://historical-debates.oireachtas.ie/D/DT/D.F.O.191901210013.html>
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- ²⁰ Laffan, op. cit., p. 239
- ²¹ Ibid., p. 10.
- ²² John Coolahan, Irish education: its history and structure (Ireland: Institute of Public Administration, 1981) p. 8
- ²³ Office of the Attorney General, (n.d.). *Irish Statute Book: Higher Education Authority Act, 1971*. Retrieved from <http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1971/en/act/pub/0022/>
- ²⁴ Laffan ibid, 236.
- ²⁵ See the Hamas covenant, articles 9, 20, 23, 27, 28, found in Mishal & Sela, op. cit., and at <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/hamas.htm>
- ²⁶ Ibid., article 22.
- ²⁷ Ibid., article 27; see Mark Jurgensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence, (California: Los-Angeles and England: London, University of California Press, 2003), pp. 164-165.
- ²⁸ Hamas Covenant, Ibid., article 32.
- ²⁹ Ibid., article 13.
- ³⁰ Ibid., Introduction. See also articles 31, 33-34.
- ³¹ Ibid., article 15.

³² Ibid., article 17.

³³ Ibid., article 18.

³⁴ Ibid., article 20.

³⁵ Ibid., article 31.

³⁶ Ibid., article 7. See also articles 1, 32.

³⁷ Ibid., article 15.

³⁸ Ibid., article 16.

³⁹ Adrien Katherine Wing & Hisham Kassim, " Hamas, Constitutionalism, and Palestinian Woman", *Howard Law Journal*, 50(2), 2007, p. 506. Also found at:

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<http://www.jihadwatch.org/2006/01/hamas-separate-classes-for-girls-and-boys.html>

⁴¹ Weiner and Weissman, op. cit., pp. 1-2.

⁴² Jonathan Figchel, " Hamas, Al-Qaeda and the Islamisation of the Palestinian Cause", p. 4, found at

http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/ELCANO_Hamas_AlQaeda_IslamisationPalestinianCause.pdf

⁴³ http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/Hebrew/heb_n/html/hamas_082.htm

⁴⁴ http://palwatch.org/main.aspx?fi=157&doc_id=1292

⁴⁵ http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/Hebrew/heb_n/html/hamas_082.htm

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⁵⁰ Rubenstein, op. cit.

⁵¹ http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/hamas_e078.pdf

⁵² http://palwatch.org/main.aspx?fi=624&fld_id=624&doc_id=607

⁵³ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6257594.stm> ; and see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m3vGDmdEP_0 , aired June 29, 2007.

⁵⁴ http://www.pmw.org.il/asx/PMW_Nahul130707.asx , aired July 13, 2007.

⁵⁵ <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eeji225G-HM&feature=related> , aired February 2, 2009.

⁵⁶ Alan M. Dershowitz, *Why Terrorism Works* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2002), pp. 95-98, 181-182.

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⁵⁸ Mark Jurgensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence*, (California: Los-Angeles and England: London, University of California Press, 2000), p. 217.

⁵⁹ *Parliamentary Debates: Dáil Éireann - Volume 1 - 21 January, 1919 Declaration of Independence*, (n.d.).

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⁶⁰ Mashal & Sela, op. cit., p. 126; http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/Hebrew/heb_n/pdf/iran_007.pdf

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