

The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Faculty of Social Science

Department of Political science

Religion, Education and Voting for Women in Israel

Final Work: "Approaches and Theories in Political Science"

Presented to: Professor Mario Sznajder and Mr. Chanan Cohen

By Lee Yarkoni and Omer Cohen

Jerusalem

June, 2014

Index

Index	1
Abstract.....	2
Introduction.....	3
Theoretical background	4
Women in Israeli politics	12
Methodology.....	15
Analysis and Results	20
Conclusions and discussion	25
Bibliography	28

Abstract

Although the situation has improved, women are one of the least represented groups in Israeli politics, especially in view of the fact that they constitute them as more than half of the population. In this research we wished to understand how the level of religiousness and education influence the willingness to vote for women. We used the INES data base from the 2013 election in order to do so. We found a weak but existing correlation between those two factors and the willingness to vote for women. The results show that the most influential factor is level if religiousness, but that education has some influence too. By examining these results, we try to explain how our research has contributed to the field and maybe provide some suggestions in how to improve the wiliness to vote for women.

Introduction

Although many years have passed since women were giving the right to vote and elect, in the vast majority of the western world, women are still a minority in the political sphere, especially when looking at senior positions. One of the reasons for that, according to many studies, is that even today many people still holds traditional beliefs and perceptions regarding to women in the political sphere.

Regarding to Israel, in the 2013 election, amazing records of 27 women were elected for the Knesset. Three parties were led by women. Although this seems impressive, one must keep in mind that those "achievements" are significantly low in comparison to many western countries. The women representation in Israeli politics is low, even when considering Golda Meir's success. The facts are that few women reach the Knesset, and even fewer serve in high influence positions. None of the existing researches on this matter aimed to test voting for women considering demographic factors such as education and religion. Therefore, our aim in this research is to try to assess how two main demographic factors influence one's decision to vote or not vote for women candidate, especially for high-influence positions, like the prime minister.

There is no doubt that religion has a major influence on voting patterns. Several studies have explained the association between religiosity and political conservatism, which reflected in willingness to vote for women candidates, as organic connection. Other studies have pointed the social context as the cause to the association between the two variables, and claimed that the information that religious people get in a certain context leads them to adopt more conservative positions. In Israel, however, the relationship between religiousness, conservatism and willingness to vote for women even stronger, due to formal and semi-formal layers of the religious law. Therefore, we believe that religiousness a strong effect on the decision on voting for women.

On the other hand, studies have shown education as a significant factor which affects the willingness to vote for women. This connection, in the American context, is explained by the "life cycles" of the political issues - those adopted first by the more educated social elites, and only later by the less educated. In addition,

different interpretations have been given to explain the relationship between education and liberal positions. Psychodynamic theory explains the relationship by the personally confident of the educated while theory of socialization explained the relationship by the educated ability to get out from the common culture.

The powerful impact those two factors have on individual, made us choose them for our research and we will try to test which one of them is more influential.

In order for us to be able to present a clear, accurate picture of this influence, we must take in to consideration alternative explanations that might be the actual factors which explain the willingness to vote for women. The first derives from the unique Israeli context- the security situation. The second and universal factor so-to-speak, is the influence of changing in social norms, which will be evident, or at list we believed it will, in different age groups.

The first section of this research will provide the theoretical background for our research question and our hypotheses that will be presented afterwards. There we will present the main researches in the field, which will provide us the base for our hypotheses. The next section will present a brief historical review regarding women's place in the Israeli politics, which we believe is important for understanding the context for this issue. The following section will present the methodology we will employ in our research, and how and why we chose it. The next section will present the analysis and result, and on our last section we will discuss those results and will try to produce conclusions, and assess the advantages and disadvantages of our research.

Theoretical background

Emerging from the contradictions between ideas and ideologies which developed in the modern enlightenment era, the question of women's equality in politics is essentially a modern question.

With the beginning of the industrial modern era and the emergence of capitalism and bourgeoisie, which established the new Western social order, a

distinction between two spheres, private and public, was created. In accordance with this distinction, institutions, rules and norms were determined. This distinction also generated the traditional definition of politics as a field which is not suitable for women. Men began to be perceived as public and political creatures, and women as domestic, apolitical creatures. The process of differentiating the public from the private sphere, which began in the 20th century, peaked during this period with the formation and institutionalization of modern political organizations. Meanwhile, liberal democratic norms, which dealt with the freedom to choose and elect governments, emerged, and political office was increasingly defined as a function of skills and achievements, rather than lineage which has characterized the pre-modern regimes.

The assumption of two separate life spheres was followed by cultural assumptions, according to which each of the two spheres were based on different social organization principles, that were designed to hold different social functions. While the public sphere is associated with the modern-industrial world characteristics (rational, competitive and utilitarian principles, contractual and formal social relations) and therefore receives power and prestige, the private sphere is conceived as the intimate sphere of life, where life is conducted according to principles of mutuality, compromise, care and emotion, which are perceived as traditional community characteristics. This distinction between the public and private spheres was accompanied by a dichotomy between the sexes, on which the house is perceived as the "specialty" of women and the public sphere as a man field. Thus, precisely in a historical period, when the social order became allegedly universal and open to all, a gendering process of the social world occurred.

During the 20th century several gender role changes took place, such as women's entry into the education systems, to labor force and into the political electorate, and in some places even to political roles. Therefore, the question of gender equality is reinforced by the persistent reality of inequality that based on a gender basis even in the 21st century. The way that the democratic order took place as a new political order and women's role in it continues to maintain gender

inequality.¹ Although the number of public offices held by women has recently increased, the women's number in elected positions is lower than that of men.²

Before turning into presenting the theories on which we will base our hypotheses, a much more fundamental question must be asked- why women are reluctant to run for senior political position in the first place? And why do men are reluctant to vote for them? We believe that there is a correlation between the two explanations to those questions. When it comes to women, the explanation lays in the fact that even as early as childhood, young girls are led to believe that the skills that they have, biologically, are not coalfield for the political world. Furthermore, they are taught that their main and must important job in life is to be mothers and wives. Thus this social construction automatically leads to fewer women who are willing; despite everything they were taught, to turn to politics.

The other, related explanation, involves men. They too are taught to believe that women's first job is to be mothers and wives, and that they lack the skills to compete in the political arena. Therefore, when considering women in that arena, the immediate belief about them is that they are obligated, first and foremost, to household maintains, which leaves them little time to engage in state affairs, especially in comparison to men. Those perceptions are even stronger, as we will present, in countries where religion have significant place in the public life. Due to all that, the small number of women in politics, roots the notion among men that women are just not "cut up of it", meaning, the political arena, and that they really have no desire to take part in it.³

Those beliefs and perceptions, led to two main characters of women in politics. The first, women's participation in the local authorities is much bigger then in the national politics. As herzog claimed, the local authorities, especially in Israel, are perceived as less important and as engaged in issues that are "women oriented" such as education.⁴ The second character, regarding to women who are considered as senior politicians, is that most of them are either single or relatively old. The

¹ חנה הרצוג, 'נשים בפוליטיקה ופוליטיקה של נשים', בתוך מין, מגדר ופוליטיקה בעריכת גיורא רוזן (תל אביב: הקיבוץ המאוחד, 1999), עמ' 307-355.

² Albert K Karnig, and Oliver B Walter, 'Election of Women to City Councils', *Social Science Quarterly*, 56 (1976), 605-13.

³ דפנה שרפמן, נשים ופוליטיקה, חיפה: תמר, ע' 19-22

⁴ חנה הרצוג, נשים ריאליות: נשים בפוליטיקה המקומית בישראל, ירושלים: מכון ירושלים לחקר ישראל, 1994, ע' 7

reason for it, is that they perceived as women who do not have to maintain household, or that they have grown children that doesn't need to be taking care of. Examples to those characters can be found in almost every country- in Israel its Golda Meir and Tzipi Livni, in the U.S.A its Hillary Clinton and Condoleezza Rice, and in Europe its Margaret Thatcher and Angela Merkel.

Larsen and Long found a relationship between general conservative attitudes and preference for traditional gender roles (i.e., a preference for men in public positions and women in the private sphere roles).⁵ In addition, some studies linked conservative political positions and high level of religiosity. Malka et al mapped these studies into two main groups: the first group assumes an organic link between religiosity levels and conservative or liberal attitudes. That is, certain values and preliminary attitudes that characterizes religiosity, lead naturally to conservative preferences.⁶ Jost et al, for example, offered a framework for understanding the psychological link between political conservatism and several non-political features, including religiosity. They defined conservatism as resistance to both change and equality, and claimed that it driven from cognitive, social, systematic and situational motives. According to Jost et al, these motives, which underlie conservatism, also underlie a variety of other features, including religious tendencies, and that is the source of the continuations of the link between religious and political conservatism.⁷

The second group of studies points to both the religious elite's message to ordinary people, according to which they should espouse conservative political attitudes, and the message from the political arena, according to which the combination of religiosity and conservatism is the natural and the appropriate way. According these attitudes, information that received by religious people in certain contexts leads them to espouse a more conservative attitude than they would without this specific context. Conservative and liberal political attitudes arise from social aspects and from the way that people react to them. Malka et al engaged in

Knud S Larsen, and Ed Long, 'Attitudes toward Sex-Roles: Traditional or Egalitarian?', *Sex Roles*, 19⁵ (1988), 1-12

Ariel Malka, Yphtach Lelkes, Sanjay Srivastava, Adam B Cohen, and Dale T Miller, 'The Association⁶ of Religiosity and Political Conservatism: The Role of Political Engagement', *Political Psychology*, 33 (2012), 275-99

John T Jost, Jack Glaser, Arie W Kruglanski, and Frank J Sulloway, 'Political Conservatism as⁷ Motivated Social Cognition', *Psychological bulletin*, 129 (2003), 339-374.

the social context of mass media, which conveys the political elite's message, that link between religiosity and conservatism.⁸

The relationship between religiosity and conservatism and between conservatism and positive attitudes towards traditional gender roles may be even stronger in Israel. Ruth Halperin claims that the low number of female politicians in Israel is part of an informal layer which is formed due to formal and semi-formal layers of the religious law.⁹ The formal layer is that of the family laws in general and the divorce and marriage laws in particular. Power relations between men and women within the family are determined according to religious law, and provide general supremacy for the male. Thus, the man controls divorce proceedings, the man can have a relationship outside of marriage and woman cannot, after marriage the woman becomes the property of the man, and during the marriage the roles are divided on a gender basis and the woman must serve her husband. The relationship between family and society, private and public, family relations and public sphere outside of it, are deeply affected by the legal regulation of the family.

The semi-formal layer engaged religion as causing indirect consequences, which are not part of the religious law substantive content. One example is the representation and the status of women in the Rabbinical Court- rabbis who addressed this issue argued that nothing prevents woman from serving as judge in Rabbinical Court, but the common interpretation was that there is no place to appoint a woman, because it would harm the Israeli household and the child's care and education, that should be part of the mother's role due to her subtlety and sensitivity.

As a result of the formal and informal level social constructions, another layer was created – an informal layer, which the political representation is its clearest example. Legal practices perpetuate women's subordination- especially in the private sphere, as well as semi-formal interpretation that in most cases prefer not to enable women access to key positions in central institutions. This subordination socialized to the public sphere, and the practices from the formal and semi-formal

Malka et al.⁸

⁹ רות הלפרין, 'הדת כגורם מעצב של מעמד האישה בישראל', בתוך אתגר הפמיניזם במדינת ישראל בעריכת דפנה יזרעאלי וטובה כהן (רמת גן : אוניברסיטת בר-אילן, 2001), עמ' 13-16.

layers, are ultimately reflected on the informal level- in under-representation of women in politics and in unwillingness to vote for them.

Given the above, our first hypothesis (H1) is that religiosity is associated with the degree of willingness to vote for women, so that there is a link between a higher religiosity level and the lack of willingness to vote for women.

However, religiosity and conservatism are not the only factors related to political behavior and to attitudes toward gender roles. Several studies have found that a person's level of education is one of the variables that affect the willingness to vote for women. Schreiber found that the willingness to vote for female candidates for the U.S. presidency grew especially among the more educated- a finding that he attached to the "life cycle" of political issues. Schreiber claims that in the early stages of particular subject development, the support ascending especially among the most educated. Thus, more liberal positions (e.g., a greater willingness to vote for women) tend to be adopted first of all by the more educated social elites, and later to spread further and to be adopted by the less educated.¹⁰

Two main interpretations have been proposed to explain the relationship between education and liberal positions over the years: (a) psychodynamic theory, according to which the more educated tend to be more personally confident and therefore more tolerant with regard to diversity and (b) a cognitive theory or a theory of socialization, according to which the more educated are able to get out from the common culture, its customs and its intolerance diverse, thanks to their "enlightened" and less harmful cultural approach. A third interpretation, that education is actually a measure of social status, was also sometimes heard. According to that interpretation the relationship between the two variables reflects only class interests. However, in a recent multi-variable analyzes, there were no findings that confirm this interpretation.¹¹ Therefore, our second hypothesis (H2) is that education increase the willingness to vote for women.

Susan Welch, and Lee Sigelman, 'Changes in Public Attitudes toward Women in Politics', *Social Science Quarterly*, 63 (1982), 312-22. ¹⁰

Frederick D Weil, 'The Variable Effects of Education on Liberal Attitudes: A Comparative-Historical Analysis of Anti-Semitism Using Public Opinion Survey Data', *American Sociological Review* (1985), 458-74. ¹¹

Many studies that examined the relationship between education and religiosity, found that higher education moderate religious attitudes. Hill, for example, found that although higher education not significantly affects religious beliefs, they are a factor which causes an increase in skepticism towards extremist religious attitudes. In addition, according to Hill, academic education reduces adherence to exclusive religious belief.¹² These studies indicate that the effect of education on religiosity may distort our results, that is, more educated people will tend to be less religious, and just because of that to express higher willingness to vote for women. To eliminate this impact, we will examine the interaction between the two variables- education and religion- in order to examine the effect of education among both religious and secularist.

Therefore, our third hypothesis (H3) claims that multivariate examination of both education and religiosity as the independent variables will moderate the effects of religiosity, so that the willingness to vote for female candidate will be higher among educated religious person than among the non-educated religious. We also believe that education will have the same impact among secular or people who are not very religious, but it will be more moderate since their initial willingness is higher.

However, one must consider the political and social inferior status of women in Israel as part of two fundamental political culture elements: Security and Judaism. The Jewish-Israeli society is characterized by an ongoing military discourse and by the prominence of national security issues. This discourse highlights the relevance of the gender based roles division to the militant effort: women are seen as secondary in this effort, and their contribution is valued by their ability to help on home front jobs or by giving birth and caring for the next generation of fighters. The woman is perceived as a social surrogate, and her primary role is as providing secondary assistance to the military and security effort.¹³

The military service in Israel reflects and shapes the gender stratification. Service duration (regular and reserve), military service conditions, military

Jonathan P Hill, 'Faith and Understanding: Specifying the Impact of Higher Education on Religious Belief', *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 50 (2011), 533-51.

¹³ גד ברזילי, 'נשים וגברים בתרבות הפוליטית הישראלית', בתוך *מגמות בחברה הישראלית* בעריכת אפרים יער וזאב שביט (רעננה: האוניברסיטה הפתוחה, 2003), עמ' 758-763.

professions and positions that are open to women compared to men, and promotion to senior ranks and roles, shaped women as inferior to men. This phenomenon projected to the political world. For example, the fact that senior officers reached directly to the top of the political world highlights the gender discrimination in political life. As a "inferior" military resource, women are regarded as politically inferior as well. Israeli politics is one-dimensional, focuses primarily on security and military aspect, and pushing the social issues, fundamentally the social justice questions, including gender equality, aside.¹⁴ Accordingly, it may be claimed that people will tend not to vote for women not because of traditional beliefs but because a unique element in the Israeli reality. Therefore, we must invalidate alternative explanations that relate to security perceptions.

Although security issues are always on the agenda, we do not believe that security perceptions are the real explanation to why people don't vote for women. Based on the results of the 2009 elections, we assume that the security explanation hypothesis will not be confirmed. These elections held immediately after Operation Cast Lead, while the security component was a central consideration in the voting patterns of the Jewish Israeli public.¹⁵ Nevertheless, the election results placed Kadima party, headed by Tzipi Livni, as the biggest party in the Knesset. Moreover, the 2013 elections were mainly about socio-economic issues.¹⁶ Therefore we hypothesize that security considerations did not affect the willingness to vote for women.

Age cohorts also show different attitudes toward women. Consistent with the hypothesis that attitudes become more liberal over time, several studies find that older men and women are more conservative than young people on an attitude toward women scale. Some of this studies suggested that older people are more conservative because they are older and some of them suggested that older people

IBID, ibid¹⁴

¹⁵ אלה הדר, "אידיאולוגיה או מנהיג? ביטחון או חברה? שיקולי ההצבעה של הבוחר הישראלי", אתר המכון הישראלי לדמוקרטיה, 26.4.2014,

<http://www.idi.org.il/%D7%A1%D7%A4%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D-%D7%95%D7%9E%D7%90%D7%9E%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%9E%D7%90%D7%9E%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%90%D7%99%D7%93%D7%90%D7%95%D7%9C%D7%95%D7%92%D7%99%D7%94-%D7%90%D7%95-%D7%9E%D7%A0%D7%94%D7%99%D7%92-%D7%91%D7%99%D7%98%D7%97%D7%95%D7%9F-%D7%90%D7%95-%D7%97%D7%91%D7%A8%D7%94>

¹⁶ שם, שם

are more conservative because they lived in different times.¹⁷ In any case, we assume that this explanation will be weaker than the religious explanation.

Women in Israeli politics

Before turning to our research, we believe that a short review about women's place in Israeli politics is necessary for understanding the "wider picture" regarding to these issue- women as a leading politician. The current section will present a short review of the history of women in the Israeli political sphere, dating back to the days of the Jewish settlement, up until the present. Our aim in this section is to offer a current, up-to-date reflection of the political reality in Israel, and women's place in it.

For many decades, the myth of gender equality in Israel was a comment belief. Meaning, women in the public sphere in Israel enjoy a relatively high quality, in comparison to other countries, even western ones. This myth was routed due to several factors. For instance, since the time of the second "Aliya", women took part in hard physical jobs. In the decades after, they even preformed as combat soldiers. On the political arena, women, unlike many other western countries, were allowed to vote even before the establishment of Israel. Unlike many other western countries, in Israel a woman was elected prime minister twice.¹⁸ Besides that, and again, unlike other countries, women, like men, have mandatory army service.¹⁹

Although this accomplishment appears quite impressive, many believe today that it used to "hush" any attempt to promote women, by claiming that they already enjoy equality.²⁰ As a result, which have been thrown out over recent years, many researches were conducted, in an attempted to question the myth. For instance, research that was conducted on kibbutz society found that although women were

Jean M Twenge, 'Attitudes toward Women, 1970–1995 a Meta-Analysis', *Psychology of Women Quarterly*, 21 (1997), pp. 35-51¹⁷

גדעון דורון, מחכ"ות לייצוג: נשים בפוליטיקה, תל-אביב : הקיבוץ המאוחד, 1998, ע' 32¹⁸

שם, ע' 15¹⁹

חנה ספרן, לא רוצות להיות נחמדות : המאבק על זכות הבחירה וראשיתו של הפמיניזם החדש בישראל, חיפה : פרדס, 2006, עמ' 15-16²⁰

allowed to work in "manly" jobs, in reality, the traditional division of labor was kept.²¹

From the first days of the Zionist movement, women took an active part²² in it, although they were outnumbered by men.²³ When the Jewish settlement and its institutes were established, women began to claim their political rights- meaning, the right to vote. At the time, a dispute erupted between different groups about the question whether or not they should be allowed to vote. The "old settlement" men, who were mostly religious, objected, while the "new settlement" men, who were Zionists, were in favor. After almost a decade, the dispute came to an end when women got the right to vote in 1926.²⁴ When the 1948 war broke out, women were recruited to the "Hagana", where some of them took active part in combat, but the majority served in non-combat positions, in order to allow men to be fighters.²⁵

In the first decades Israel, less than 10 percent of Knesset members were women. Only one woman was a member of the ruling coalition, from the first government until the twelve.²⁶ Nevertheless, in 1969, for the first time, a woman, Golda Meir was elected to be prime minister. This event, according to some, caused more damage to women than good, since it created the illusion that women are able to take part, even a senior one, in politics, if they only want to.²⁷ In fact, at that time Golda was the only woman in the government, when women were less than seven percent of all Knesset members. Golda herself resigned in 1974, due to the Agranat's Committee's findings, even though she was reelected year before.²⁸

In the following decades, women continue to be a minority in the Israeli politics- by the end of the 1990's, most of the coalitions had no more than a few women members. By the end of that decade, the numbers began to rise- for instance, in 1999 women were 12 percent of all Knesset members.²⁹ However, it is

²¹ שם, עמ' 23-24

²² שם, ע' 19

²³ חנה הרצוג, נשים ריאליות : נשים בפוליטיקה המקומית בישראל, ירושלים : מכון ירושלים לחקר ישראל, 1994, ע' 3 דורון, ע' 51

²⁴ עוגן גולדמן, נשים בחינוך ובמערכת הפוליטית בישראל, ירושלים : הכנסת, מרכז המידע המחקר, 2001 : עמ' 15, 19

²⁵ דפנה שרפמן, נשים ופוליטיקה, חיפה : תמר, ע' 69

²⁶ גולדמן, ע' 15

²⁷ דורון, ע' 68

²⁸ נשים בממשלות, מתוך אתר הכנסת, 23.4.2014 :

<http://www.knesset.gov.il/govt/heb/GovtByParameter.asp?par=1>

²⁹ ממשלות ישראל מאז קום המדינה, מתוך אתר הכנסת, 23.4.2014 :

important to mention that even as members of the governmental coalition, they usually served in secondary "feminine"- Minister of Health, Education and so on. It was only at the beginning of the 21st century, that women began to serve in the more "prestigious" offices- Minister of foreign affairs and justice ministry.³⁰ In addition, no women have ever served as a minister of defense, although in the past men with no military experience, which considered by many as mandatory requirement for this office, served in that role.³¹

At the beginning of the 21st century, the women's number in the governmental coalitions began to rise. For instance, 13 women were members of the 30th government.³² In the 2009 election, Kadima party, led by Tzipi Livni, got the largest amount of votes. Nevertheless, the refusal of other parties to recommend her to form a government prevented her from becoming prime minister.³³ The 2013 elections created a precedent, when women become just over a fifth out of all Knesset members (22.5%), and six members of the governmental coalition are women. In addition, three parties were led in the last elections by women- Tzipi Livni at the head of the "Tnuva", Shelly Yehimovitz at the head of "Avoda", and Zehava Galon at the head of "Meretz".

Another interesting aspect is the political affiliation of the women Knesset members. Since our research aim is to determine how religion affects voting for women, we believe that by examining the religious parties, we can get an idea in their election results. In the ultra-orthodox parties- "Shas" and "Yahadut Hatora", there is not, and never has been, even one woman. In fact, the latter even forbids women to be candidates in the elections.³⁴ However, in the Zionist-religious party "Habiet Hayehudi", the percentage of the women is similar to that of the leading-coalition-party, "Halikudh Beitenu".

<http://www.knesset.gov.il/govt/heb/GovtByNumber.asp?govt=31>

³⁰ נשים בממשלות

³¹ רונן מדזיני, ההכרעה המסתמנת: נתניהו ולבני מחר אצל הנשיא, מתוך אתר Ynet, 23.4.2014.

<http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3674351,00.html>

³² women in national parliaments, inter-parliamentary union, excess 23.4.2014:

<http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm>

³³ חברות בכנסת ה-19, מתוך אתר כ"ן-כוח לנשים, 23.4.2014.

<http://www.ken.org.il/index.php?dir=site&page=content&cs=3024>

³⁴ שרפמן, ע' 69

Although in recent years a positive change is evident, we must look at these numbers in comparison to other countries around the world. Those comparisons allow us to understand why those changes, positive as they are, are not enough. Israel's percentage of women representation has ranks her in the 65 place in the world. This rank is based on the results of the last election. Most of the western democratic countries are ranked higher, with some countries ranking significantly higher than Israel. Moreover, even some of the third world countries, such as Ruanda and Algeria are ranked higher then Israel.³⁵

As stated above, this section had two purposes: First, to present a short and specific review about our research subject, and Second, to demonstrate the mistaken perception regarding women's place in Israeli political sphere. The facts, as they rise from this review, are that women's portion out of all the Israeli legislators is significantly small. That means that more than half of the population is sub-represented. The case is even worse if we consider the low numbers of women legislators in the Arab and the ultra-orthodox sectors. This review means, or at least it was our intention, to demonstrate how important our research is.

Methodology:

As we presented before, our main aim in this research is to examine how, if at all, education and level of religiousness effects one's wiliness to vote for a women candidate in Israeli national elections. As presented in the theoretical background, our hypotheses are that an individual, who defines himself as very religious, will be less likely to be willing to vote for a woman candidate, to vote for parties that are led by women and especially for those who are running for prime minister. On the other hand, we expect this objection decrease when considering one's education. In order to test our hypotheses, we will use the Israeli national survey (INES) that has been conducted since 1969.³⁶ The survey was meant to detect changes in voting pattern, and to collect information regarding the specific issues that were unique to each

women in national parliaments, inter-parliamentary union: ³⁵
Election study 2013, the Israel national election studies, excess 23.4.2013: ³⁶

election. Moreover, and that is why we chose to use it, it allows us to define the responders on a demographic base. We will use the last survey, from the 2013 election. The survey population was picked randomly and contains 1718 responders. The vast majority of the responders are Jews, and non Jewish- Muslims, Christian, etc.

It is important to mention, that we chose to filter from the main data base the non-Jewish responders, due to several reasons. Firstly, the Arab population in Israel, Muslims and Christians alike, are relatively more conservative in comparison to the Jewish one. Meanings, that even those who are less religious, will be less likely to vote for women.³⁷ Secondly, up until today, all the parties who led by women, were Zionist oriented. Hence, it would be impossible for us to distinguish between those who did not vote for those parties, because they were led by women, and those who chose to do so because of the parties' Zionist orientation.³⁸

Furthermore, the decision to use the last survey, and not to include other surveys, although they are obtainable, was made for several reasons. Firstly, including several surveys would have it impossible for us to roll out time as an alternative explanation- for instance, changes in social norms. Conducting such research, although it would have been very interesting, is impossible giving its size. Secondly, the format of the surveys is changed every election. Those changes, although they seem minor, have the power to change the results. For those reasons we chose to use only the most recent survey. The survey contains over one thousand responders, more than enough for us to get significant results.

It is worth to mention, that we wished to include the survey of the 2009 election, but could not do it. The 2009 survey would have helped use to exclude one of the alternative explanations- that security perceptions regarding to women are the actual explanation. Unfortunately, that survey does not include questions regarding voting for women, unlike the 2013 election survey. Therefore, we had to exclude it from our sample. Even though, we believe that even without it, we will be able to exclude the mentioned explanation, as we will present later in this section.

³⁷ טראב אבו-רביעה-קווידר, נעמי וינר-לוי, נשים פלסטינאיות בישראל: זהות, יחסי כוח והתמודדות, ירושלים: מכון ון-ליר 2010, עמ' 7-9

³⁸ יואב שטרן, בחירות 2009: ירידה חדה בשיעור הערבים שהצביעו למפלגות ציוניות, מתוך אתר Ynet, 23.4.2014, <http://www.haaretz.co.il/news/politics/1.1245258>

Using the recent survey has the clear advantage, besides reflecting current, up to date reality, in the last elections more parties than ever in the past were led by women. In 2013 elections, three parties were led by women, when two of them, tzipi livni and shelly yehimovitz were even candidate for prime-minister. This fact alone makes this survey perfect for testing our hypotheses.

In order to do so, we must define specifically the variables which we use. Our first independent variable is education. As presented before, education will be defined as the highest level or diploma the respondent has successfully obtained. For instance- finishing primary school, junior high school, high school and so on, as measured in different researches. The variable will be defined operationally as followed: what is your education (v137).³⁹ The possible answers are as followed: Elementary school or less, Partial high school ,Full high school – without matriculation exams ,Full high school with matriculation exams ,Post high school, nonacademic (teachers seminar, nursing school, engineering school, yeshiva) Partial academic degree Full academic degree – BA ,Full academic degree - MA or higher.

Since we are interested in the impact of academic education as oppose non-academic one, we will create, using this question, binary variable. We will unite the low and medium categorize to one (1-5) which will represent non-academic education. The higher categorize will be united into one (6-8) and will represent academic education.

Our second independent variable, religiousness level, is defined as the responder's level of devotion in practicing religious rules and tradition, as according to them. Operationally, this variable will be measured by composing two questions from the survey. Since level of religiousness is a very vague concept, will believe that we can measure it better by two questions instead of one. The first question will be as followed (v132): To what degree do you observe religious traditions? When the possible answers are: Not at all, A little bit, a lot, I observe all of them. The second question is (v150): Do you define yourself as, when the possible answers are: Secular, Traditional, Religious, Ultra-orthodox (Hareidi). In order to verify our new

This is The exact Formulation of the question of the survey, for further information see the appendix³⁹

variable's reliability, we conducted an alpha-crobbach test. The results- 0.881, proofs that it is reliability.

Our dependent variable, willingness to vote for women candidate, is defined as the way individual's perceive women as fit or unfit to the political sphere. In order to do so, we chose question v122: "To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements: Politics are more suitable for men than for women" when the possible answers are on a scale of 1-4, when 1 means: Definitely disagree, 2 Disagree, 3 Agree, 4. definitely agree.

Beside our main variables, we must create variables for the alternative explanations we wish to exclude. As presented before, we believe there are two alternative explanations that might explain the lack of willingness to vote for women. The first one is giving a high priority to candidate's security experience. Since the vast majority of women do not serve in combat units in the army, and even fewer serve in high ranks, a person who holds this perception would probably vote for men candidate. In order to create a reliable variable, we composed two questions: To what degree will the following issues influence or not influence your vote? When the responders are requested to address security issues such as the Iranian threat or terror and to rank them as important or not (v63, v64). Again we conducted a reliability test, and according to it, our variant is reliable (0.7984).⁴⁰

Another alternative explanation we wish to exclude is that age is the actual explanation, meaning that changes in social norms affect the willingness to vote for women. This variable will be measured by the question: What age group do you belong to? (v3) when the possible answers are: 18-22, 23-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, 60-69, 70-79, 80 and over. The variables we presented will be tested by the suitable correlation tests. Those tests and their results will be presented in the next section.

However, in order to test our hypocrisies more profoundly, we will conduct another regression in order to understand how our two independent variables affect each other. We will create a new variable, which will contain both of them, and through it, we will test the interaction between them. In other words, we will seek to understand how does, if at all, education affect religious people. We wish to examine

The syntax file as well as our commend file can be found in the index, for further information⁴⁰

if there is a difference between two people with similar level of religiousness, when one of them is educated and the other is not. We believe that threw those results, the true impact of education will discover.

Before that, we must first acknowledge the problems that might arise. First, like we noted before, the fact that we cannot use the 2009 survey. Using it would have allowed us to exclude more easily our first alternative explanation- priority to security issues. The 2009 elections were unique, in the sense that they were held shortly after big vast military operation, and one of the leading candidates was a woman. We believe that we can overcome this disadvantage, by choosing relevant questions from the 2013 survey, but using the former one would have valid our results even more.

Another problem, also already mentioned, is that we had to filter-out the non-Jewish population from the survey, due to cultural and social differences between them and the Jewish population. It means that our results will only reflect the opinions and norms in the Jewish population. We believe it is possible to conduct wider, more inclusive research, which would have included these population segments, for instance by consider their unique features. Since our research is very narrow, and we lack efficient tool to do so, we had no choice but to exclude this population from the tested sample.

Finally, like every survey-based research, we are facing the problem regarding those who did not took part in the survey. For instance, we do not believe that we would find many responders who are extremely religious. We believe that extremely ultra-orthodox individuals will probably refuse to take part in this survey. Like other survey-based researches, we must acknowledge this, and to admit that we have no ability to solve those kind of problems.

All in all, we believe that although our research has some problems, the fact that we are using a well-established data base, and that we gave a lot of thought as to how to measure each variable will allow us to obtain relatively valid results. That will assist us to confirm our hypostases, or to reject them.

Analysis and Results⁴¹

To test the hypothesis, we first examined the effect of the two independent variables- religion and education- on the dependent variable, using linear regression. The regression results were significant ($p > 0.05$), and indicate that the model holds little effect on the willingness to vote for women- it explained less than 8 percent of the independent variable variance. While these results allow us to reject the null hypothesis, they indicate a relatively small effect of the variables examined on the willingness to vote for women. The results indicate that the independent variable, the religiosity level, holds value of 0.28 when the other variables held constant. That is, transformation from minimum religiosity level (a secular person) to the maximum religiosity level (Haredi) will be reflected in decrease of 0.28 in the willingness vote for women. It should be noted that this result is positive due to the adjustments we made in order to arrange the variables values in the same direction.⁴²

Table 1. Regression analysis for variables predicting willingness to vote for women, additive model

Variable	Willingness to vote for women candidate			
	coefficient	SE	Beta	probability
Religiousness	0.283	0.044	0.257	0.000
Education	-0.035	0.024	-0.056	0.148
Security perceptions	0.015	0.036	0.016	0.676
Age group	-0.004	0.006	-0.023	0.548
Constant	0.243	0.046		0.000

The value of the second independent variable, education, is -0.035 when all the other variables are held constant, i.e., a transformation from the maximum value (Academic degree- MA or higher) to the minimum value (elementary education or less), will decrease willingness to vote for women at 0.035. Thus, we can reject the null hypothesis that there is no correlation between education and willingness to vote for women. In this case too, the negative result is due to the values order of the independent variable. That is, while lower value in the education variable reflects

We arranged the values according to the hypotheses so that secularity will express greater willingness to vote for women and vice versa

Result Syntax file with attached in appendix⁴¹

⁴² so that secularity will express greater willingness to vote for women and vice versa

low education, lower value in the variable "willingness to vote for women" express greater willingness. Here we see relatively weak association, compared to our expectations that relied on the contemporary literature. It is worth noting that this result is not significant, That is, one cannot deduce from the findings regard the education variable about the population outside the sample.

In order to test which of the independent variables holds the greatest impact on willingness to vote for women, we examined the beta values- the standardized values of the regression variables. Results suggest that religion has a greater effect on the willingness to vote for women (0.24) than education (-0.056).⁴³ This finding suggests that religiousness has a stronger effect on willingness to vote for women than education, as opposed to findings of previous studies. However, the correlation between the willingness to vote for women and religion is significant ($p > 0.05$), while its correlation with the education variable is not ($p < 0.005$). That is, one cannot deduce from the findings regard the education variable about the population outside the sample.

At this point we turned to examine alternative explanations. The beta value of the first variable, security perceptions, is 0.015, which means that there is a relatively minor effect on the willingness to vote for women, compared to the other independent variables, education and religion. Accordingly, we can determine that security perceptions are not the main explanation of the willingness or unwillingness to vote for women. However, the regression results for this variable are not significant ($p < 0.05$), i.e. one cannot make suppositions about the entire population from these results.

The second alternative explanation examined is the age influence- the impact of social norms changes over time which will be reflected in different age groups. Regression beta value of this variable is -0.004, meaning that age affects, but to a lesser extent. The result is negative because of the variable values order. This means that in contrary to our hypothesis, it is the older age groups who express greater willingness to vote for women, compared with younger age groups. But, this effect is relatively low compared to the effect of religion and education. In addition, the


As we explained, the negative value of the variable stems from its values direction ⁴³

results for this variable are not significant ($p < 0.05$), that is, one cannot deduce from these results about the population outside the sample. However, for this study, we can rule out this explanation as the original explanation of the willingness to vote for women.

These results indicate that religion has a greater impact on the willingness to vote for women, compared with education. However, from these results, the question arises whether education affects religious people differently than its affect secular people. That is, if a religious person has a lower willingness to vote for women, can we assume that education will increase that willingness, or it will be maintained the same. To do this, we examined the variables in interacting with each other – i.e., whether education has any effect on religious people willingness to vote for women. Interaction results, -0.079, indicate that education moderates the unwillingness to vote for women, among religious people. It should be noted that the relationship between the willingness to vote for women and the interaction variable we created is not significant, meaning that it's not possible deduce from results to the general population at a confidence level of 95%. In other words, if we consider only the sample participants, it is likely that when having two people with the same religiosity level, but different education level, the more educated person will show a greater willingness to vote for women. However, it should be noted that among secular people, the willingness to vote for women in all education levels is greater than that of religious people at the same education level, as shown in the graph below:

Table 2. Regression analysis for variables predicting willingness to vote for women, interactive model (education)

Variable	Willingness to vote for women candidate		
	coefficient	SE	probability
Religiousness	0.316	0.058	0.000
Education	-0.009	0.038	0.796
Security perceptions	0.018	0.036	0.607
Age_group_1	-0.004	0.006	0.544
Education * Religiousness	-0.079	0.089	0.376
Constant	0.229	0.049	0.000



Moreover, since previous studies have shown a link between age and religiosity - so that among adults the level of religiosity is higher- we decided to examine the effect of religiosity on willingness to vote for women among different age groups. To do this, we examined the age variable in interaction with the religious variable. According to results obtained, the impact of religiosity on the willingness vote for women varies in different age groups - while the willingness of older people to vote for women remained almost similar among all religiosity levels, the willingness of young people to vote for women, depends on their religiosity level- younger religious expressed much lower willingness to vote for women than older religious. Thus, while young seculars express higher willingness to vote for women than older seculars, the trend reversed at higher religiosity level and when it comes to extreme religious, we can see a higher willingness to vote for women among the older people.




Table 3. Regression analysis for variables predicting willingness to vote for women, interactive model (age)

Variable	Willingness to vote for women candidate		
	coefficient	SE	probability
Religiousness	0.489	0.110	0.000
Education	-0.036	0.024	0.135
Security perceptions	0.018	0.036	0.607
Age group	-0.012	0.010	0.254
Age group* Religiousness	-0.051	0.025	0.042
Constant	0.174	0.057	0.003

These results indicate that the higher the religiosity level of a person, the greater the chances that he will express relatively low willingness to vote for women. In addition, the higher the level of education of person, his willingness to vote for women will be higher. In other words, the null hypotheses, according to which those two variables have no effect, have been rejected. Also our hypotheses about the alternative explanations confirmed- their effect is relatively limited compared to the independent variables. It is noteworthy that many of the results obtained were not significant. This means that the results we received, and most of the conclusions that

will be presented in the next section, valid to this study only and to the sample of the survey we used, and are not likely represent the entire population.

Conclusions and discussion

The results that we presented in the last section are indicating that 2 out of the three hypotheses we presented can be confirmed. Nevertheless, we found some interesting results, which need to be addressed. Firstly, regarding our second hypotheses (H2) regarding education, we were surprised to find that its impact was not as strong as expected, in comparison to what we found in the literature. It is important to mention, that the coefficient for this variable were not significant, but even so, it was surprisingly low. This finding can be explained in the nature of education and the differences in the educational contents taught by the different high education institutions in Israel. For instance, we cannot assume that a person with a B.S.c⁴⁴ exposed to the same ideas and contents as a person with a B.A in sociology. This might be one of the reasons we got such poor results.

Regarding to the effect of religiousness (H1), which was the most influent factor, it was also, much low then we expected. The reason for it is the disadvantages of using survey that we presented in the methodology section that is the exclusion of certain groups in the population. There is a profound problem trying to examine people who are "extremely religious" in Israel, since most of the people who fits this description probably refuse to take part in surveys. The ultra-orthodox community in Israel is a very close one, and therefore her members are reluctant to take part in those kinds of surveys. Since our aim in this research is not to examine the ultra-orthodox society, we do not have the tool or the ability to elaborate on this matter, but it is important to notice this society too contain people with different perceptions and beliefs. In the survey itself, we found few ultra-orthodox responders, but from the reasons we presented, we believe that those people are relatively more moderate, and it is therefore very difficult to see them as represented example of the entire ultra-orthodox community.

⁴⁴the equivalent degree of B.A in engineering

Regarding our alternative explanations, the results we got indicates that we can exclude at least one of them- the security perceptions- as an alternative explanation. Meaning, most of the people, even if giving a high priority to security issues, do not believe that women are less competed. These results are compatible with the results of the 2009 election, when Tzipi Livni got the largest amounts of votes after a big military operation. Nevertheless, the 2013 election brought to the center of intention a totally different topic- the social protest that took place a year and a half before. Those reason made us believe that we will not witness a large influence of this factor on the wiliness to vote for women, as we eventually did.

Regarding our alternative explanation of age, the results that we got from the first regression indicates the opposite of what we believed we will find- that older people will tend to show higher willingness to vote for women than the young. Although not significant, we wished to be able to exclude this explanation, which lead us to conduct another regression. This time, the results allowed us to do so. As presented in the former section, older people will less tend to vote for women, when religion has a relatively small impact. When regarding to the young, the results are opposite. This results allowed not only to exclude age as an alternative explanation, but also to indicate that religion have a significant impact over young people, and that the un-willingness of some of them to vote for women, are derive from it, and not from social norms.

However, the most important results for this research are the interaction between the two variables (H3). It is important to mention again, that these results are not significant, but we believe that they have some validity, since it compatible with the results in similar researches. The results indicate that education has a moderating impact regarding perception on women. In other words, that education has a significant power to change even the most rooted perceptions and beliefs. Although secular individual will show more willingness to vote for women then a very religious individual, education will increase the willingness among the latter.

All in all, our research aim was to understand better the influence of two factors- religion and education with willingness to vote for women. As we presented, our hypothesis were conformed, even though the results were lower than expected, for reason we mentioned. Our research has few main weak points. First, as

mentioned in the methodology section, we were not able to include the non-Jewish survey population in it. We believe that conducting a vast research, using different methodological tools on the topic; will be able to produce a better reflection of the entire Israeli population. Unfortunately, it is beyond our reach in this kind of research to do so.

Second, using survey has indeed many advantages, but also some disadvantages, as we evident in some of the results. When conducting a research on a closed community such as the ultra-orthodox, one must keep in mind the difficulty in obtaining information on it, especially in a national survey. In that case too, we believe that a vast research, employed methodological tools from sociology will be effective, but in that case too, we were unable to do so. Third, a weak point that we did not anticipated is the problem of ignoring social-demographic factors. Here too, we could not relate to those factors, but it is certainly an interesting topic for future researches.

Although we failed to obtain significant results, we believe that our research has made some contribution to the existing literature. First of all, we conducted, as far as we know, the first focused, current research on this topic in Israel. The fact that we used a well-known, up-to date survey, allowed us to present an accurate picture of reality on this topic, in Israel. Secondly, we were able to exclude two main alternative explanations to this phenomenon, which excluded the "unique" Israeli circumstances many believed are behind the lack of willingness to vote for women. In that way, we were able to proof that Israeli society is "normal" regarding to this aspect.

And above all, we were able to create a solid platform to future researches on this issue. As we stated before, we believe that a vast, more comprehensive research will be able to obtain significant results, but nevertheless, our results indicates a clear conclusion- that education has a crucial impact on moderating people's beliefs. This conclusion should not be ignored by the decision makers. Therefore, we will be honored if this small, humble research will lead to more researches and hopefully, to a change in policy that will promote women in the political arena. This promotion, will contribute not only to women, but to the entire society, and was the initial goal of this research.

Bibliography

Election study 2013, *the Israel national election studies*, excess 23.4.2013:
<http://www.ines.tau.ac.il/>

Hill Jonathan, 'Faith and Understanding: Specifying the Impact of Higher Education on Religious Belief', *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 50 (2011), 533-51.

Jost, John T, Jack Glaser, Arie W Kruglanski, and Frank J Sulloway, 'Political Conservatism as Motivated Social Cognition', *Psychological bulletin*, 129 (2003), pp. 339-374

Karnig, Albert K and Oliver B Walter, 'Election of Women to City Councils', *Social Science Quarterly*, 56 (1976), pp. 605-613

Larsen, Knud S and Ed Long, 'Attitudes toward Sex-Roles: Traditional or Egalitarian?', *Sex Roles*, 19 (1988), pp. 1-12

Malka, Ariel, Yphtach Lelkes, Sanjay Srivastava, Adam B Cohen, and Dale T Miller, 'The Association of Religiosity and Political Conservatism: The Role of Political Engagement', *Political Psychology*, 33 (2012), pp. 275-299

Twenge, Jean M, 'Attitudes toward Women, 1970–1995 a Meta-Analysis', *Psychology of Women Quarterly*, 21 (1997), pp. 35-51

Weil, Frederick D, 'The Variable Effects of Education on Liberal Attitudes: A Comparative-Historical Analysis of Anti-Semitism Using Public Opinion Survey Data', *American Sociological Review* (1985), 458-474

Welch, Susan and Lee Sigelman, 'Changes in Public Attitudes toward Women in Politics', *Social Science Quarterly*, 63 (1982), pp. 312-322

women in national parliaments, *inter-parliamentary union*, excess 23.4.2014:
<http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm>

אבו-רביעה-קווידר, סראב, נעמי וינר-לוי, נשים פלסטינאיות בישראל: זהות, יחסי כוח והתמודדות (ירושלים: מכון ון-ליר 2010), עמ' 7-9

ברזילי, גד, נשים וגברים בתרבות הפוליטית הישראלית, בתוך מגמות בחברה הישראלית בעריכת אפרים יער וזאב שביט (רעננה: האוניברסיטה הפתוחה, 2003), עמ' 758-763

גולדמן, עוגן, נשים בחינוך ובמערכת הפוליטית בישראל (ירושלים: הכנסת, מרכז המידע המחקר, 2001)

דורון, גדעון, מח"כות לייצוג: נשים בפוליטיקה (תל-אביב: הקיבוץ המאוחד, 1998)

הלפרין, רות, 'הדת כגורם מעצב של מעמד האישה בישראל', בתוך אתגר הפמיניזם במדינת ישראל בעריכת דפנה יזרעאלי וטובה כהן (רמת גן: אוניברסיטת בר-אילן, 2001)

הלר, אלה, "אידאולוגיה או מנהיג: ביטחון או חברה? שיקולי ההצבעה של הבוחר הישראלי",
אתר המכון הישראלי לדמוקרטיה, 26.4.2014

<http://www.idi.org.il/%D7%A1%D7%A4%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D-%D7%95%D7%9E%D7%90%D7%9E%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%9E%D7%90%D7%9E%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%90%D7%99%D7%93%D7%90%D7%95%D7%9C-%D7%95%D7%92%D7%99%D7%94-%D7%90%D7%95-%D7%9E%D7%A0%D7%94%D7%99%D7%92-%D7%91%D7%99%D7%98%D7%97%D7%95%D7%9F-%D7%90%D7%95-%D7%97%D7%91%D7%A8%D7%94>
הרצוג, חנה, 'נשים בפוליטיקה ופוליטיקה של נשים', בתוך מין, מגדר ופוליטיקה בעריכת גיורא רוזן (תל אביב: הקיבוץ המאוחד, 1999)

הרצוג, חנה, נשים ריאליות: נשים בפוליטיקה המקומית בישראל (ירושלים: מכון ירושלים לחקר ישראל, 1994)

חברות בכנסת ה-19, מתוך אתר כ"ן-כוח לנשים, 23.4.2014
<http://www.ken.org.il/index.php?dir=site&page=content&cs=3024>

יואב שטרן, בחירות 2009: ירידה חדה בשיעור הערבים שהצביעו למפלגות ציוניות, מתוך אתר הארץ, 23.4.2014
<http://www.haaretz.co.il/news/politics/1.1245258>

ממשלות ישראל מאז קום המדינה, מתוך אתר הכנסת, 23.4.2014
<http://www.knesset.gov.il/govt/heb/GovtByNumber.asp?govt=31>

נשים בממשלות, מתוך אתר הכנסת, 23.4.2014
<http://www.knesset.gov.il/govt/heb/GovtByParameter.asp?par=1>

ספרן, חנה, לא רוצות להיות נחמדות: המאבק על זכות הבחירה וראשיתו של הפמיניזם החדש בישראל (חיפה: פרדס, 2006)

רוזן מדזיני, ההכרעה המסתמנת: נתניהו ולבני מחר אצל הנשיא, מתוך אתר YNET, 23.4.14
<http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3674351,00.html>

שרפמן, דפנה, נשים ופוליטיקה (חיפה: תמר, 1988)

