



Hebrew University of Jerusalem  
Faculty of Social Sciences  
Department of Political Science

# **The Effect of Emotions on Decision Making in National Security**

Eliya Cornblit, Tamara Pearlman and Nir (Haim) Weiner

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## **Abstract**

*Emotions have the power to strongly affect the human decision making process. Specifically, people's decisions are altered according to the level of identifiability of the subjects. Using an online experiment, we examine the effect of the identifiable victim theory on the decision making process in the realm of national security. We utilized the Decision Board computer program by running three identifiably-differing versions of a captured soldier scenario. Our aim was to chart the effects that the varying intensity of emotions would have over the decisions making process. However, the results did not show a significant differing effect of emotional intensity on the decision making process. Our findings raise important questions, later explored in this paper, regarding the universality and implementation of the identifiable victim theory outside of the economic realm, where it was originally designed.*

## **Introduction**

Understanding the human decision making process has become a widely explored field in the social sciences in the last few decades. Massive research has been dedicated to the effects of emotions on the decision making process of individuals (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee and Welch, 2001; Loewenstein and Lerner, 2003). Research has clearly shown that introducing emotion arousing stimuli into the decision making process dictates courses of action that divert the individual from his typical decision making process, resulting in altered courses of action (Sherman, Beike and Ryalls, 1999; Rottenstreich and Hsee, 2001). Researchers have focused on the *identifiable victim effect*, which, by Schelling's (1968) definition, causes the death of a particular person to invoke "anxiety and sentiment, guilt and awe, responsibility and religion, [but] . . . most of this awesomeness disappears when we deal with statistical death".

Several psychological theories suggest that people use distinct processes to make judgments of specific as opposed to general targets (Hamilton and Sherman, 1996; Sherman, Beike and

Ryalls, 1999). Dual-process models in social psychology suggest that people become more mentally and emotionally engaged when they process information about specific individuals than when they process information about abstract targets (Chaiken, 1980; Petty and Cacioppo, 1986). These models illustrate the way specific cases, such as identifiable victims, are more likely to receive greater cognitive attention and deeper consideration, while abstract cases, including statistical victims, are less emotionally or mentally involving. The differential functioning of separate processes helps explain why knowing there is a particular someone in need whom you can help feels qualitatively different from knowing that you could help one of many possible needy people. *The* victim is more emotionally gripping than *a* victim.

In recent works, Small and Loewenstein (2003, 2005) have shown a difference in the reaction of subjects between the identifiable and the none-identifiable victim. In their study, they have demonstrated that subjects were more willing to compensate others who lost money when the losers had already been determined than when they were about to be determined. Kogut and Ritov (2005) have shown that the willingness to contribute money to help a single identifiable victim is greater than the willingness to contribute to help a single none-identifiable victim. While there is a plethora of literature on the influence of the identifiable victim effect on the decision making process, this research has been mostly limited to the bounds of the economic sphere (e.g. donations, refunds, willingness for monetary compensations, etc.). The exploration and examination of the identifiable victim effect on the individuals' decision making process in other spheres is lacking both in magnitude and in depth. Bridging this gap is the natural next step in the research of the human decision making process. With this study we aspire to contribute to this collective effort by examining the identifiable victim effect within the sphere of national security.

## **National Security in Israel**

Ever since Israel's establishment in 1948, it has confronted an overwhelmingly hostile external environment. For over half a century, as well as in the pre-state days, the Israeli national security policy has relied upon a broad national consensus which holds that Israel faces a realistic existential threat of genocide, or at the minimum, of politicide (Freilich, 2006). As a result, national security has been at the forefront of Israeli political and academic life. However, little academic attention has been devoted to the processes of Israeli national security decision making (Freilich, 2006).

Israeli society is stratified into numerous segments on varying and intersecting dimensions. However, national solidarity reaches its peak when the country is faced with the unnerving situation of a captured soldier (Kaplan, 2008). Stemming from the special emotion Israelis present toward the wellbeing of soldiers, and also from the central role decisions in the realm of national security play in Israeli politics and Israeli life, we seek to explore the effect of emotions, and specifically the identifiable victim effect, on the individuals' decision making process in the realm of national security.

Our research question is *how triggering of different levels of varying emotions will affect the decision making process of individuals in the realm of national security.*

We use empirical methods, utilizing the Decision Board computer program by running three scenarios describing a situation in which an Israeli soldier is captured by the Hamas: a basic neutral scenario and two more emotionally charged scenarios – a military scenario and a personal scenario. In each scenario, the participants are asked to choose a preferred reaction to the soldier's capturing on behalf of the state of Israel.

We hypothesize that the strength of emotions evoked will differ across scenarios and that the effect on the subjects' decision making process will be highlighted in the following ways:

### **Scenarios and Emotions**

*Hypothesis 1:* The various scenarios will prompt differing levels of intensity of emotions.

More accurately we hypothesize that the personal scenario will prompt more intense emotions than both the military scenario and the basic scenario and that the military scenario will prompt more intense emotions than the basic scenario (due to the identifiable victim effect).

### **Emotions and Decisions**

*Hypothesis 2:* More intense emotions will lead to a greater and more intense acquisition of information.

Subjects who are more emotionally engaged and who display more extreme emotions will devote greater cognitive attention and deeper consideration to the decision making process as well as to the decision itself (due to the dual-process theory) (Chaiken, 1980; Petty and Cacioppo, 1986).

*Hypothesis 3:* More intense emotions will lead to more extreme decisions.

We expect to see a positive connection between the intensity of emotions and the extremity of the decision, in a manner that the more emotions where evoked by the scenario the more extreme alternative will be made on the part of the subjects exposed to the scenario.

## **Method**

### **Field Experiment**

In order to evaluate the decision making process, we set out a field experiment. The primary research tool used by our team is computerized decision process tracing - a research technique that allows observation and recording of various indicators of an individual's choice strategy.

Utilizing the Decision Board computer program, online decision-making tracing software, allows for the analysis of sequential and interactive decision problems. Some of the unique capabilities of the computerized decision process tracers as a research tool are their ability to detect various decision strategies, test the effects of multiple situational and personal factors on decision processing and outcomes, and their ability to deal with counterfactual data and scenarios, as well as serve as a training device.

We utilized the program by running three differing versions of the same scenario in the field of national security in order to evoke different levels of emotions within the subjects.

The subjects of the experiment were mostly undergraduate and graduate students from Israeli higher education institutes approached by the researchers. In order to increase the number of subjects, and due to the lack of funding available to the researchers, we also used online snowball sampling.

The subjects were randomly divided into three groups (according to the last two digits of their identity number) and presented with one of three differing scenarios of an Israeli soldier captured in Israeli territory near the Gaza Strip barrier by the Hamas.

*Scenarios.* A control group was introduced with a basic informative scenario giving only the necessary details of what occurred (The "Basic scenario"). A second group was introduced with a more emotionally charged scenario. This scenario was based on the basic scenario, but

included additional personal military information regarding the soldier, such as his unit, his mission and reason for being where he was captured, etc.- this in addition to his name, age and rank (The "Military scenario"). The third group was introduced with an even more emotionally charged scenario. This third scenario was also based on the basic scenario, but included additional personal civilian information on the soldier, such as details regarding his bereaved family and him being an only son to a father that was killed during his military service in Lebanon, his health condition as a child and his struggle to enlist into his father's military unit, etc. - this in addition to his name, age and rank (The "Personal scenario").

*Decisions.* All the subjects were instructed to respond to the questions and information presented to them as if they were the Israeli prime-minister and had to decide which alternative among seven presented alternatives of action Israel should choose to act upon as its first reaction to the soldier's capturing. The alternatives were: Releasing Palestinian prisoners as a confidence-building measure; initiating talks with the Hamas; requesting international intervention; targeted killings of active members or leaders of the Hamas; air strikes on military targets of the Hamas; land invasion into the Gaza strip; waiting for Hamas' next maneuver (and currently refraining from response).

Subjects had the opportunity to be exposed to additional information regarding criteria that are relevant to the decision making process. The subjects were told that this information was gathered by senior diplomatic officials and national security experts. The criteria were: the life of the captured soldier; short term security of Israeli civilians; long term security of Israeli civilians; Israeli soldiers' safety; lives of Palestinians; Israel's relations with the world; Israel's relations with the Palestinian Authority. The subjects had the option of grading each criterion according to its importance in their opinion from 1 (having the lowest importance) to 10 (having the highest importance).

The subjects were presented with a table of closed cells, each cell containing information regarding the repercussions of a possible alternative on a certain criterion.<sup>1</sup> The subjects had to click on a cell in order to reveal the requested information. The subjects chose themselves which cells to open (if any), how many cells to open and in what order. Upon opening a cell the subjects were able to grade the information contained within that cell as positive information or as negative information in their opinion (-5 being extremely negative information, 5 being extremely positive information, and 0 being neutral information).

*Acquisition of information.* The Decision Board program maps and records the decision making process of each subject, i.e. which cells were opened; in which order the subject opened the cells; the time periods that were dedicated to the examination of each new piece of information; the grade given to a specific cell or criterion; and, of course, the final decision made by the subject. As part of the examination of our second hypothesis we shall use the data about the number of cells that were open by the subject as an indicator for the amount of information the subject acquired and the total time dedicated by him to the table as an indicator to his deeper consideration and more intense acquisition of information.

*Emotions.* After deciding on the preferred alternative, the subjects filled out an online form and rated twelve given emotions, possibly evoked within them by the exposure to the scenario. The intensity of the emotions evoked was assessed on a 10-point scale from 1 (being the lowest level of the emotion) to 10 (being the highest level of the emotion). The emotions graded were: anger, annoyance, horror, vengefulness, fear, sadness, stress, sorrow, rage, hatred, apprehension and joy (serving as an indicator to see if the questionnaire was filled out genuinely).

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<sup>1</sup> Albeit not essential for the purposes of our research, the information presented to the subjects within the table, including the criteria and extremity of decisions, was formulated following a consultation with a professional in the field of Israeli security.



*Controls.* The subjects were also asked in the above-mentioned online form to give personal details for statistical analysis such as age, gender, political views, education, income etc. (to serve as control variables). Political view was assessed on a 10-point scale according to the subject's own definition of his position on the Left-Right Ideological scale regarding Israel's security issues (1 - being extreme left and 10 - being extreme right). Education was assessed on a 9 levels scale – from elementary education to high school education, high professional education, undergraduate student, bachelor degree, graduate student, master's degree, doctoral student and PhD. Income was assessed on a 5-point scale according to their report of their monthly income vis á vis the average monthly income (substantially below the average monthly income, below the average monthly income, near the average monthly income, above the average and substantially above the average monthly income).

*Extremity of decisions.* In order to examine the effect of the emotions on the extremity of the decisions we clustered together the most extreme decisions on each part of the scale of the decisions for reaction – both militant and diplomatic reactions – as well as the more moderate decisions.<sup>2</sup> We gathered the most lenient alternative - releasing Palestinian prisoners as a confidence-building measure with the most militant alternative - land invasion into the Gaza strip (as the extreme tips of the decisions scale); initiating talks with the Hamas together with air strikes on military targets of the Hamas; and the most moderate alternatives - requesting international intervention and targeted killings of active members or leaders of the Hamas. We have created an extreme decision scale from 1 (standing for the most moderate decisions) to 3 (standing for the most extreme decisions). Since the decision to wait for Hamas' next maneuver is actually abstention from any reaction to the capturing of the soldier it was placed outside of the extremity scale.

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<sup>2</sup> This was also done following a consultation with a professional in the field of Israeli security.

## **Results**

### **Subjects**

70 Subjects filled out all the parts of the experiment (20 were the control group, 22 received the "Military scenario" and 28 received the "Personal scenario"). Out of which 44 (63%) were males and 26 (37%) were females. This ratio was more or less constant throughout the three scenarios, varying from 61%-39% to 65%-35% (see Table 1, Annex 1). The youngest subject was 19 years old and the oldest 57. The mean age of the subjects was 28.75 and the median was 27.5. Almost 68% of the subjects were between the ages of 20 and 30 (see Figure 1, Annex 2).

In rounded percentage, 30% of the subjects were undergraduate students (21 subjects), 14% graduate students (10 subjects) and 7% doctoral students (5 subjects), 21% hold bachelor degrees (15 subjects), 13% hold Master degrees (9 subjects) and 6% hold a PhD (4 subjects) (see Table 2, Annex 1). 39% of the subjects declared earning substantially below the average monthly income, 20% less than the average monthly income, 12% near the average, 13% above the average monthly income and 16% substantially above the average monthly income (see Table 3, Annex 1).

On the Left-Right political view scale (1 - being extreme left and 10 - extreme right), 5.7% (4 subjects) belong to the extreme left (1), 41.4% (11+18 subjects) to the left (2-3), 15.7% (11 subjects) to the centre-left (4), 18.5% (5+8 subjects) to the center (5-6), 5.7% (4 subjects ) to the centre-right (7), 8.5% (5+1 subjects) to the right (8-9) and 4.3% (3 subjects) to the extreme right (10). In total, more than 60% of the subjects belong to the ideological left (varying between the scenarios from 54% to 70%). The mean and the median are central left (4.3 and 4 respectively) (see Table 4, Annex 1 and figure 2, Annex 2).

## Scenarios and Emotions

After standardizing to a zero-to-one scale all the responses for the different emotions (except for joy, which was left out of the scale), we combined them to an Emotions' Scale, which is an average of all the responses (Cronbach's Alpha reliability is  $\alpha = .9198$ ). The minimal value of the emotions' scale indicated is 0 and the maximal 0.808. 20% of the subjects were at the lower level of the emotions' scale between 0 and 0.101, 10% between 0.101 and 0.202, another 10% between 0.222 and 0.2828, 10% more between 0.292 and 0.393, and an additional 10% between 0.404 and 0.454. Consequentially, 70% of the subjects reached a combined emotional reaction lower than 0.5. Additional 10% were between 0.464 and 0.545, another 10% between 0.565 and 0.636 and the last 10% between 0.646 and .0.808. The mean of the Emotions' scale is 0.343 and the median is 0.363. Resonating from this is that the combined emotions' scale shows emotional response at the low end of the scale for most of the subjects (see Table 5, Annex 1).

We found no significant correlation between the scenarios and the reported emotions (using both gamma and Pierson measures there was a slight correlation around 0.04, but no significance:  $p > 0.5$ ). Reexamination using a regression with the scenarios as dummy independent variables (the basic scenario serving as the base-line) revealed largely the same results (the coefficients were 0.03 for the military scenario and 0.02 for the personal scenario and not significant,  $p > 0.5$ ) (See Table 1).

**Table 1.** Regression Examining Change in Intensity of Emotions Due to the Scenarios

	<b>Coefficients</b>	<b>Beta coefficients</b>
<b>Constant</b>	.3212121 (.0502076)*	
<b>Military Scenario</b>	.0350781 (.0693717)	.0739737
<b>Personal Scenario</b>	.0276335 (.0657371)	.0614964
<b>N</b>	70	70

Standard errors in brackets: \*\*\* $p < .001$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; \*  $p < .05$

This result of lack of significance proved to be similar with the control variables as well – no change in the insignificance of the scenario variables. The only variable that was found significant in effecting the intensity of emotions was gender (being a female increased the level of emotions by 0.137,  $p < 0.05$ ) (See Table 2).

**Table 2.** Regression Examining Change in Intensity of Emotions Due to the Scenarios with Controls

	<b>Coefficients</b>	<b>Beta coefficients</b>
<b>Constant</b>	.184241 (.1398673)	
<b>Military Scenario</b>	.0018405 (.0656767)	.0039383
<b>Personal Scenario</b>	-.0012924 (.061608)	-.002914
<b>Age</b>	.0088764 (.0049006)	.2658353
<b>Gender</b>	.1370201 (.056756)*	.3024173
<b>Education</b>	-.015721 (.0168768)	-.1259937
<b>Income</b>	-.0404694 (.0209891)	-.2786549
<b>Political view</b>	.1141299 (.1021567)	.1353796
<b>Adj. R<sup>2</sup></b>	12%*	
<b>N</b>	69	69

Standard errors in brackets: \*\*\* $p < .001$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; \*  $p < .05$

This finding means that the scenarios did not succeed in their mission to evoke different levels of emotions within the subjects, thus failing to substantiate our first hypothesis.

### **Emotions and Decisions**

We continue to examine the second part of our hypotheses, which regards the effect of emotions on the decision making process. The minimal number of cells that was opened was zero cells (1 subject). The maximal number of cells belongs to one subject that opened 103 cells. 10% of the subjects opened 0 to 2 cells. The following 20% opened between 4 and 15

cells. The next 10% opened 16-21 cells and the following 10% between 24 and 30. The next 10% opened 31-46 cells and additional 20% opened 48 to 55 cells. The following 10% opened between 56 and 63 cells (see Table 6, Annex 1). The average number of cells that were opened by the subjects was 35.

Running a regression in order to examine the effect of the intensity of emotions over the number of cells revealed that the coefficient of the intensity of the emotions was substantial ( $b=3.77$ ), but not significant ( $p>0.5$ ) (See Table 3). Adding the control variables enlarged the emotions' coefficient ( $b=4.83$ ) however it remained not significant ( $p>0.1$ ). No other variable was found significant in its effect over the number of cells dependent variable (See Table 4).

**Table 3.** Regression Examining the Effect of Intensity of Emotions over the Number of Cells Opened

<b>Coefficients</b>	
<b>Constant</b>	33.80577 (5.687867)***
<b>Intensity of Emotions</b>	3.770083 (13.94738)
<b>N</b>	70

Standard errors in brackets: \*\*\* $p < .001$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; \*  $p < .05$

**Table 4.** Regression Examining the Effect of Intensity of Emotions over the Number of Cells Opened with Controls

	<b>Coefficients</b>	<b>Beta coefficients</b>
<b>Constant</b>	37.93541 (16.53018)	
<b>Emotions</b>	4.83429 (15.93988)	0.041532
<b>Age</b>	-0.77747 (0.6217241)	-0.20004
<b>Gender</b>	7.650666 (7.386532)	0.145067
<b>Education</b>	-0.415898 (2.099013)	-0.02864
<b>Income</b>	3.404886 (2.686752)	0.201414
<b>Political view</b>	23.09797 (12.79712)	0.235383

<b>Adj. R<sup>2</sup></b>	0%
<b>N</b>	69

Standard errors in brackets: \*\*\* $p < .001$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; \*  $p < .05$

The Decision Board program measures the time dedicated by each subject for making the decision in seconds. Divided by 60 and we extract the number of minutes. Almost 13% of the subjects dedicated 5 minutes or less to the decision making process. Around 31% dedicated 5 to 10 minutes for the decision making process. 26% of the subjects dedicated between 10 and 15 minutes – thus 70% of the subjects dedicated no more than a quarter of an hour to the decision making process. Additional 10% dedicated 16 to 18 minutes and another 10% dedicated 18 to 25 minutes. The fastest decision was made after 2.36 minutes and one subject supposedly dedicated more than 302 minutes (see Table 7, Annex 1). However the last subject was clearly a major deviation that could have resulted from the subject doing something else while replying or receiving a phone call, and cannot be treated as a normal observation and therefore was coded as a missing value.

Running a regression in order to examine the effect of the intensity of emotions over the time dedicated to the decision making process revealed that the coefficient of the intensity of the emotions was substantial and negative ( $b = -4.7$ ), meaning that the more emotions were evoked the amount of time dedicated to the decision was diminished. However this is not significant ( $p > 0.5$ ) and therefore cannot be generalized (See Table 5).

**Table 5.** Regression Examining the Effect of Intensity of Emotions over the Dedicated Time

	<b>Coefficients</b>
<b>Constant</b>	17.957 (5.788746)**
<b>Intensity of Emotions</b>	-4.713477 (14.20322)
<b>N</b>	69

Standard errors in brackets: \*\*\* $p < .001$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; \*  $p < .05$

Adding the control variables changed the emotions' coefficient to be positive and larger (b=7.04) however it remained insignificant ( $p>0.5$ ). Other variables did not reveal significance in their effect over the time dedicated by subjects to the decision making process (See Table 6).

**Table 6.** Regression Examining the Effect of Intensity of Emotions over the Time Dedicated by the Subjects with Controls

	<b>Coefficients</b>	<b>Beta coefficients</b>
<b>Constant</b>	10.24208 (17.04494)	
<b>Emotions</b>	7.044193 (16.46744)	0.059496
<b>Age</b>	-0.048159 (0.648134)	-0.01219
<b>Gender</b>	-1.791067 (7.747365)	-0.03298
<b>Education</b>	-0.536459 (2.168356)	-0.0363
<b>Income</b>	4.721285 (2.837775)	0.272689
<b>Political view</b>	-8.389684 (13.19645)	-0.08393
<b>Adj. R<sup>2</sup></b>	-.01%	
<b>N</b>	68	68

Standard errors in brackets: \*\*\* $p < .001$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; \*  $p < .05$

These results do not support our second hypothesis; i.e. we could not substantiate our second hypothesis based on these results, as will be elaborated in the discussion part.

Now we turn to examine the effect of the emotions on the decision itself. First we scaled the decisions between 0 and 1 - from the more peaceful and lenient one (releasing Palestinian prisoners as a confidence-building measure, which received the value 0) to the most militant aggressive one (land invasion into the Gaza strip, which received the value 1). Since the decision to wait for Hamas' next maneuver is actually abstention from any reaction to the capturing and only one subject had chosen this alternative, it was neglected and referred to as a missing value.

Only 3% of the subjects (2 subjects) chose releasing Palestinian prisoners as the favorable reaction, 19% chose to engage in talks with the Hamas, 29% (20 subjects) chose to request international intervention (this was the mode decision), 26% preferred the alternative of targeted killings of active members or leaders of the Hamas, 14.5% chose air strikes on military targets of the Hamas, and 8.7% chose to execute land invasion into the Gaza strip (see Table 8, Annex 1).

Utilizing regression we found no significant relation between the emotions and the chosen alternative ( $b=.02, p>.5$ ) (See Table 7). Adding the control variables to the regression did not change the insignificance though the direction had changed to negative effect ( $b=-0.3, p>0.5$ ). The only variable which had significant effect on the final decision was the political view on a left-right scale ( $b=.55, p<0.001$ ) (See Table 8). The meaning of that is that a person with a right political view tends to more militant reactions and a person with a more leftist political view would tend to a more peaceful less militant reaction (not a very surprising finding). From the standardized beta coefficients it is notable that even if it were significant the intensity of the emotions would be minor in comparison with the other (control) variables.

**Table 7.** Regression Examining the Effect of Intensity of Emotions on the Decision (chosen alternative) of the subjects

<b>Coefficients</b>	
<b>Constant</b>	0.5065824 (0.0571645)***
<b>Intensity of Emotions</b>	0.0190734 (0.1418203)
<b>N</b>	69
Standard errors in brackets: *** $p < .001$ ; ** $p < .01$ ; * $p < .05$	

**Table 8.** Regression Examining the Effect of Intensity of Emotions on the Decision (Chosen Alternative) of the Subjects - with Controls



	<b>Coefficients</b>	<b>Beta coefficients</b>
<b>Constant</b>	0.2828199 (0.1451317)	
<b>Emotions</b>	-0.033685 (0.1412295)	-0.02852
<b>Age</b>	0.0023994 (0.0055746)	0.059548
<b>Gender</b>	0.0419002 (0.0648581)	0.079147
<b>Education</b>	-0.023126 (0.0184791)	-0.15926
<b>Income</b>	0.0297923 (0.0233089)	0.174938
<b>Political view</b>	0.5563813 (0.1119956)***	0.565868
<b>Adj. R<sup>2</sup></b>	25%***	
<b>N</b>	68	68

Standard errors in brackets: \*\*\* $p < .001$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; \*  $p < .05$

Using the extreme decisions' scale and running a regression, again we found no significant effect of the emotions on the extremity of the decision ( $b = -.03$ ,  $p > .5$ ). No significance was found adding the control variables, though the coefficient of the emotions changed even in direction ( $b = .11$ ,  $p > 0.5$ ) (See Table 9). Replacing the control variable of left-right political view with a variable of extreme political view (combining extreme left with extreme right, left with right, centre-left with centre-right to see only the extremity of the political view) did not change the insignificant outcomes (See Table 10).

**Table 9.** Regression Examining the Effect of Intensity of Emotions on the Extremity of the Decision of the subjects - with Controls

	<b>Coefficients</b>	<b>Beta coefficients</b>
<b>Constant</b>	1.057526 (0.4584281)*	
<b>Emotions</b>	0.1112256 (0.4461024)	0.0347
<b>Age</b>	0.002011 (0.0176084)	0.01839
<b>Gender</b>	-0.176703 (0.2048675)	-0.12299
<b>Education</b>	0.0469626 (0.0583699)	0.119168

<b>Income</b>	0.0284217 (0.0736258)	0.061495
<b>Political view</b>	0.4511984 (0.353761)	0.16909
<b>Adj. R<sup>2</sup></b>	0%	
<b>N</b>	68	68

Standard errors in brackets: \*\*\* $p < .001$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; \*  $p < .05$

**Table 10.** Regression Examining the Effect of Intensity of Emotions on the Extremity of the Decision of the Subjects - with Controls, including Extremity of Political View

	<b>Coefficients</b>	<b>Beta coefficients</b>
<b>Constant</b>	1.202714 (0.482555)*	
<b>Emotions</b>	0.1992614 (0.4466503)	0.062166
<b>Age</b>	0.0032264 (0.0178341)	0.029505
<b>Gender</b>	-0.267206 (0.1943706)	-0.18598
<b>Education</b>	0.0444532 (0.059833)	0.1128
<b>Income</b>	0.012924 (0.074082)	0.027963
<b>Extreme Political view</b>	0.0148183 (0.0721987)	0.026007
<b>Adj. R<sup>2</sup></b>	-3%	
<b>N</b>	68	68

Standard errors in brackets: \*\*\* $p < .001$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; \*  $p < .05$

## **Discussion**

In this paper we aspired to add to the body of research which maps the effects emotions have on the decision making process. Specifically, we wished to examine the validity of the identifiable victim effect on the decision making process in the realm of national security. Our results differed from the research's hypotheses and also from the results expected in light of previous studies in other realms of human behavior. In the following section, we shall analyze the results in light of our initial three hypotheses and suggest possible explanations for our

findings, which indicate potentially fruitful directions in future research to be later elaborated upon.

Our first hypothesis concerned the connection between the scenarios and the level and intensity of emotions. Based on the findings of previous studies, we expected the personal scenario, which was supposed to be more emotionally charged, to have a stronger effect on the subjects' emotions than the other two scenarios, and that the military scenario would have a stronger effect on the subjects' emotions than the basic, more neutral scenario. These expectations were based on the aforementioned identifiable victim effect. However, our research findings show that the intensity of emotions conveyed by the subjects did not differ significantly as a function of the scenario to which the subject was exposed. This raises some questions about the difference between our findings and the findings of previous research.

We suggest that a possible reason for this difference is that the issue of captured soldiers is an exceptionally emotionally loaded issue in Israel a priori, and therefore the variations in the identifiability throughout the scenarios were negligible compared to the already existing emotional load. It is also possible that the differing identifiability of the victim throughout the scenarios was insufficient.

Our second hypothesis concerned the connection between emotions and the decision making process, specifically the information acquisition patterns. Based on the dual-process theory, we expected that the subjects who are more emotionally engaged and who display more extreme emotions will devote greater cognitive attention and deeper consideration to the decision making process and will therefore wish to be exposed to as much relevant information as possible. However, our findings did not demonstrate a significant difference in the information acquisition patterns of the subjects that varied in levels of emotional intensity. This result also raises questions about the difference between our findings and those expected from the dual-process theory. It is plausible that a highly emotionally motivated person would feel the

decision has been made clear to him via the emotional channel rather than the analytical one, and will therefore feel no need to acquire further information. However, this hypothesis is not founded upon theoretical background and requires further research.

Our third hypothesis concerned the connection between emotions and the final decision made by the subjects. We expected to see a positive connection between the intensity of emotions and the extremity of the decision, in a manner that the more and the stronger the emotions evoked by the scenario were, the more extreme alternative will be made on the part of the subjects exposed to the scenario. However, in the case of this hypothesis as well, our findings did not validate our initial hypothesis. In the following chapter we offer two possible explanations, which are of a different nature, to this puzzling result.

### **Conclusions**

In conclusion, all of the findings above outline a picture which differs from our initial expectations. We would like to offer several explanations to these results: one regards the methods of research, and the other refers to the theoretical background from which the research question stemmed and the universality of the identifiable victim theory explored.

Utilizing the Decision Board computer program we presented the subjects with a multi-layered task which focus revolved around the captured soldier plot. This method of research was aimed at exploring the application of the identifiable victim effect outside of the economic sphere and specifically within the sphere of national security. It is not unreasonable to assume that utilizing a different plot, perhaps one which is not as emotionally and socially charged, would enable the identifiability effect to manifest itself in a more significant manner. It is also plausible that the lack of significant results is due to the size of our sample, which contained a total of 70 subjects throughout the three scenarios. Perhaps a similar research with a minimum of 120 subjects (an average of 40 per scenario) would enable greater significance of results. Stemming from these

two realizations, we find opportunities for future research to enhance and improve the aforementioned method. One plausible direction would be to examine the identifiable victim effect within the realm of national security via a different, less emotionally charged plot, e.g. utilizing a military assault plot in the place of the captured soldier plot. Another future research direction could increase the size of the sample, which may lead to more significant results.

Another plausible reason for our lack of significant findings lies within the identifiable victim theory itself. As elaborated in the theoretical chapter, the identifiable victim theory has been explored chiefly within the economic realm. Furthermore, Schelling (1968) composed this theory based on observed events within the economic realm. Our attempt at applying this theory to other realms was daring but speculative. There is a lack in empirical data that shows that the effects of identifiability should be valid outside of the economic realm as well. For this reason, our research was a small step forward in the direction of establishing that body of research. More specifically, it would not be far-fetched to hypothesize that the reason our research did not yield significant results which support our hypotheses (or, for that matter, significant results of any kind) is because the identifiable victim theory does not apply to realm of national security. Future research can examine this matter on two levels: Does the identifiable victim theory apply outside the economic realm? Does it apply to the realm of national security? These research, and others, could grant us insight into the boundaries of the effect of identifiability, as well as into the realm of national security.

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**Annex 1 - tables**

**Table 1. Gender**

		<b>Scenario 1</b>	<b>Scenario 2</b>	<b>Scenario 3</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Male</b>	%	<b>65.00%</b>	<b>63.64%</b>	<b>60.71%</b>	<b>62.86%</b>
	Num.	13	14	17	44
<b>Female</b>	%	<b>35.00%</b>	<b>36.36%</b>	<b>39.29%</b>	<b>37.14%</b>
	Num.	7	8	11	26
<b>Total</b>	%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	<b>Num.</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>70</b>

**Table 2. Education**

		<b>Scenario 1</b>	<b>Scenario 2</b>	<b>Scenario 3</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>High School</b>	%	<b>5.00%</b>	<b>13.64%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>5.71%</b>
	Num.	1	3	0	4
<b>Professional School</b>	%	<b>5.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>3.57%</b>	<b>2.86%</b>
	Num.	1	0	1	2
<b>Undergrad.</b>	%	<b>15.00%</b>	<b>31.82%</b>	<b>39.29%</b>	<b>30.00%</b>
	Num.	3	7	11	21
<b>BA</b>	%	<b>30.00%</b>	<b>22.73%</b>	<b>14.29%</b>	<b>21.43%</b>
	Num.	6	5	4	15
<b>Graduate</b>	%	<b>20.00%</b>	<b>13.64%</b>	<b>10.71%</b>	<b>14.29%</b>
	Num.	4	3	3	10
<b>MA</b>	%	<b>15.00%</b>	<b>13.64%</b>	<b>10.71%</b>	<b>12.86%</b>
	Num.	3	3	3	9
<b>Doctoral</b>	%	<b>10.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>10.71%</b>	<b>7.14%</b>
	Num.	2	0	3	5
<b>PhD</b>	%	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>4.55%</b>	<b>10.71%</b>	<b>5.71%</b>
	Num.	0	1	3	4
<b>Total</b>	%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	<b>Num.</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>70</b>



**Table 3. Income**

Monthly average		Scenario 1	Scenario 2	Scenario 3	Total
<b>Substantially Below the average</b>	%	<b>31.58%</b>	<b>54.55%</b>	<b>32.14%</b>	<b>39.13%</b>
	Num.	6	12	9	27
<b>Below the average</b>	%	<b>15.79%</b>	<b>9.09%</b>	<b>32.14%</b>	<b>20.29%</b>
	Num.	3	2	9	14
<b>Near the average</b>	%	<b>21.05%</b>	<b>13.64%</b>	<b>3.57%</b>	<b>11.59%</b>
	Num.	4	3	1	8
<b>Above the average</b>	%	<b>10.53%</b>	<b>9.09%</b>	<b>17.86%</b>	<b>13.04%</b>
	Num.	2	2	5	9
<b>Substantially Above the average</b>	%	<b>21.05%</b>	<b>13.64%</b>	<b>14.29%</b>	<b>15.94%</b>
	Num.	4	3	4	11
<b>Total</b>	%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	<b>Num.</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>69</b>

**Table 4. Political View**

		Scenario 1	Scenario 2	Scenario 3	Total
<b>Extreme Left</b>	%	<b>10.00%</b>	<b>4.55%</b>	<b>3.57%</b>	<b>5.71%</b>
	Num.	2	1	1	4
<b>2</b>	%	<b>15.00%</b>	<b>13.64%</b>	<b>17.86%</b>	<b>15.71%</b>
	Num.	3	3	5	11
<b>3</b>	%	<b>20.00%</b>	<b>18.18%</b>	<b>35.71%</b>	<b>25.71%</b>
	Num.	4	4	10	18
<b>4</b>	%	<b>15.00%</b>	<b>18.18%</b>	<b>14.29%</b>	<b>15.71%</b>
	Num.	3	4	4	11
<b>5</b>	%	<b>10.00%</b>	<b>9.09%</b>	<b>3.57%</b>	<b>7.14%</b>
	Num.	2	2	1	5
<b>6</b>	%	<b>15.00%</b>	<b>13.64%</b>	<b>7.14%</b>	<b>11.43%</b>
	Num.	3	3	2	8
<b>7</b>	%	<b>5.00%</b>	<b>9.09%</b>	<b>3.57%</b>	<b>5.71%</b>
	Num.	1	2	1	4
<b>8</b>	%	<b>5.00%</b>	<b>9.09%</b>	<b>7.14%</b>	<b>7.14%</b>
	Num.	1	2	2	5
<b>9</b>	%	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>3.57%</b>	<b>1.43%</b>
	Num.	0	0	1	1
<b>Extreme Right</b>	%	<b>5.00%</b>	<b>4.55%</b>	<b>3.57%</b>	<b>4.29%</b>
	Num.	1	1	1	3
<b>Total</b>	%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	<b>Num.</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>70</b>

**Table 5.** Emotions scale

emotions	Freq.		Percent	Cum.
0		5	7.14	7.14
0.010101		1	1.43	8.57
0.020202		1	1.43	10
0.030303		1	1.43	11.43
0.050505		1	1.43	12.86
0.060606		2	2.86	15.71
0.080808		2	2.86	18.57
0.10101		1	1.43	20
0.10101		1	1.43	21.43
0.111111		1	1.43	22.86
0.121212		1	1.43	24.29
0.131313		1	1.43	25.71
0.141414		1	1.43	27.14
0.181818		1	1.43	28.57
0.20202		1	1.43	30
0.222222		1	1.43	31.43
0.232323		1	1.43	32.86
0.252525		1	1.43	34.29
0.262626		1	1.43	35.71
0.272727		2	2.86	38.57
0.282828		1	1.43	40
0.292929		1	1.43	41.43
0.313131		1	1.43	42.86
0.343434		2	2.86	45.71
0.353535		1	1.43	47.14
0.363636		3	4.29	51.43
0.373737		2	2.86	54.29
0.383838		2	2.86	57.14
0.393939		2	2.86	60
0.40404		2	2.86	62.86
0.414141		1	1.43	64.29
0.424242		2	2.86	67.14
0.444444		1	1.43	68.57
0.454546		1	1.43	70
0.464647		1	1.43	71.43
0.474748		1	1.43	72.86
0.484849		1	1.43	74.29
0.505051		1	1.43	75.71
0.515152		1	1.43	77.14
0.545455		2	2.86	80
0.565657		1	1.43	81.43
0.575758		1	1.43	82.86
0.606061		2	2.86	85.71

0.616162		2	2.86	88.57
0.636364		1	1.43	90
0.646465		1	1.43	91.43
0.656566		1	1.43	92.86
0.666667		1	1.43	94.29
0.717172		1	1.43	95.71
0.727273		1	1.43	97.14
0.757576		1	1.43	98.57
0.808081		1	1.43	100
Total		70	100	

**Table 6.** Number of cells opened by the subject

Number of Cells	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
0	1	1.43	1.43
1	2	2.86	4.29
2	4	5.71	10
4	1	1.43	11.43
5	1	1.43	12.86
7	2	2.86	15.71
8	1	1.43	17.14
9	1	1.43	18.57
10	3	4.29	22.86
11	1	1.43	24.29
12	1	1.43	25.71
14	1	1.43	27.14
15	2	2.86	30
16	1	1.43	31.43
17	2	2.86	34.29
19	2	2.86	37.14
20	1	1.43	38.57
21	1	1.43	40
24	1	1.43	41.43
26	1	1.43	42.86
28	1	1.43	44.29
29	1	1.43	45.71
30	3	4.29	50
31	1	1.43	51.43
35	2	2.86	54.29
38	1	1.43	55.71
41	1	1.43	57.14
43	1	1.43	58.57
46	1	1.43	60

48	2	2.86	62.86
49	1	1.43	64.29
50	3	4.29	68.57
51	1	1.43	70
52	3	4.29	74.29
53	1	1.43	75.71
55	3	4.29	80
56	2	2.86	82.86
58	1	1.43	84.29
59	1	1.43	85.71
61	1	1.43	87.14
62	1	1.43	88.57
63	1	1.43	90
64	1	1.43	91.43
65	1	1.43	92.86
80	1	1.43	94.29
81	1	1.43	95.71
89	1	1.43	97.14
98	1	1.43	98.57
103	1	1.43	100
Total	70	100	

**Table 7.** Time dedicated by the subject in Decision Board

<b>Time (minutes)</b>	<b>Freq.</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>Cum.</b>
2.366667	1	1.43	1.43
2.783333	1	1.43	2.86
2.966667	1	1.43	4.29
3.883333	1	1.43	5.71
4.383333	1	1.43	7.14
4.55	1	1.43	8.57
4.583333	1	1.43	10
4.816667	1	1.43	11.43
5	1	1.43	12.86
5.033333	1	1.43	14.29
6.5	1	1.43	15.71
6.6	1	1.43	17.14
6.833333	1	1.43	18.57
6.883333	1	1.43	20
6.95	1	1.43	21.43
7	2	2.86	24.29
7.15	1	1.43	25.71
7.416667	1	1.43	27.14
7.6	1	1.43	28.57
7.883333	1	1.43	30

7.916667	1	1.43	31.43
8	1	1.43	32.86
8.033334	1	1.43	34.29
8.383333	1	1.43	35.71
8.45	1	1.43	37.14
8.866667	1	1.43	38.57
8.883333	1	1.43	40
9.233334	1	1.43	41.43
9.616667	1	1.43	42.86
10.05	1	1.43	44.29
10.23333	1	1.43	45.71
10.58333	1	1.43	47.14
10.6	1	1.43	48.57
10.63333	1	1.43	50
10.68333	1	1.43	51.43
11	1	1.43	52.86
11.03333	1	1.43	54.29
11.23333	1	1.43	55.71
11.51667	1	1.43	57.14
12.18333	1	1.43	58.57
12.23333	1	1.43	60
12.33333	1	1.43	61.43
13.41667	1	1.43	62.86
13.43333	2	2.86	65.71
13.76667	1	1.43	67.14
14.26667	1	1.43	68.57
14.53333	1	1.43	70
16.05	1	1.43	71.43
16.7	1	1.43	72.86
17.4	1	1.43	74.29
17.78333	1	1.43	75.71
17.91667	1	1.43	77.14
17.95	1	1.43	78.57
17.98333	1	1.43	80
18.6	1	1.43	81.43
21	1	1.43	82.86
21.31667	1	1.43	84.29
21.83333	1	1.43	85.71
21.88333	1	1.43	87.14
22.46667	1	1.43	88.57
22.66667	1	1.43	90
22.76667	1	1.43	91.43
24.58333	1	1.43	92.86
30.58333	1	1.43	94.29
41.66667	1	1.43	95.71
127.55	1	1.43	97.14
186.3333	1	1.43	98.57


302.8167	1	1.43	100
Total	70	100	

**Table 8.** Decisions


		Scenario 1	Scenario 2	Scenario 3	Total
<b>Releasing Palestinian prisoners</b>	%	0%	0%	7.14%	2.9%
	Num.	0	0	2	2
<b>Talks with the Hamas</b>	%	10.53%	9.09%	32.14%	18.84%
	Num.	2	2	9	13
<b>Request International Intervention</b>	%	42.11%	40.91%	10.71%	28.99%
	Num.	8	9	3	20
<b>Targeted Killings</b>	%	26.32%	22.73%	28.57%	26.09%
	Num.	5	5	8	18
<b>Air Strikes</b>	%	15.79%	9.09%	17.86%	14.49%
	Num.	3	2	5	10
<b>Land Invasion to Gaza Strip</b>	%	5.26%	18.18%	3.57%	8.7%
	Num.	1	4	1	6
<b>Total</b>	%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	<b>Num.</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>69</b>

**Annex 2 - graphs**

**Figure 1.** Age of subjects



**Figure 2.** Political view of subjects



## התרחישים

צוות המחקר מודה לך על השתתפותך במחקר זה בנושא ביטחון לאומי.

לפני תחילת המחקר, אנא העתיקי את כתובת האינטרנט הנוכחית. כתובת זו מכילה את מספר הנבדק שלך. מאוחר יותר תתבקשי להדביקה, וכך נוכל להבטיח אנונימיות מוחלטת במילוי השאלון.

דמיין/י כי נבחרת לתפקיד ראש ממשלת ישראל. כעת מוטלת עליך חובת ההחלטה בכל הנושאים הבוערים והחשובים.

בשעות הלילה המאוחרות מתקבל טלפון ובו מזכירך הצבאי, אשר מודיע לך כי בפעילות בסמוך לגדר המערכת בגבול רצועת עזה נחטף חייל ישראלי על ידי הזרוע הצבאית של החמאס. טרם ברורים פרטי האירוע, אולם נראה כי ידרשו שחרור אסירים ביטחוניים תמורת שחרורו.

תוספת לגירסה ב' - פרטים אישיים: החייל, סמל ראשון אייל ניר, בן 21 תושב המרכז, הוא בן יחיד למשפחה שכולה, אשר אביו נהרג בפעילות מבצעית בלבנון. אייל, אשר סבל מבעיות בריאותיות בילדותו, נאבק לפני גיוסו על מנת להעלות את הפרופיל הרפואי שנקבע לו, בכדי שיוכל להתגייס ליחידה הקרבית בה שירת אביו.

תוספת לגירסה ג' - פרטים צבאיים: החייל, סמל ראשון אייל ניר, בן 21 תושב המרכז, היה חלק מכוח שהוזנק השבוע לרצועת עזה, לתגבור כוחות עקב עלייה בהתרעות ממוקדות באזור. אייל היה מפקד כוח הסיור הרכוב אשר נתקל בחוליית מחבלים. כתוצאה מחילופי האש נהרג נהג הסיור, הלוחם הנוסף נפצע קשה ופונה במסוק לבית החולים סורוקה בבאר שבע.

בכדי להגיע להחלטה מהירה בדבר התגובה הראשונית שיש לנקוט, כונס פורום מצומצם של גורמים מקצועיים בכירים במערכת הביטחונית והמדינית ובו נקבעו הקריטריונים שעל בסיסם תתקבל ההחלטה כיצד על מדינת ישראל לפעול בנידון, והם:

- חיי החייל
- בטחון תושבי ישראל
- בטחון חיילים נוספים
- חיי פלסטינים
- יחסים עם הרשות הפלסטינית
- יחסים עם העולם

ראשית, עליך לקבוע בטבלה המוצגת מטה את מידת החשיבות של כל אחד מהקריטריונים בקבלת ההחלטה על אופן הפעולה, ולהעניק לכל אחד מהם ציון בין 1 ל-10 (1 - חשיבות נמוכה ביותר, 10 - חשיבות גבוהה ביותר) [על ידי לחיצה על כפתור ה-Weight].



בשלב זה, התגבשו מספר חלופות לפעולה אפשרית כתגובה ראשונית לאירוע, והן:

- סיכול ממוקד של בכירים / פעילים בארגון החמאס

- הפגזות אוויריות של מטרות צבאיות של חמאס

- כניסה קרקעית לרצועה

- בקשה להפעלת לחץ בינלאומי

- שיחות עם החמאס

- שחרור אסירים ביטחוניים בהתאם לדרישה שתתקבל

- חוסר תגובה

בכדי להגיע להחלטה מושכלת, המטה שלך הכין פירוט של ההשלכות של כל אחת מהפעולות בכל אחד מהקריטריונים אשר צוינו לעיל. אם ברצונך לעיין בהן, תוכל ללחוץ על התא המתאים ולקבל את המידע. אנא תן ציון לתא על פי הערכתך את המידע שהוא מכיל: החל משלילי מאוד (5-) ועד לחיובי מאוד (5), דרך ציון ניטרלי (0).

כאשר תגיעי להחלטה, אנא בחר/י בחלופה של הפעולה הראשונה שבה תורה לנקוט ולחץ/י אישור.

לאחר קבלת ההחלטה, אנא עבור/עברי לכתובת האינטרנט הבאה בכדי להשלים מספר מצומצם של פרטים אישיים (תוך שמירה על אנונימיות מלאה).

### טבלת קריטריונים

חוסר תגובה	שחרור אסירים ביטחוניים	שיחות עם החמאס	בקשה להפעלת לחץ בינלאומי	כניסה קרקעית	הפגזות אוויריות	סיכול ממוקד	
לא מסכן את חיי החייל.	מבטיח את חיי החייל.	לא מסכן את חיי החייל.	לא מסכן את חיי החייל.	מסכן את חיי החייל ברמה גבוהה.	מסכן את חיי החייל ברמה גבוהה.	מסכן את חיי החייל ברמה בינונית.	חיי החייל
יאפשר את המשך הירי אל עבר יישובי ישראל.	הרגעת המצב.	החמאס ינסה להראות כי הוא יכול לשלוט על השטח וישקיע מאמצים בעצירה של הירי תלול המסלול.	החמאס לא ירצה להסלים את המצב. הירי ימשך ב"טפטוף".	כניסה קרקעית תשתיק זמנית את רוב הירי על היישובים בישראל.	רבות מתשתיות החמאס יפגעו, בהם רוב המשגרים לטווחים הבינוני והארוך. הירי על היישובים הקרובים לגדר ימשך.	הסיכול יביא לניסיונות תגובה של הארגונים הקטנים ברצועת עזה ועלול לגרור את החמאס להצטרף לחימה.	ביטחון תושבי ישראל בטווח הקצר

<p>יצייר את ישראל כחלשה, ויעודד ניסיונות של החמאס וארגונים נוספים בעתיד.</p>	<p>עידוד החמאס לשחזורי המבצע בכדי להשיג מטרותיו.</p>	<p>הבנות יגרמו לרגיעה, כל עוד החמאס יקבל את רצונו.</p>	<p>כל עוד הקהילה הבינלאומית תמשיך לספק לחמאס את צרכיו, השקט יישמר. אולם, לחמאס יהיה אמצעי סחיטה אשר יוכל להפעיל לכשירצה.</p>	<p>כניסה קרקעית תפגע בתשתיות החמאס בצורה אנושה.</p>	<p>ההפגזות יפגעו במלאים ובתשתיות של הארגונים בצורה בינונית.</p>	<p>סיכולים יפגעו בשרשרת הפיקוד של ארגון החמאס ויצריכו זמן הערכות מצדו.</p>	<p>ביטחון תושבי ישראל בטווח הארוך</p>
<p>החולשה המוקרנת תעודד פעולות קיצוניות יותר.</p>	<p>חוץ מעידוד פעולות נוספות, שחרור פעילים יכול להגזרה על ידי המשוחררים עצמם.</p>	<p>החמאס ינסה לרסן פעילות כוחנית של שאר הארגונים במהלך השיחות.</p>	<p>אין סיכון מצד החמאס בסבב הנוכחי. ארגונים קטנים יותר ינסו להראות רלוונטיים, וינסו להוציא פעולות גרילה לפועל.</p>	<p>כניסה קרקעית מסוכנת מאוד ותגבה מחיר בחיי חילים.</p>	<p>למרות שידוע על מספר טילים נגד מטוסים (קרקע אוויר) שבידי החמאס, רמת יכולת התפעול של המערכות עודה נמוכה.</p>	<p>סיכון מזערי למבצעים, וסיכון לפעולות תגמול מצד החמאס.</p>	<p>ביטחון חיילים</p>
<p>אין סיכון.</p>	<p>אין סיכון.</p>	<p>אין סיכון.</p>	<p>אין סיכון.</p>	<p>סיכון גדול לאוכלוסייה האזרחית.</p>	<p>סכנה לתושבים המתגוררים בסמוך ליעדי התקיפה.</p>	<p>קיימת סכנה לסביבה המידית של יעדי הסיכול.</p>	<p>חיי התושבים הפלסטינים ברצועת עזה</p>
<p>אין שינוי ביחסים עם הקהילה הבינלאומית.</p>	<p>התקרבות קטנה לקהילה הבינלאומית.</p>	<p>התקרבות ישראל לקהילה הבינלאומית.</p>	<p>הידוק שיתוף הפעולה בין ישראל לקהילה הבינלאומית.</p>	<p>קריאה של מועצת הביטחון להפסקה מידית של פעולות הצבא הישראלי. גינוי נרחב של ישראל בעולם.</p>	<p>כינוס חירום של מועצת הביטחון של האו"ם.</p>	<p>צפוי גינוי רפה מן העולם.</p>	<p>יחסים עם העולם</p>

**קישור לשאלון פרטים אישיים**

[https://docs.google.com/forms/d/1FS6ib1b90IOfkJ5jZH2\\_UmXAkt4Ltp\\_ejq0JZ\\_OZ9U/viewform](https://docs.google.com/forms/d/1FS6ib1b90IOfkJ5jZH2_UmXAkt4Ltp_ejq0JZ_OZ9U/viewform)