

The Rise of the New Center

By Alex Troitsky – 309801959, second draft

The main goal of this paper is to create the appropriate conceptualization of the phenomenon of “new center” political parties and to point out to some theoretical implications of this conceptualization. The argument is based on Katz and Mair’s(1995) theory of parties’ evolution and its’ development by Yael Yishai (2001).

The paper is structured as follows: I will present an overview of the theoretical frame of the parties’ evolution theory. Accordingly, I will construct a model consisting of three of independent variables which allow us empirically distinguish between political parties of different types. In the next part I will demonstrate, using this model, that in four cases at least new center parties are (predominantly) of post-cartel type. Finally, I will discuss some theoretical implication of this finding and possible directions of future research.

Part 1 – Party as evolving institution

Party in modern democracy is a political institution. But how does it work? There are a number of theories describing parties’ *modus operandi*. One group of such theories can be called class-based. The most prominent (but not the only) example of theories belonging to this group is so called social-democratic political theory. In general terms these theories see parties as vehicles by which class interests are transported to political structure (or, in classical Marxism, to superstructure). Thus political position of a party, according to these theories, is determined by coherent interests of social class supporting it (see for example Esping-Andersen, 1990). As class-based interests are permanent (or at least very stable) the coherent aggregation of interests of specific class in specific institution (party) produces ideologisation (more on this see Resende, 2005, pp. 10-18) of this institution. Thus class-based parties are, generally, ideological parties.

The second group of theories has begun with Downsian model of parties’ vote-seeking strategy (Downs, 1957). More modern (and competing) spatial and multidimensional models and directional model (Macdonald, Listhaug and Rabinovitz 1991) also belong to this group. The parties in these theories are conceptualized as competing ultimate vote-

seekers (Resende, 2005, pp.19-22). Or, simply put, a party adopts position on relevant issue (or issues) strategically – in order to maximize a number of seats it receives from an electorate. The voters, on the other hand vote according to their preferences – that is, according to their standing on specific issue (or set of issues).

The important contribution of both approaches described above was establishing a specific and testable connection between voter's behavior and parties. If voters tend to vote according to their class – the class-based, ideological parties should thrive; if not – Downsian competition should take precedence. In other words, there was a place now for behavioristic contribution to this, essentially institutional, question.

The research in voters' behavior has shown that voting patterns are changing in time. Specifically, class-based voting is declining across established democracies and issue-based voting is on the rise. But this research project found another, unpredicted patterns. Firstly, there was a trend of “de-alignment” of population from political parties (see Dalton, 2004, Katz and Mair 1996, for summary of other findings see Ingelhart and Welzel, 2011), while, in the same time, the commitment of the same population to democratic values remained stable. Secondly, “post-materialistic” political issues entered the field of electoral policy.

So a new theory of party and parties' system in democracy was required, one that could account for observed change in patterns. Thus the new theory needed to be evolutionary and reciprocal – one that describes how parties adapt to changes, “evolve”

Such a theory was created by Katz and Mair (Katz and Mair, 1995, 2009). It describes evolution of parties by introducing a new variable – relations of parties to civil society and political structure. But, as opposed to class-based theory these relations are not stable, but evolving. On the other hand, the reason parties adapt to circumstances is their basic goal – to be in power. Thus in some sense evolutionary theory of parties takes into account deepest insights of both class-based and office-seeking theories.

As this paper deals with contemporary politics, it is focused on the latest stage of parties' evolution. Katz and Mair (Katz and Mair, 1995) describe this type of parties as “cartel parties”. Those parties, essentially, lost connection with civil society and are acting as

state agency with a goal to supply “services of democracy” to population. As such, they rely on state in matters of financial support, as a partisan *membership* plummeted across developed democracies. But state can reliably supply only limited amount of resources, hence the goal of the parties is to limit the number of actual recipients of support. Thus established parties are acting as cartels, with a goal to limit the access to resources supplied by state to political actors.

The important caveat to Katz and Mair’s theory in general and to cartel party theory in particular is the claim that the theory describes “ideal type” parties, while real, existent parties usually have the characteristics of several types simultaneously (Katz and Mair, 1995). Nevertheless, the theory is meaningful in at least two senses: it describes which characteristics are on the rise and which are declining under specific conditions, what changes we are expecting, when and why; also, while “pure” party of a certain type may be difficult to find (Katz and Mair, 1995, 2009), it still makes sense to speak of “dominant characteristics” of each party.

Cartel theory is consistent with many observable trends. Aforementioned “de-alignment” of public from partisan politics is one of examples. Additionally, some findings point out to independence of policy output from partisan composition of a government (Imbeau, Petry, Lamari, 2001). Those findings are also consistent with cartelization theory.

But in the economic theory cartel is inherently unstable solution. Similarly, political cartel, as authors of theory themselves observed (Katz and Mair 2009, p.759), constantly faces two major problems – defection from within and entrance from outside. Besides, the theory was published at 1995, before almost twenty years. It covers a time-span of almost two centuries of democratic development, and observes constant changes across all this period. We have no theoretical reason whatsoever to assume that evolution of parties as institution and of their connection with civil society and state has stopped.

Yael Yishay (Yishay, 2001) proposed a theory of one possible development after the establishment of the cartel. She pointed out that a break of the cartel parties with civil society is a structural weakness of the cartel as a whole: a party which could establish a link between itself and a civil society should be able to break into cartel structure. In the

same time, it is still impossible to enter the same river twice: the de-alignment of public from partisan politics already happened, class structure eroded and it makes the reintroduction of mass party ineffective strategy.

The solution of these dilemma lies, according to Yishay (2001), in linking with particular parts of population through civil society institutions. Such institutions provide certain type of resources or services to certain parts of population in the name of (more or less) “noble” goal. They need a political “roof” to acquire the resources from the state. On the other hand, they are competing for such resources with other parts of civil society.

Thus the new types of parties are shaped by their “returning” to *particular parts* of civil society. On one hand, they need to actualize politically voters belonging to certain category in the society: voters should not only belong to this category but also vote as such. Thus these new parties restore the politics of belonging, or of identity. But this time those political identities are necessary particularistic: they, after all, are actualized for intra-societal competition.

On the other hand, the parties of new type cannot rely on civil society for acquirement of resources necessary for political competition: they are appearing because certain parts of society lacking the resources to begin with. Therefore the main political goal of those parties is to break into the cartel and participate in the “distribution of the pie”.

This new type of party was called by Yishay “post-cartel” parties.¹ It is important to note that according to Yishay’s article the “post-cartelization” can be both as entrance and as defection from the cartel (see above).

However, the classification of parties by their social *modus operandi* is not the only existent and useful classification. Another classification is dealing with a strategic use by parties of their position on different political issues. This classification is distinguishing between mainstream and niche parties. The cartel parties are mainstream parties “by

¹ The name is actually not very successful: while Katz and Maier named different types of parties according to their most distinct operational feature (elite, mass, take-all, cartel), while this name relates to time-period of appearance. In this sense any future types of parties will also be “post-cartel”. The “belonging parties” seems to be more useful term.

default”, but how are post-cartel parties related to niche parties? To answer this question we should first understand what exactly niche party is.

The closer look in the literature reveals that there are *two* interconnected but different concepts: niche party and single-issue party. The niche party’s definition could be found in the paper by Meguid (Meguid, 2005, for operationalization see Wagner, 2011) and claims that niche parties:

1) niche parties reject the traditional class-based orientation of politics; 2) the issues raised by the niche parties are not only novel, but they often do not coincide with existing lines of political division; 3) niche parties further differentiate themselves by limiting their issue appeals...niche parties rely on the salience and attractiveness of their one policy stance for voter support.

Single-issue party is defined by Mudde (2007) as follows:

1) The single-issue party has an electorate with no particular social structure; 2) the single-issue party is supported predominantly on the basis of one single issue; 3) the single-issue party does not present an ideological programme; 4) the single-issue party addresses only one 'all-encompassing issue' in its literature.

The key point is the fact that parties, considered by Meguid as typical niche parties *are not*, according to Mudde single-issue parties. If we take into account the aforementioned erosion of class-based party politics in general (thus equalizing statements (1) in both definitions) we can see that the definitions are almost identical. And we have to face a problem – there is a cases² which belongs to “niche” class but not to the “single-issue” class, but the definitions cannot capture the difference.

One way to deal with a problem is to deny existence of single-issue parties. But this will not solve a problem entirely: the extreme right parties in Europe would be still inconsistent with at least some points of Meguid definition (as Mudde’s paper shows).

² Consider for example new extreme –right parties, which are considered as typical example *both* by Meguide and Mudde.

Besides, we are dealing with “closest to ideal type” concepts, hence even if “pure” single-issue party is nowhere to be found, there still may be some cases best described as such.

The other option is to make some order in the definitions. We can begin with the observation that, as mentioned above, point (1) in both definitions is irrelevant – in some cases it describes mainstream parties as well.

Niche parties, while “differentiate themselves by limiting their issue appeals”, (Meguid, 2005) are not necessary limited to only *one* policy – rather a limited complex of policies which mainstream failed to represent (Mudde, 2007). The limited complex can function as “differential” tool the same way “one issue” does. Consider, for example, the appropriation by some Green parties of the left-wing economical discourse (which actually helped them to become more distinct entities).

On the other hand single-issue parties, if there are any of them around, should be confined to limited *and single* issue. This issue can be limited conceptually (for example “pure ecological”), socially (for example protection of interest of pensioners) or circumstantially (promoting specific set of political measures). Those parties really “does not present an “ideological programme”; instead they are ready to go along with whoever willing to take they demands into account. In contrast, as Meguid shows, niche parties are necessary trying to distance themselves from the mainstream in order to survive. The differences between niche and single-issue parties can be summarized in the following table (see Table1):

Party-type/characteristics	Niche	Single-issue
Appeal based on differentiation of	policy	issue
Ideology	elaborated	Flexible or none
Strategy	Controversy, combativeness	Cooperation, cooptation


Table 1: the distinction between the niche and the single-issue party-types

Is there are in reality any single-issues parties? Taking into account the aforementioned claim that there are no “pure” parties, the answer seems to be positive. Polish agrarian party (PSL), which adjusted its position on almost any issue according to the political

trends, seems to be one example. The Israeli “Third way”, which contested in the 1996th election, seems to be another. Splitted from Labor party, it entered the coalition with Likud, despite proclaimed preference to Labor on other issues.

So there are three distinctive types of parties by relation to issues: mainstream, niche and single-issue. How are they related to the modus operandi classification? As mentioned above, cartel parties are mainstream parties. Single-issue parties actually can be inside or outside the cartel, depending on specific party system, but even inside they are able to retain some of their unique characteristics - promotion of one issue instead of providing managerial service like a cartel parties.

On the other hand new post-cartel parties are expected to behave as niche parties: they goal is to break into the cartel (as mentioned above) and, as Meguid shows, this is a viable strategy. It doesn't mean that all of niche parties are post-cartel ones. This also doesn't mean that old parties which desert the cartel should become niche parties: both of those claims should be discussed and tested separately elsewhere. Overall, the resulting parties' typology can be illustrated as the following Wayne diagram (see picture 1).



Picture 1 - Wayne diagrams – relations of parties' typologies by party type and strategic standing on issues

A-mainstream parties, B- niche parties, C- single-issue parties, D-cartel parties, E- post-cartel parties. (A-D) is not an empty set, mass and catch-all parties belong there. (B-E) may be a non-empty set in different historical-institutional circumstances.

So, to define the type of specific new party in post-cartel period we have to build a model which allows us to differentiate between a cartel, post-cartel and single-issue parties. The model should enable us to access the classification on the ground of empirical evidence, take into account mixed nature of actual parties and be effective for most (ideally- for all) democratic party system.

Part 2 – Operationalization of Parties’ Types

To begin a quest to find relevant empirical markers of parties’ types we have to summarize known characteristics of those types. Table 2, presented below is a continuation of Katz and Mair (1995) typological table, which repeats the entry about cartel parties, but adds two more entries: for post-cartel and single-issue parties.

Characteristics	Cartel	Single-issue	Post-cartel
Principal goals	Professional management	“Noble” goal	Actualization of particular identity
Basis of competition	Managerial skills, efficiency	Expertise on the matter	“Us” and “Them”
Electoral competition	Contained	Collaborative Mobilization	Competitive mobilization
Party work and campaigning	Capital-intensive	Both labor and capital-intensive	Both labor and capital-intensive
Members-elite relations	Mutual autonomy	Top-down leader-centric	Leader-defined
membership	Blurred, individualistic	Blurred, utilitarian	Belonging
Channels of communication	Privileged access to state-regulated channels	Existing privileged (social) channels of interest groups, NGO’s	Existing “native” (social) channels, NGO’s, own channels
Representative style	Agent of state	Expert-promoter	“Prophet”-Advocate

Table 2 – characteristics of cartel, niche and post-cartel parties by Katz and Meir’s (1995) parameters; column “cartel” is a (somewhat shortened) copy of respective column in the original article.

A short explanation is in order about each set of characteristics. First two rows were already described in previous part of this paper. The pattern of electoral competition is determined by parties' goals: the single-issue parties need to mobilize people with shared specific goal, while post-cartel parties need to actualize politically ones identity – that is also to mobilize potential voters to their ranks. However, post-cartel parties also need to break into the cartel (or to represent themselves as outsiders of the cartel in case of defection) – thus they need to adopt very competitive stance, while single-issue parties, in order to achieve their goal, need to emphasize their readiness to “work together”.

As both single-issue and post-cartel are mobilizing parties, their campaigns are both capital and labor-intensive: capital is needed in the age of “de-alignment”, while labor-intensive campaigning is not an electoral tool per se, but a mean to mobilize supporters.

Members-leadership relation, representative style and membership are connected parameters. Representative style is determined by parties' functionality. Hence single-issue party representative are experts and promoters for the issue that in the core of parties existence. Those experts claim to have ultimate authority on this issue, and thus relations are top-down and leader-centric. A membership is blurred and utilitarian in the sense that members are valued by they relation to the main goal

On the other hand, as the main functional feature of post-cartel parties is actualization of identity (“belonging”) their leadership style is one of “prophet”-advocate. As “prophets” the leadership's function is to “show” to members how their really are. As advocates – they need to represent their claims as unique, specific and legitimate. Thus the member-elite relations become leader-defined – the elite provide definition of “member” as a part of identity's actualization. The membership of those parties, even more blurred than the one of cartel parties, defined primary by belonging to specific political identity.

Finally, channels of communications of both single-issue and post-cartel parties are of mixed nature. While both types strive to get access to state-control channels under cartel's control, their also use alternative communication channels, in particular new ones, provided by the rise of social media. In addition, some existing media could be

useful tools for both types of the parties: namely those that share a single-issue main goal or oriented toward an audience which happens to be the target of identity actualization.

As this analysis shows, there are a number of parameters which can be operationalized into variables which should allow us to distinguish between parties of different types. However, some of the variables are hard to obtain and others are not sensible enough.

In this paper I intend to use three operational variables which derived from parameters described above:

- 1) Leadership: personal characteristics of parties' leaders. They may be expressed in a number of ways: emphasized points of personal biography and personality (like achievement, experience or reputation) and expressed relation to accepted "rules" of behavior (in politics in particular)
- 2) Attitude toward cleavages: what is the main issue the party promotes? How it relates to main cleavage and to standing of other players?
- 3) Attitude toward establishment: is the party endorses the existent political situation, propose some "improvement" of policy while accepting the structure and values in general or deliberately presents itself as "other" while criticizing the system in general?

Who is the most "appropriate" leader for parties of each type? For carte parties those are political managers, which are emphasizing their managerial skills, achievements and abilities "to get the job done". For single-issue parties those are "experts", leaders able to claim that their opinion (on the issue) is valuable and important. For the post-cartel, "prophets"-advocates' in order to perform their function properly, should distance themselves from the existing political environment. Their act as outsiders in the political system, thus demonstrating the "otherness" of identity actualized; sometimes they are breaking the rules "just for show" – to emphasize particular nature of this identity.

There are two important points: firstly, we are looking here for the self-emphasized behavior and not for the traditional political actions like parliamentary voting. This is especially (but not exclusively) true for the post-cartel parties. Successful post-cartel

party should break into the cartel and thus to demonstrate some degree of actual cooperation with the cartel. However, in demonstrative, public acts and pronouncements, they need to present themselves as outsiders. What is important here is a public image of a politician.

Secondly, it is likely that success in politics requires mixed skills. It is possible that every moderately *successful* politician has some “prophetic” charisma, managerial skills and, at least, some expertise in some areas. But, as previously, we are not looking for actual performance of politicians, but for their public image.

What are parties’ attitudes toward cleavages in society? Cartel parties should emphasize their managerial experience, for which positions on historically “traditional” cleavages, on which they have been operating a long time is the best option. After all, they are (usually) historical parties, which have risen from those main cleavages. Single-issue parties, in line with their goal, should emphasize their standing on one specific limited issue. Additionally, as Rovny (2013) shows, their standing on the main issues as a whole (historical main cleavage) should be as blurred as possible. As for post-cartel parties, there are, in line with Meguid’s reasoning should adopt combative, divisive rhetoric concentrated on the secondary cleavage. There is one additional option open to them: if, for some reason, some standing on main political cleavage was excluded from “central” political discourse post-cartel party can adopt this position as the tool for identity actualization. As Mudde (2007) has shown, this strategy is relatively wide-spread and can result in rather complex ideology, but in line with Meguid’s argument this ideology should still be contrary to the cartel position, if the post-cartel party strives to success.

Once again, we are dealing with proclaimed positions and not with actual parliamentary voting, while the last is not necessarily coherent (or even compatible) with the first.

Finally, what are the attitudes of parties of each type toward existing political system and establishment? Cartel parties are the establishment themselves, thus they should necessarily adopt and justify the existent system and its rules. Single-issue parties are not there to change the system, just to adjust some aspect of its performance, in line with “collaborative competitive” electoral strategy. This stance can be defined as

“improvement”. Finally the post-cartel parties, with their more divisive and controversial attitude, should present themselves as a harsh critics of a system and established players.

Those are characteristics of “ideal” parties of each type. They are summarized in the following table:

Characteristic/party's type	Leadership	Standing on the cleavages	Attitude toward system and establishment
Cartel	Manager, professional	Main	justification, promotion
Single-issue	Expert	Limited (main or secondary)	cooperation, improvement
Post-cartel	Outsider	Secondary	Critical, combative

Table 3: Characteristics of “ideal” party-types according to operationalized variables

As mentioned above, actual parties are expected to be, at least sometimes, of “mixed” type. The system of variables proposed here (see Table 2) is flexible enough to capture such “mixed” cases. In the same time, it is possible, using this model to speak of dominant characteristics in each case.

On the other hand, this system can be expanded in future to operationalize some other parameters (see Table 1) of different party types. In this sense the goal of proposed model is to serve as first estimation of party type, subjected to future research on the matter. Nevertheless, even this first estimation can provide enough evidence in this stage to build on.

Part3: Using the variables; the methodological commentaries.

The single-issue parties are relatively rare occurrence, partially because they are, as the model suggest, at their best in undisturbed cartel environment. There are still a number of immediate suspects: Israel “Third Way”, mentioned above, is just one of them (the present Polish PSL is another). The main goal of the party was rather limited – to insure the inclusion the Golan Heights under Israeli law. The party stance was cooperative – it

indeed entered the Likud's government, but was ready to cooperate with Labor as well, as long as their goal was promoted. The leader – Avigdor Kahalani, former Labor MP, - emphasized his military experience on Golan Heights as a source of his supreme expertise on the matter.

The cartel parties are, usually, the historical ruling mainstream parties. But there are important exceptions for this rule of thumb. Firstly, a new party can undergo a process of cartelization. The good example of this may be Israeli "Kadima" under Ehud Olmert³: the leader carefully presented himself as successful "manger" of the state, the main policy has become the peace process with the Palestinians through talks⁴ (Olmert even produced elaborated project of future agreement) - which is one of traditional positions on the main Israel political cleavage – and party, being in government tried to defend system's functioning.

Secondly, a historical party can try to defect from cartel through the process of post-cartelization. The supposed example of original Yisahy's paper is Israeli Labor party. This process becomes much more obvious in this party under the leadership of Shelly Yachimovich. The party shifted its focus from "political" cleavage to social-economic one (secondary for Israeli society) and adopted much more leftist (and thus divisive) position on this cleavage, declining to enter unity government as lesser partner. The leader presented herself as political stranger (coming from being professional journalist almost straight to party leadership). Finally, the party's rhetoric toward "the system" (consistently with a move to the left) has become much more critical and combative, accompanied by emerging demands for "a change" and (failed for now) attempt to ride the tide of social-economic protest of 2011.⁵

³ for more on the Kadima, as well as the discussion of its centric nature and the meanings of the term see Hazan, (2007)

⁴ Why and how "Kadima" was able to usurp this goal from Labor is a separate question

⁵ This can be a partial answer to the previous question – the Labor voluntarily left the place that Kadima entered.

Parameter/party	years	leader	leadership	cleavage	style	type
Third Way	1996-1999	Avigdor Kahalani	expert	limited	cooperation	Single-issue
“Haavoda” - Labor	2012-2013	Shelly Yahimovich	outsider	secondary	critique	Post-cartel
Kadima	2006-2008	Ehud Olmert	professional	main	justification	cartel

Table 4 – Most close parties to ideal party types – the Israeli case

As shown in Table 4, the model indeed able to capture the difference in the party types. Moreover, it is able to determine the party type in specific point of time, thus, potentially, taking into account changes that might occur in political system.

Now I will apply this model on four cases of new political centrist parties which emerged in the last electoral cycle.

Why the new center parties are important? Firstly – the very possibility of emergency of new player in the center of the main political spectrum is somehow paradoxical in the light of Downsian model of electoral competition: established parties (given more or less normal distribution of electoral preferences) should be centralized enough to be able to block any entrance in the center. The issue-voting and postmaterialist preferences (Ingelhart and Wenzel 2011) arguments don't solve this problem: as Ingelhart and Rabier (1986) have showed the established Right-Left division of political preferences serves as “universal solvent” for voter's preferences, thus maintaining Downsian pattern.

Secondly, the emergence of successful new parties in the established democracies in general is important topic of studies. However, while the Green movement, as well as the rise of extreme Right, is studied to a certain degree, the new centrist parties received, until now, less attention.

Methodologically speaking, the main topic of the following analysis is descriptive inference and not a causal one. The main claim of this part of the paper is that *in some cases we are able to observe a new phenomenon*. Naturally, this leads to certain methodological peculiarity. We not only need, but virtually have to select our cases on

dependent variable: if there are some cases of specific phenomenon we have to look in those cases to observe it.

Additionally, this research doesn't make a claim about a whole population of relevant cases. Instead its primary goal is to show that sometimes a new phenomenon is observed. Only provided this goal will be reached with sufficient clarity (as the author certainly hopes) we could ask about conditions, under which this phenomenon arise, and start to look for the source of the variance – that is for causal inference.

Finally, to claim the observation of new phenomenon means to apply anew some concepts to some occurrence – this is a task of conceptualization. Since Quine (for example Quine, 1951, Quine 2004) it is known that this task cannot be accomplished by purely neo-positivistic methods. Thus this part of the paper involves *empirically-based interpretation* of observed facts. The previous part, in fact, provided us tools to reach such an interpretation on more robust basis, by comparing the actual cases to ideal (theoretical) concepts: namely the existing parties to “ideal” party's types.

Part 4 – The New Center

There are four cases which I will analyze here: Austrian “Team Frank Stronach” (“Team Sronach”), Czech ANO, Israeli “Yesh Atid” and Polish “Your Movement” (former, in time of the election, “Palikot Movement”).

All four parties were created before the last elections and succeed in entering the respective parliaments. Yesh Atid and ANO succeeded to become second largest parties in parliaments and junior partners in newly formed governing coalitions, holding respective Treasure ministries. Palikot Movement has become third largest party in Polish parliament, outperforming both historical left-center SDL and historical single-issue PSL. Team Sronach has become fifth biggest party in Austria, behind PFO and Greens.

Two of my cases are placed in “old” democracies – Austria and Israel, and two in “newer” “post-soviet” ones – Czech Republic and Poland⁶. All four countries are using party-list-PR systems for parliamentary elections. All of the countries, except Israel, have a number of multi-member electoral constituencies (while Israel is a single electoral district). All countries except Austria have one-tier electoral system (Austria is using 3-tier system).⁷ As for this article I will postulate that the main political cleavage in the three European countries is economic, while in Israel this is the “security” cleavage – and first and foremost the relations with Palestinians. There is one peculiarity – in the wake of the recent euro-crisis the EU and euro questions have rose into prominence. For the sake of this article I will assume that a stance on Europe is a part of main lavage if it is mostly economically motivated and a separate cleavage in all other cases⁸.

All four countries are showing signs of cartel-policy crisis⁹: the number of parties represented in parliaments after last elections has grown, the support for the mainstream, historically ruling parties (with an exception of Poland) diminished and right-winged and left-winged parties support increased . On the other hand there is a sings that cartel, more or less powerful, existed in all four countries. Most of Austrian governments was (and still are) unity governments. In all other cases the ruling party was one of “mainstream”: OVP and SPO, usually (with some exceptions) with support of FPO. In fact, until the rise of the Green and rig-wing turn in FPO there was no other relevant state-wide political parties (Liberal forum first entered the politics in the 90th, while Communists experienced steady decline to insignificance since the first post-war electoral cycle).

⁶ The summary of electoral systems I used are available in “ElectionGuide” and “IDEA”, the results of all historical elections, including the recent ones are taken from “Parties and Elections in Europe”, see the bibliography.

⁷ For more information about each electoral system see Appendix A.

⁸ A brief example for the sake of clarity: in Austrian case FPO’s euroscepticism is mostly ideologically-motivated (xenophobia, nationalism etc.), and thus a part of separate cleavage, while in the current BZO (after Hider’s death) it is mostly economically-motivated (“paying the debts of others”, regulatory red-tape etc).

⁹ I wouldn’t say “disintegration”, because existence of, albeit weakened, cartel may be, in this stage of evolution consistent with post-cartel politics: after all the post-cartel parties strive to break into the cartel, not to destroy it: as in Yishay’s example they are, despite their anti-system rhetoric entering governing coalitions.

Czech political system, while appearing to be more volatile, was dominated by CSSD and ODS (center-right and center-left, respectively). Although unity government *per se* never occurred, there were cases of “Opposition Agreement” governments – official agreement between the two aforementioned parties to allow minority government to rule. Such an agreement proved to be stable, producing in 1998-2002 4-years minority government. Moreover, during this government CSSD and ODS worked on electoral reform, with a goal to reduce number of parties in parliament and to increase the share of seats of big parties. The resulting law was struck down by Constitutional Court, but weaker reform was adopted. Additionally, since the stabilization of party system and until the elections of 2010 not only the two largest parties received more than 50% of the votes (combined), also the number of parties in parliament was declining. Moreover, despite apparent volatility, there was, until 2013, only two persons (in more than 20 years) were elected (by the parliament) as Presidents of the Republic: Vaclav Gavel, the leader and the symbol of anti-communist resistance and Vaclav Klaus, the Finance minister in the first post-communist government (under Gavel), Prime Minister of the following two governments and the founder of ODS.

In Polish party system, where unity governments never took place, we can still observe some signs of cartel politics. Firstly, there is a stable decline in the number of represented parties. Secondly, two of the three parties that formed governing coalitions as major partners are, in fact, a split parties (since 2001) of Solidarity Electoral Platform, center-right electoral coalition governing in 1997-2001. Since that split and until last elections no new party entered the Polish parliament, while a number of parties lost their place in it. The third party was a major center-left force in the country, forming a number of governing coalitions, but slipped into the third and eventually fourth place.

Israeli case of cartel formation and crisis is described in Yishay’s paper (2001). It has to be added, that since reinstatement of the old electoral system¹⁰ the Israeli politics has experienced two more major shifts: the displacement of the Labor by Kadima as the second “big” party (the “first” one being Likud) and collapse of the same Kadima party

¹⁰ For the analysis of the systemic consequences of Israeli “direct election” (of prime-minister) system see Rahat and Hazan, (2005) and Hazan, (1996)

in the elections of 2013. The third development trend is a diminishing of the “big” parties. The biggest party in the current Knesset (parliament) is, in fact, the electoral block of two separate parties – Likud and Israel Beiteinu. Taking into account that it needs (arithmetically) at least two partners to form a coalition we can say that minimal winning coalition in the current Knesset consists of four parties. By comparison, during 70th and 80th “the two big” parties were arithmetically able to form a coalition all by themselves anytime they wished so.

So, we can reasonably suspect that there is a cartel crisis under way in all four countries. Now I shall briefly analyze each of four cases.

Austria - Team Stronach.

Team Stronach is the least successful of our four cases. Founded by 80-years old Austrian-Canadian “tycoon” Frank Stronach in 2012, the party performed well in the state elections, but underperformed in general elections, securing less than 6% of votes and 11 seats in 183-members parliament (lower house).

The Stronach’s standing on the issues can be described as economical eclecticism and economical euroscepticism with political pro-european position. Stronach called the euro “monstrosity” (Skyring, 2012), while supporting united Europe as political entity and free-market zone. On economical questions Stronach, while in general presenting right-liberal stance, promising to reduce bureaucracy and reign in the state debt, in the same time has borrowed some ideas from the left – namely infrastructural investments and the assault on the banking system. Overall, the main team of Stronach’s campaign were (with the following exception) in the line with the main political cleavage (see Programme-Stronnach in the bibliography).

Stronach’s was bluntly confrontational toward the political establishment. He refused to talk (about forming coalition government) with “professional politicians”(Keenan, 2013), blaming them for all real and imagined failures (Bell, 2013) has casted the politics of Austria as outdated which “Has barely changed since he left Austria in 1954” (Mackinnon, 2013). He suggested (before establishing Team Stronach) that Austria “needs intellectual revolution” (Die Presse, 2011).

Team Stronach is a very leader-centric party. And Stronach has casted himself as “outsider”, having just returned to Austria from Canada and turning to politics from business. This was an important resource for justifying his anti-establishment sentiments (Bell, 2013)

Czech Republic – ANO 2011 – Movement of Disgruntled Citizens

Founded by Andrej Babis as social movement (note the name) – which became political party, ANO entered the parliament in 2013 elections as second-largest force and virtual kingmaker (AB, 2013). It has become a coalition partner with social-democratic CSSD, controlling, among others, the Ministry of Finance.

ANO proclaimed goal is to fight political corruption and “to take control on politics from politicians”. It supports, among other measures an abolition of parliamentary immunity and tighter control of politicians’ income (see Programme – ANO2011 in the bibliography).

In economic (main cleavage) sphere, despite casting itself as center-right pro-business, the party supports some measures typical that are for left-wing: reducing VAT and increasing direct taxation (through introduction of progressive personal income tax, as noted in coalition agreement)(CTK, 2014, PrismGroup, 2014). Some other economic policies cannot be defined in traditional terms: achievement of food autarchy and reduction of energy export are examples of such goals (Programme – ANO2011). To summarize, proclaimed party goal belongs to the secondary issue, while its position on the main goals is eclectic enough to be both centrist and divisive, fueling a controversies without becoming extreme (Ciensky, 2013A).

Party leadership intentionally emphasized its “outsider” nature. Party’s site proclaims that “we are not a party, but community”. Babis himself is controversial business-person, dubbed “Czech Berlusconi” (Ciensky, 2013A), controlling agro-food and media empires. He was a communist party member before 1989, and suspected collaborator of

communist secret police¹¹. In the same time the communists were the only party which ANO refused to acknowledge as potential coalition partners.

Party criticism of establishment is not only its main position, it is also its' *raison d'être*, as apparent not only from aforementioned statements, but also from the name itself.

Israel – Yesh Atid.

The party first entered the politics before the elections of 2013, becoming second-largest party in Knesset and a coalition partner in control of, among others, the Ministry of Finance.

The party campaigned on three issues: “new politics”, economic policy, especially the increasing economic burden on the “middle class” defined as “working people”, and relations of the state and the religion, specifically, “equality of duty” in army service (from which ultra-orthodox population was exempted) and bringing back the ultra-orthodox population into the “working force” (see Programme – Yesh Atid).

All three of those issues do not belong, in Israel, to the main, security cleavage. On this cleavage the party generally supported talks with Palestinians, casting itself as center-left. But relative insignificance of this issue for the party was shown than, after the election the party formed the parliamentary block with right-wing “Habait hayehudi”¹², which oppose the talks with Palestinians, let alone any agreement (the proclaimed goal of the block, dubbed “brothers’ pact”, was to negotiate any possible coalition agreement together).

The party’s stance was also rather divisive. The party insisted that it would not enter any coalition with ultra-orthodox parties in it, effectively forcing them into the opposition. Similarly, “equality of duty” was perceived by ultra-orthodox population as a major assault, which didn’t stop the coalition from adopting the new law.

¹¹ Babis himself both suited for those accusations and admitted the limited collaboration in the name of Czech economic interests, (see “Adrej Babis”, party’s site).

¹² “The Jewish Home”, former Mafdal party

The party's critical position toward the establishment was best shown in its' "new politics" slogans, which was blurred enough to assure only one point – the "new" is not the "old" one. In fact most of the new political practices by the party can be summarized as establishing the limits on the number of ministerial posts, increasing electoral threshold and constant appearance of the Minister of Finance on Facebook. Nevertheless the party still casts itself as the opposite to the old, corrupt and detached establishment.

The leader – Yair Lapid – former media person emphasizes his "outsider" nature not only by the means mentioned above, but also by emphasizing his non-political carrier. It may be no coincidence that aforementioned "brother's pact" was agreed with another newcomer in politic – former businessmen, successful high-tech entrepreneur and the chairman of "Habait hayehudi" Naftali Bennet¹³.

Poland – Your Movement – former Palikot Movement

One more movements-come-party (The Warsaw voice, 2013), the Palikot Movement, first entered the Polish politics before the last elections (2011), becoming third-largest party in parliament with 10% of votes - more than once-ruling SLD (Union of Left Democrats). The party changed later its name to "Your Movement".

The party's main issue is state-religion relations, with a goal to promote greater secularization in Poland. This is very divisive and controversial goal in the rather traditional and devoted country, where largest parties maintain good relations with Catholic Church (Clienski, 2012).

On the main issue parties position, usually perceived as center-left, is eclectic. The two prominent goals is full employment economic (meaning no unemployment at all), increasing social security and pro-European stance, but, in the same time also a leaner state and promotion of private entrepreneurship. This eclectic brought some observers to question the left economical placement of the party (Stanley, 2012). Thus the main party

¹³ Of course the possibility of such an alliance can be explained by structural characteristics of parties and system, such as leader-centric nature of both parties and increasing personalization of politics, but this cannot explain why the leaders would prefer such an alliance with a" distant " party, rather than to choose more "close" partners (on the main political axis). I am grateful to Dr. Chanan Cohen for his insight on the matter.

issue is secondary, while the position on the main issue is blurred (see Programme – Your Movement).

Janus Palikot came first to politics from business as a member of ruling Civil Platform (PO), and quickly become a prominent, popular but controversial MP. The party he created was very leader-centric, as seeing from its name. Palicot couldn't present himself as complete political outsider outright, being elected twice as an MP from the ruling party. As a result he restored to very controversial style of media-handling, positioning himself outside the established rules of conduct (Kulish, 2011)¹⁴. Altogether, the “*infant terrible*” image of the politician serves as his “outsider” marker, however we have to take into account his political experience and career. Preferring to err on a caution side, this politician will be considered, in this paper, as one of mixed type: half professional - half outsider

As for position toward the establishment, the party, following its anti-clerical position, often emphasized the connections of the church with the politicians as a problem. But this position often was apparent in Palikot's controversial statements¹⁵. Overall, the party and its' leader stance is critical toward establishment.

Overall, the four cases can be summarized in the following table

Parameter/party	leadership	cleavage	Relation to establishment	Dominant type
Team Stronach	outsider	main	critical	Post-cartel 2/3
ANO 2011	outsider	secondary	critical	Post-cartel
Yesh Atid	outsider	secondary	critical	Post-cartel
Your Movement	Professional- outsider	secondary	critical	Post-cartel 5/6

Table 5 – Four cases of the new centrist parties and most close “ideal” party type

¹⁴ A good summary of some of his exploits can be found in the Wikipedia's page on his name

¹⁵ claiming that SDL members was a minority in need of protection along with gays and Jews, and accusing PiS leader of murdering his brother – the late President – are just two examples

In the Table 5 I assume that each of the three parameters contributes equal measure of definition of party type. Thus, if one party has two parameters that belong to a certain party (A) type, but the third to another type (B), I describe this party as 2/3 close to the type (A).

According to the Table 4 we can be reasonably assured that we are observing here the appearance of new centrist post-cartel parties. What we cannot conclude is that closeness to the post-cartel type ensured greater success for such parties (as it seems from the first look): the table didn't take into account the variance which is based on differences in electoral systems, which surely influenced parties' performance.

Nevertheless, the very existence of post-cartel centrist parties is meaningful finding. Its theoretical consequences and possibilities for future research will be discussed in the following part of the paper.

Part 5: Discussion, Consequences and Research Possibilities.

So we are observing the appearance of post-cartel parties as new center parties. This is not the only post-cartel parties to appear. There are also extreme post-cartel parties as well (the Austrian FPÖ and Israeli "Habait hayehudi" and various Left-Green parties could be a good examples). It is also not the only way to the post-cartel parties to appear in the political center – the "defection" of a cartel party can be accompanied by its post-cartelization (as apparent from the example of Israeli Labor).

Nevertheless there are some important consequences of those parties being *in the same time* new, center and post-cartel. Firstly, this typology can shed some light on possible trajectories of development for such parties. Namely those parties could have rather short life-span, thanks to their critical position toward the mainstream politics. The successful new party is one that enters the coalition with others, necessary engaging in old-style politics of compromises, deals and so on. And the centrist post-cartel parties would find it hard to continue to distinguish themselves from their coalition partners. Thus the party should have to find a completely new *raison d'être* or to lose its appeal.

Secondly, the post-cartel parties in the center are changing political system of democracy in general. The post-cartels are parties of belonging, of identity. The identity, once activated, will not necessarily “go away” with the disappearance of initial activator. The result may be an appearance of large group of (formerly) centrist voters who are ready to vote not according to their interests or social status, but according to who are they in their own eyes. On one hand, the “hard” base of the mainstream political center should shrink in the process, and a voting volatility should arise. On the other hand, another party which could “catch” those “identity votes” not necessarily has to be a centrist one. Thus the appearance of centrist post-cartel parties could bring about growing polarization in political system in general.

Finally, the appearance of the new post-cartel parties could be accompanied by observable change in perceived hierarchy of needs (Maslow, 1943, Kenrick et al., 2011). If the main vote-motivation is indeed belonging, than a prominence of respective needs group should rise.

All three of aforementioned consequences can be reformulated as hypothesis and subjected to future research programs.

There are also two important discussions to be held. The first one is to answer why centrist post cartel parties have appeared in this specific stage of political development. The second one should reconsider the role of identity as belonging in the political action in general, and in modern electoral politics in particular. We should also remember, that the post-cartel identities are, according to the model, particularistic identities which inherently encompass only a part of any given polity. This difference should be taken into account in the reconsideration.

Of course, there are some caveats to the finding of this paper. Firstly, the empirical methodology of it contains some interpretative elements, which are necessary for the conceptualization of a new phenomenon. Nevertheless, once this task is accomplished, the more naturalistic approach for the task of identification of parties’ types in general should be established. This approach would accomplish two things – to provide basis for

future inquires in the causal questions and to provide an alternative operative measurement of party types.

Additionally, as mentioned above, my findings do not take into account important external influences, such as specific electoral system, economical parameters and so on. While those variables are unimportant for determination of the party type per se, they are necessary for any future analysis of connection between parties' evolution and, virtually, anything else. In other words, the next step should be asking: when such parties arise and when they do not.

Finally, there is a question of future development of parties' evolution theory. Specifically, we should ask is the development of post – cartel parties an entirely new step of evolution of the system or is it a specific type of party in the cartel stage of development (about the discussion emphasizing the difference between party type and system structure see Katz and Mair (1996) and Koole (1996)). In other words, we are facing two options here. The rise of post-cartel may mean the literally- post-cartel stage of system development. On the other hand it may mean that cartel structure, while necessary based on cartel parties, in its later stage of development allows some place to parties of belonging. Both options lead us to the question about determination of development trends of political institutional structure in modern democracies.

Conclusion

In this paper I have built an operational model for empirical determination of parties' types, according to Katz and Mair and Yshay's theories. I have shown that new successful centrist parties in some cases are most close to the post-cartel type. I have pointed out to some empirical and theoretical implications of this finding, along with a brief description of future empirical and theoretical research possibilities

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- 2) Program-full – see Appendix B
- 3) Biography - <http://www.teamstronach.at/frank-stronach/franks-biographie-timeline>
(German)

C) You Movement

- 1) Program: <http://twojruch.eu/materialy/program> (Polish)

D) Yesh Atid

- 1) Program – full: http://yeshatid.org.il/programmes/full_platform/ (Also see Appendix C)
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Appendix A: Electoral Systems

1) Austria:

There are 9 multi-member constituencies corresponding to each of the states. Each of these is subdivided into smaller, regional constituencies, of which there are 43 in total. Each party fields regional, state, and national lists of candidates. Each voter gets one ballot on which she votes for one party and may express candidate preferences within that party's regional and state-level lists. Seat allocation proceeds in three stages. First, regional seats are allocated (d'Hondt method). Second, provincial seat allocations are calculated, the sums of parties regional seats within each province are subtracted from these totals, and seats are allocated accordingly (d'Hondt method). Third, this process repeats at the national level (Hare method), where party lists are closed. Parties must win at least one seat each in a regional constituency to qualify for seats at the state and national levels. Additionally, any candidate who receives at least one-sixth of her party's votes is automatically awarded a seat. There is a 4 percent threshold for parties to gain representation, although a party that fails to reach this mark may still gain representation if it wins at least one seat in a regional election

2) Czech Republic:

Electors may cast two preference votes for candidates on their chosen party list. There are 14 multi-member constituencies. Votes are tabulated using the D'Hondt method. A threshold of 5% is required in order for a party to enter the Chamber of Deputies. The threshold is 10% in case of a coalition of two parties, 15% for a coalition of three parties, 20% for a coalition of four or more parties

3) Israel

Israel has a unicameral Knesset with 120 seats, in the Knesset 120 members are elected through a closed-list proportional representation system to serve 4-year terms. There is a

two percent threshold required to gain representation¹⁶. All candidates run in one, nationwide district

4) Poland

There are 41 multi-member constituencies consisting of anywhere between 7 and 19 seats. Electors are required to cast a preferential vote for the candidate of their choice. All preferential votes are tabulated as votes for the candidate's party. There is a 5% threshold for parties and 8% threshold for coalitions. The threshold applies to the share of the total national vote, not the constituency. Candidates that belong to ethnic minorities are exempt from threshold requirements.

Source: ElectionGuide, <http://www.electionguide.org/>

¹⁶ The threshold was risen by the recent law (2014) to 3.25%, however, as for now no elections were held under new rules