

The protest movements in Israel: from unity to fragmentation

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Abstract

In recent years there has been an increasing academic interest in the field of protest movement.¹ In this paper we wish to discuss one element of the theory: the organizational aspect.² Our case study is two post war protest movements in Israel, the Yom-Kippur war movement (1974) and the 2006 Lebanon war movement. Our focus will be on explaining what were the factors making the difference between the two protest movements on the sequence between unity and fragmentation, basing ourselves on the European approach of New Social Movements (NSM).³ The research hypothesis relies on changes in the economic structure in western society, which profoundly influence the character of society, transforming it from materialism and collectivism to postmaterialism and individualism. Our research hypothesis is that according with the collective identity principle protest movements reflect in their *modus operandi* this identity. Our methodology is: interviews with central actors of the protest movements, analysis of journalists' articles and books dealing with these movements.

Introduction

As the socio-political phenomenon of protest movements has put down roots in the western world in the eighteenth century and gathered momentum since,⁴ we find increasing academic interest in it.⁵ Social movements' research produced prominent theories and definitions for explaining and describing different elements of protest movements. We would like to focus in this paper on one of those elements, which got a lot of research interest; the organizational aspect. Some researchers even claimed that the organizational character of movements directly influences their success.⁶ We will describe in this paper the essential difference in how two protest movements in Israel organized, between the Yom Kippur war protest movement (1974) on one hand, and the 2006 Lebanon war protest movement on the other hand, focusing on the sequence between unity in protest in the first case and its fragmentation in the second.

We will focus on explaining the factors making the difference between the two protest movements, basing ourselves on the European approach which examines the social structures' influence on protest movements.⁷ The research hypothesis relies on the paradigmatic argument that an essential process from materialism and collectivism to postmaterialism and individualism is taking place in western society from the fifties on, as a consequence of changes in the economic structure which profoundly influence the nature of society. We will also treat the change in economic policy which took place in Israel during the eighties, from a welfare state conception to a neo-liberal one,⁸ both as a product and as an influencing factor of post-materialist society. Our research hypothesis is that in accordance to the collective identity principle – protest movements reflect this identity in their conduct. Thus, the social processes from collectivism to individualism and from materialism to postmaterialism did not skip protest movements. Our methodology is: interviews with central actors of the two protest movements mentioned above, analysis of those interviews and of journalistic articles and books dealing with these movements.

Central approaches in research to protest movements

The novel character of protest movements at the last quarter of the twentieth century spurred controversy between researchers who had to reexamine their definitions of social movements in general and protest movements in particular.⁹

While the collective behavior approach,¹⁰ which dominated the social movements' field of research over half a century ago, attributed anti-democratic behavior to protest movements – the new social movements disproved that hypothesis, and proved protest movements to be an important democratic force.¹¹

As a result, the paradigm of new social movements (NSM) which was formed by European sociologists who refuted the collective behavior's argument was developed, whereby the collective nature of social movements is a constant variable which defines these movements despite the historic gap between them.¹² In parallel was developed in the U.S. the resource mobilization theory (RMT) which is based on the assumption that the central factor that shapes the development of social movements is the resources available to them.¹³

In contrast to the American resource mobilization theory and to the rational choice approach which examine individuals incentives for participation in protest, organizational processes and political opportunities – the European new social movements theory examines social movements on the macro level; i.e. the influence of social structure on the nature of social movements.¹⁴ Our hypothesis is based on the structural conception of the new social movements' paradigm including the collective identity principle, which sees protest movements as one element of the social whole.¹⁵

The collective identity principle, in contrast to the collective behavior principle, refutes the understanding that individuals tend to participate in protest movements for irrational reasons. According to the concept of structural influence on protest movements, Francesca and Polleta argue that the collective identity principle has the capability to answer essential questions with which the resource mobilization theory does not deal. A few of them being: (1) where do the protest movements' interests stem from? (2) Where does individuals' incentive to act come from? (3) Which factor influences the protest movements' *modus operandi*?¹⁶

The answers the collective identity principle offers to the above mentioned question are: (1) the identity specific to each collective explains why protest movements grew and were prominent in one place and not in another. For example, explaining the abortion protests in the U.S. and not in Europe; (2) understanding collective identity explains individual's pleasures and obligations which persuade them to participate in protest movements; (3) if collective identity explains individuals' incentives to participate in protest movements – it obviously has the power to shed light on the protest movements' patterns of action.

Protest movements' *modus operandi* reflects society

The last answer constitutes the basis to our research hypothesis in this paper, i.e. the collective identity of a society influences the protest movements' patterns of action. We argue that the change in Israel's collective identity between 1974 and 2006 influenced unequivocally the conduct of post-war protest movements in Israel on the sequence between a unified, single group protest and fragmentation into sub-groups. However, two questions have to be asked: (1) what is the change that occurred in Israel's collective identity? (2) how did this change come about?

Our answer to both questions lies in the new social movements' main argument, which is that these movements are a product of a postindustrial economy. Thus these protest movements demarcate a post-materialist era, in other words – a mature capitalism. That's why the new social movements are qualitatively different from past social movements which were mainly made up of the working-class.¹⁷

In our view, though this change of values began in the 1950's – it is actually a stable process in which post-materialist values are steadily gaining ground over materialist values. For this reason it is clear that postmaterialism nowadays is more in advanced – some will say more dangerous – than it was half a century ago.

Alain Touraine argues that the new social movements paradigm which is based on the passage from a materialist era to a post-materialist one has succeeded where the Marxist theoreticians have failed: the explanation of the European student protest movements' choice for quality of life values rather than strictly economic issues.¹⁸ As a consequence, some Marxist theorists have changed their world view and adopted the new social movements' paradigm as an alternative.¹⁹

Touraine's argument that postmaterialism and individualism stand as obstacles in front of a unifying factor for protest movements is central in our paper. According to him the post-materialistic era breaks up universal principles which both guided and somehow put limits to protest movements. But in these days, the absence of such principles affects the protest movements' ability to unite. Consumer society's individualism motivates its members to take part in protests not for an image of an ideal society but rather out of interests of personal creativity and responsibility towards oneself.²⁰

In this paper we deal with "protest movements" which are part of a more comprehensive phenomenon of "social movements". In "protest movements" we

mean social movements which come under the definition of "contentious politics", which Tilly defined simply as follows: "Confrontations of ordinary people with authorities and / or elites—as the building blocks of social movements".²¹

The Influence of the economic structure on The Israeli society

As mentioned before, at the basis of this work lies the hypothesis about the transition of the Israeli society, from collectivism to individualism, and the influence of this transition on the nature of protest. Many theories explain this transition as a consequence of different factors, such as economic and political factors; our study will examine this transition as a product of the economic approach, which emphasizes economical changes as causing social and cultural transformations, and on this framework, we will focus on the assumptions of the post-materialistic approach.

Approaches focusing on economical factors see the tendency to split and individualism taking place in the Israeli society, as consequences of economical processes, both global and local. Svirski identifies an expression to this process in Israel with the application of The Emergency stabilization program in 1985. A program which signifies some turn point in the Israeli economy, with the transition of the Israeli economy from characterized with the intervention of the government in almost all of the economic scopes – to one which bases on openness to the world and private market powers.²² According to him, some researchers see the as implications of this program a bad turn point in the socio-economic history of Israel. They think that this program signifies a transition of the Israeli society: from solidarity and mutual responsibility to an ethos of individualism; transition from responsibility of the state to its citizens to a policy of growth and privatization; while the economic actors act like individuals motivated by private interests and personal utility considerations.²³

Maman and Rozenhack find evidence to this transition in the Israeli political economy, from a developed-state model to a neo-liberal model, in the central bank of Israel institutional change during the 1980's – from a marginal position in the Israeli politics to a central actor, a powerful institutional and political factor, which has a lot of influence at it's construction and dynamic. That change is a consequence of a parallel global tendency.²⁴ According to them, The Bank of Israel has a central roll in this process, being a state agency which performs in global networks. This Bank initialized and promoted those institutional arrangements, which reduced the state

intervention in the Israeli economy as welfare state, and strengthened the markets' privatization and liberalization.²⁵ Those processes lead to changes in the relations between the political, economical, and social scopes in Israel, increasing poverty and class polarization and causing harm to the social and economical security of large parts of the population- which worsened the damage to the social cohesion. According to the socio-economic criticism of the researches who holds this position, that processes form a new economical elite, composed of capital owners, managers and free profession senior owners, which inserts its control at most of the economical resources of society and increases its benefits over the weaker populations.²⁶ More evidence to the social split in Israel is the double tension which takes place between the neo-liberal policy, which does not priorities the wellbeing of the whole society, and the need of the state to enlist its whole society to tasks of the security conflict management.²⁷

The broad influence of economical changes on society and its values is explained by Inglehart, who claims that changes in economic structure lead in turn to transformations in society's values and culture in general, and transition from materialist values to post-materialist one. People who hold materialist values prefer the satisfaction of basic needs as existential and economic security – while people who hold post-materialist values prefer 'higher' needs as self fulfillment and appreciation and lifestyle.²⁸ Those transformations are expressed also on the political agenda, where there is now not only security and economical themes, but also other themes like environment, nuclear weapon, moral norms and the like. We see in the transformations of the economic policy in Israel, the transition to private economy and reduction of the state intervention in the market, on one side, a product of post-materialist society which emphasizes individualism and people's desire to act freely on the economic arena, and on the other side, a process which strengthens and stimulates post-materialist processes in society.

According to the post-materialist approach, a person's experiences at childhood and adolescence have a significant influence on his values as an adult; hence, a person who experienced existential or economical danger at childhood would incline to material values at adulthood, while a person who experienced an economical and physical security at childhood would incline to post-materialistic values.²⁹ Thus, we might assume that the protestors of post Yom Kippur War, who grew in Israel in the 50's and 60's, would exercise a protest more materialistic in

nature than the protestors of 2006 Lebanon War, who grew up in the 80's and 90's, the years of the mentioned economical transformation. Inglehart also argues that post-materialistic values make individuals more interested in self-expression while criticism toward government.³⁰

That mentioned change in the values of society and its individuals, leads to changes in the means of acting and conduction on the part of the whole groups on society, including civil society, and the social movements. According to Yael Ishay, the civil society is shaped by the economy, society, value system and the politics.³¹ Hence, while social movements in different countries before the economical transformations engaged primarily on materialist, basic existential affairs – today, indeed, with the rising standards of life and education, the social movements in the new political era act primarily on the basis of promoting the values of environment and life qualities, rights and liberty of the society as a whole. Because of the intensified engagement with values of equality, there is now more pluralism concerning the characteristics of the social movements' actors, which emphasizes their unique identities as woman, racial and national minorities, homosexuals and the like.³² Ishay argues that those values take place in the Israeli civil society, which has been transferred from a country of austerity to a country of abundance.

The globalization and economical liberalization processes, the increase in education and life standards and the variety of communication means – all those have lead to changes in the Israeli peoples' centers of identity: while Israel in the past was a republican democracy, which suggested common cultural heritage to all its members – in the last decades, there is a transition to an era of diverse unique identities. There is a decrease in the collectivistic values and there are no more expectations from people to enlist themselves in favor of the general public. Indeed, the Israeli society began to foster post-materialist values of environment, women's equality and more.³³

At the basis of the economical approach, and the post-materialist one within, we suggest that the economical changes which have taken place in Israel from the mid 80's – formed a young generation, of post-materialist values, as opposed to the previous generation. This gap between the generations has a lot of influence on the action scopes of the Israeli society, including the conduct of protests.

Hence, while the protest movement of 1974 was made of activists which, in their childhood, lived under existential and security threats, and rigid collectivist society, the activists of 2006, who grew up with economical abundance and decreased

engagement in existential affairs in favor of other values, as a part of a consumer, individualistic and pluralistic society, have fostered those values. This change explains the fragmentation in the protest movement of 2006, as opposed to the unity of the 1974 protest movement.

The political expression to the fragmentation in Israeli society

Finally, we suggest that the splitting and polarization processes which have taken place in Israeli society as a consequence of the fundamental changes in economic structure – influenced the political system in Israel too. Approaches focusing on political factors as influences see this change in the political system as a reflection of the existing fragmentation in society. Hence, in 1973, Sartori related to the Israeli political system as a special case, of one dominant party, without significant opposition.³⁴ In 1979, Guttman characterized the Israeli political system as a radical multi-party system, which is characterized by a process of fragmentation which dominates the entire party system.³⁵

In 1999, Sartori reexamines the Israeli political system, this time characterizing it as a system of a radical pluralism, unable to function and stagnated, which radically exemplifies the polarized pluralism model: a multiplicity of power centers and parties, which pull to different directions and generate a split in society and inability to lead significant processes.³⁶ Based on these characterizations, we suggest that the splitting and polarization in the Israeli political system between 1974 and 2006 also reflect the social splitting in society between those years, and lead to the inability of the different factions to compromise and act in common. The rising of niche parties and the multiplicity of parties in Israel's political system in lasts decades, actually express the entrance of post-materialist values to the Israeli society.

Protest movements in Israel: between unity and fragmentation

The post Yom Kippur war protest movement was established before the release of all the soldiers and reserve duty soldiers. The protest began when a reserve captain Moti Ashkenazi, a commander of Budapest Stronghold, established his own protest tent, near the Prime Minister's office in Givat-Ram in Jerusalem. Ashkenazi protested against the failures in the operational level and against the failed conduct of the government during the war. His protest was published in the media and aroused interest and sympathy. Individuals and groups, citizens and released soldiers, began

expressing their support, and some even joined as activists in the protest. The movement protested in the name of the ministerial responsibility principle and required the resignation of security minister, Moshe Dayan. The peak of the protest was a demonstration in Givat-Ram on March the twenty fourth, 1974, which included around twenty five thousands demonstrators. Following the conclusions of the Agranat Committee, which attributed the responsibility for the war's failures on the military rank only, the protest was intensified, calling to the Prime Minister's resignation. Following the protest, on April the eleventh, 1974, the Meir's government resigned.

The post 2006 Lebanon war protest movement was established as well because of failures in the operational level and the conduct of the government. This protest was divided between several groups that demanded a number of different requirements: resignation of the military and political leadership, the establishment of an investigation committee of the state (which the Supreme Court president nominate the committee members) and the return of the kidnapped soldiers, which was one of the factors in starting the war. The most dominant groups among the protesters were the reserve duty soldiers, the bereaved families group and the movement for quality government. That protest's peak was reached in a demonstration which took place in Rabin Square in Tel-Aviv, on August the eighteenth 2006, and which included about one hundred thousands peoples. Following the protest and the Vinograd Committee's conclusions who investigate the war failures – the Chief General Dan Halutz has resigned, and later the Minister of defense Amir Peretz resigned. The Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert, stayed at office, and resign two years later, following his alleged involvement in a number of corruption cases.

In this study we find basis for comparison between the two protest movements. Despite the historical gap between the periods, the extent of the protest, and the extent of the traumas which led to their establishments – we find many points of resemblance between those protests. As seen in Shaffran's study, the resemblance comes across in their establishments, their background, their similar main goal and means of action which constitutes as good ground for comparison.³⁷

Research findings

In the course of this research we used primary sources such as interviews with leading activist in both protests movements,³⁸ books regarding the movements,³⁹ and news papers of both periods.

The findings show substantial differences in the organizational level of both periods that are consistent with our hypothesis. One can say that because of the similarities between the two protests that were found on the same basis and share similar methods of action, these differences are significant and can point out on a change that occurred in the Israeli society.

Despite the fact that both protests were combined from individuals and groups from different ideological backgrounds, our main finding shows differences in the ability to be unified in a single group around one single cause. In the Yom Kippur protest individuals were able to join together and leave aside political conflicts, while the protest movements in 2006 struggled unsuccessfully to compromise and to find one common cause in a united group.

The Yom Kippur protest was combined out of civilians from all around the country, all economic strata, and political views⁴⁰ such as left wing movement Matspen, right wing groups such as Vatikey Hamachtarot, reserve duty soldiers groups, students, kibbutz members and bereaved families.⁴¹ Reviewing the press converge regarding the 2006 Lebanon protest shows that the protest was combined out of separated groups such as reserve duty soldiers groups,⁴² the officers forum,⁴³ the bereaved families forum,⁴⁴ the movement of quality government,⁴⁵ Peace Now movement,⁴⁶ civilians who live in the north of Israel,⁴⁷ Tafnit⁴⁸ and settlers⁴⁹ that were working parallel to one another. The media portrayed the different groups as separated protest movements who run their protest alone while occasionally joining forces for a specific activity, finding which also came across in the interviews made with the activists in this research.

Despite the fact that the content of the protest in the 2006 Lebanon war is not post-materialistic per say, the pluralism and fragmentation of the protest illustrate the existence of a post-materialistic process and the need of each group to speak and emphasize his distinct identity and unique voice against the omissions of the war.⁵⁰

The differences in the organizational ability of the protest movements start from the very beginning in their formation process. Surprisingly, we find that it was the 2006 Lebanon protest groups, who struggled to form into one movement, which

showed a high level of organizational skills, distinct division of roles and key members as paid professionals.⁵¹

In contrast, the Yom Kippur protest movement started as a spontaneous protest,⁵² with less organized actions and division of roles. In light of this, the success in unifying the Yom Kippur Protest is much more prominent.

The protest movement of the Yom Kippur war was formed around the character of Moti Ashkenazi, who succeeded in sweeping individuals and groups from all political spectrums. The activists from the movement describe the formation of the movement as a natural and spontaneous act of individuals uniting together. Additionally, the press describes different groups that identify themselves with Ashkenazi's struggle and call to support him.⁵³

The protest against the 2006 Lebanon war started with separate groups from all over the country that protested from different reasons; however the main protest groups started to formulate when the war ended. The protest of the 2006 Lebanon war was characterized from its start with several separated protest encampment that stood in Agran's square, and in Gan-Havradim in Jerusalem.

The members of the movement of quality government went in a campaign calling for the establishment of an inquiry committee of the state.⁵⁴ At the same time, a group of reserve duty soldiers started to protest against the war failures,⁵⁵ often working with the bereaved families, another group who was active in the protest.⁵⁶

From interviews with activists it seems that the beginning was a spontaneous act, but after one month, with the establishment of the Vinograd Committee for inspection of the war failures, the protest became settled and organized. "There was order, discipline; there was someone who organized the activity. Every night there was an evaluation".⁵⁷ Although there was order and discipline, one should notice the fact that it was always collaboration between the different groups and never unification into one group. Therefore it seems that keeping the individual identity in the protest is accepted in today's post-materialistic Israeli society.

Another aspect in the logistic organization comes across in financing the activity. Whereas the Yom Kippur protest was based on private contributions and generally low budget, as seen in Ashkenazi words: "we couldn't get money for a stage... also not for chairs",⁵⁸ the activists in the 2006 Lebanon protests say: "we were rolling in money and we weren't sure what we should do with it",⁵⁹ the activists also mention that some money came from political objects.⁶⁰ The call to protest in the Yom

Kippur war is another example of the low budget: Made only with a small number of ads and through the coordinators of the different groups, opposite to a high number of ads and billboards in the 2006 protest. The financing of the protest in 2006 shows the existence of people and organization with political interests combined with paid professionals in the protest.⁶¹ It seems that those personal interests damaged the ability of the groups to reach a common goal and work together.

The division of roles in the 2006 Lebanon protest was clear and decisive from the beginning, another indication of the professional character of the protest contrary to the spontaneous Yom Kippur protest. Each one knew his specific role in the group: "we stood in a circle. Each one introduced himself and his profession and we hand out roles: you're an electrician, so put lights, you're a cook, prepare the food. They asked me: what do you do? spokesman? be our spokesman. This is how I became the spokesman of the reserve duty soldiers", Says Nir Hirshman.⁶² Yakir Segev says: "In the second round everyone knew what they were doing from the beginning, we had lists".⁶³

The spontaneous formulation of the Yom Kippur protest and pursuit after Moti Ashkenazi led to his unquestionable leadership in the protest.⁶⁴ Ashkenazi was the one who decided on the goal of the movement, its method of action and protest. An expression of that can be found in his decision to prohibit any kind of weapons in the demonstration.⁶⁵ Beside Ashkenazi's leadership there were a few more individuals in the leadership but there was never "a fight over leadership".⁶⁶ In contrary, and despite of the clear division of roles, interviews with activist from the protest in 2006 shows the existence of many conflicts over leadership: "there were a few conflicts... the attempt of certain people to gain profit from the activity".⁶⁷ The conflicts were especially prominent in the reserve duty soldiers groups and peaked with the departure of Dr. Roni Bart after several arguments over the protest strategy.⁶⁸ "There were all kinds of people who thought they should lead, when they realized it's not like this they vanished" says Yakir Segev.⁶⁹ The general impression from the interviews is that the presence of representative of different groups, paid professionals in the leadership and the attempt of individuals to gain personal profit, economic or political, created a conflicted atmosphere. This impression indicates on a process of individualism that characterizes a post-materialistic era as described by Inglehart⁷⁰ and Touraine.⁷¹

Arguments between the 2006 Lebanon war protesters were discovered mainly on the media's attention. Nir Hirshman said: "People started to interview, and some of them started to be megalomaniacs... there were people who broke our exclusivity". Hirshman described researches he made "without getting any credit... I did, I volunteered, and the thanks go to Yuval Porat's guys?"⁷² Eliad Shraga also talked about the competition with reserve duty soldiers on the spot light: "the spot light makes a lot of people confused. It can deceive people... its very juvenile, very immature... when they realized they were not on stage they tried to interfere".⁷³ on the opposite side, Yair Segev described the competition on the media's attention with the movement of quality government: "In a way there was a problem because it was clear that the reserve duty soldiers was something that photographed well, much more authentic, and this overshadowed them".⁷⁴ When the Yom Kippur protesters were asked about this kind of competition, they answer conclusively that there was no competition.⁷⁵

Another central finding that reflects on the ability to unite and working together is the ability to unite under one single cause. In the Yom Kippur protest the goal was clear as formulated by Ashkenazi: "the goals were very specific you can sum them up in one statement – the ministerial responsibility principle. You get power and you must stand in your commitments... I insisted that people would come focused on this specific message... because of my persistence the protest didn't stray and the dynamics stayed until the government resigned".⁷⁶ Another member of the protest, Yossi Mart, associated the success of Yom Kippur protest with the unity of the message: "in my opinion, the secret of the 1974 protest's success was the leadership's determination to focus on one goal alone, and not giving up on anything".⁷⁷ In contrast, the protest in 2006 was characterized by the multiplicity of messages, and moreover, the groups' inability to decide upon a unified goal, a characteristic matching Touraine's claim regarding the difficulties protest movements in a post-materialistic and individualistic era are facing with trying to find a unifying center.⁷⁸

The fact that the 2006 activists in the different groups understood the importance of unification to the success of the protest, and therefore were willing to cooperate, is prominent in the interviews. Each side describes itself as the initiator of an attempt for inter-groups cooperation, and lays the blame for the failure to do so on the other side. In fact, it seems that despite the statements of willingness to cooperate, none of the sides was willing to compromise on the movement's message. For

example, while the reserve duty soldiers group focused on the demand for the resignation of the political and military echelon and also claimed the return of the kidnapped soldiers – the movement for quality government focused on the demand for the establishment of a commission of inquiry to investigate the failures in the war.

Yakir Segev blamed the movement for quality government's insistence on their message: "There were differences on the Ideological level because the movement for quality government fought from the beginning on the demand for commission of inquiry. This is what they wanted. And we wanted to get rid of all the leadership. They demanded different things".⁷⁹ As opposed to Segev, Eliad Shraga described the attempt to unite from the perspective of the movement for quality government: "For both moral and practical reasons we decided at the stage of defining the goal to seek for a rational and a reachable goal, and therefore we demanded to set up a commission of inquiry. That was our goal".⁸⁰ Moshe Klughaft described the argument over the goal inside the bereaved families group: "there were tactical arguments over whether to go for Olmert or a commission of inquiry. It was an argument all the time".⁸¹ Roni Bart summarized the debate: "Eliad Shraga wanted the goal of the activity would be the establishment of a commission of inquiry. These young fellows argued, and rightfully, that a commission of inquiry is a good thing, but the argument was that you don't need an inquiry to say that the management was a failure, because it is obvious, and it's obvious that these guys need to go home".⁸²

Another barrier was the fear of each one of the central groups to be identified with distinct political bodies such as the settlers group or "Peace now" leftist group, as described by Nir Hirshman: "There were a group of few weirdoes, 'Oranges', next to us. We immediately told them, don't come near our tent... we didn't want our protest to be painted in Orange... Not just that, whoever came to us with a Kipa, immediately – a hat".⁸³ Also, political movements made efforts to shake themselves off groups of different political attributes: In this manner, "Peace now" movement has declared that it is renouncing the protest of the bereaved families which is identified with the right and does not represent, according to them, all of the bereaved parents.⁸⁴ The attempt to keep the identity of the group, characterizing movements in a post-materialistic age,⁸⁵ was in itself a barrier to unity when each group was concerned with losing its unique voice in the unity. Yakir Segev explained: "The movement for quality government made a movement for quality tent, with movement for quality shirts, a

movement for quality title. It was important to them... in fact, if they were to join us, they would have been swallowed by us".⁸⁶

The contests between the groups become even clearer when the activists describe the case when they did unite to one operation, the main demonstration in Rabin Square. Each side attributes to itself the success and the leading of the event. "When we moved to a demonstration with two hundred thousands people because only us were capable of that amount, with that status, suddenly they wanted to be on stage", described Eliad Shraga.⁸⁷ In contrast, Moshe Klughaft described: "In the second demonstration in the square, I managed it at the level of who speaks, when, at what minute, who sings",⁸⁸ and Yakir Segev claimed: "In the second round I organized the demonstration. I don't remember if I actually did it alone... but on the third round it was completely me. I organized, gathered the people, it was all me".⁸⁹

According to the collective identity principle, the analyses shows that the differences between the two protests are derived a great deal from the entrance of individual and post-materialist values into Israeli society, a process mentioned by Svirsky and Shalev⁹⁰ in regards to the transition from an economical model of an interfering state according to a welfare state principle, to the regulating state model in a neo-liberal economy. This process symbolizes a transition from a collective ethos to an individual one in Israel. The success of Yom Kippur protest to unite can point to the existence of a collective identity in the Israeli society which is manifested in a few levels. The first is related to the activists' ability to put aside their personal opinions and political identity in order to create a unified and consolidated front. Though divergence in political opinions between activists – they have accepted majority decisions and goals and succeeded to focus on the common instead of the different.

Unlike the protest in 1974, the protest activists in 2006 were unsuccessful with creating a unified front and instead of bridging over the gaps, and stood firm in their opinions. Even when they did reach agreement, no one had expected or requested to cancel the division between sub-groups. Moreover, even inside the groups a contest existed on the leadership, and attempts of activists to gain political capital on account of the protest and highlight their individual selves as can be seen by the excessive use of the word "I" in the interviews. It seems like we are facing here with a tendency of individuation and fragmentation of the protest movements into sub-groups, and also between the members of the groups themselves.

The second level relates to the existence of solidarity in Yom Kippur protest. As a result of the shock and trauma of the war, citizens and groups chose to come together into one struggle uniting all layers of society in mutuality. In contradiction, the shock and trauma of second Lebanon war set the conditions for the creation of a number of groups and the withdrawal into camps which sometimes see themselves as competing camps, instead of partners with a shared purpose.

With the findings brought in this research, it is important to remember at the same time that there are, after all, gaps derived from the years past between Yom Kippur and today, which could cause a certain bias in the interviews with Yom Kippur protesters. There is an amount of idealization and even romanization of the protest as remembered in Israeli society's collective memory, as the "one man's protest", a movement of protesters displaying perfect solidarity and full unity. This bias was taken into account while processing and analyzing the findings. The declarations of Yom Kippur interviewees were carefully measured and processed. Declarations which were ill founded or biased, to our opinion, due to this Idealization, received lower weight. In addition, this biased is balanced by the tendency of 2006 Lebanon war protesters to display their protest in flattering light, to blur the differences and struggles and emphasize the unity when possible. Indeed, the protesters of 2006 grew up on the Yom Kippur idealization themselves and even mentioned the wish to resemble that protest.

Possible reservations to our research can be found in a possibility to explain the findings by alternative explanations, mainly a main difference pointed out in the interviews as well, which is the difference in the extent of the trauma and perceived disaster between the two wars. The number of deaths in Yom Kippur, about 2350, is incomparable to the number of deaths in 2006 Lebanon war: 164. Also, the element of surprise at Yom Kippur war was much more prominent⁹¹. However, it should be pointed out that this war ended with the strengthening of IDF image, whilst after 2006 Lebanon war the image of IDF was the worst in the history of Israel.⁹² Another explanation can be found at the media level. The multiplicity of media channels in 2006 could function as a catalyst to the split in the protest movement, when nowadays there is no need to unite in order to get media coverage and public attention. We focused in this research on the effects of a socio-economical structure on the behavior of protest movements in the macro level. We think this approach has the ability to

explain in a better, more profound way the phenomenon, while other variables can be joined to the explanation.

The analyses shows another interesting point, which is unrelated directly to our hypothesis but is of importance. The year 1974 was a difficult year to the Israeli economy, characterized by recession, inflation and high levels of unemployment.⁹³ The year 2006, on the other hand, was a very good year to the Israeli economy, characterized by development and economic growth⁹⁴. The findings point to the fact that this difference had an effect on the protest. It seems that in years of depression the incentive to protest for a political change is larger. In good economical years, citizens are less enthusiastic for change, even when they agree with the content of the protest. Moreover, when the economic situation is well, citizens are less likely to persist with the protest. The welfare of citizens is therefore a moderating variable in their commitment to the protest. Yakir Segev summarizes this argument: "people didn't want to change the leadership, what now, elections... instability and all that... people didn't want change because the situation was good."⁹⁵ It seems as if a depression is a strengthening factor in protests, as an incentive to work for change. Of course our findings are not enough to conclude such a statement, but can be grounds for further research on the subject.

Nonetheless, a relevant argument from this view point is that a depression can encourage a materialistic nature of protest, while protests in a state of economic growth will result in a more post-materialistic messages and behavior.

Conclusion

Relying on new social movements' paradigm (NSM) which sees the protest movements as an element in a social system as a whole, and according to the collective identity principle which carries in it the argument that social movements reflect society – we argue that the change that occurred in protest movements in Israel between the unifying of protest into a single group and its fragmentation into sub-groups, is a product of change that occurred in Israeli society, between relative materialism and collectivism – or premature post-materialism – on one hand and advanced (some will say exaggerated) post-materialism and individualism on the other hand.

We based our research hypothesis, from the outset, on the common understanding among sociologists that the changes the economic structure underwent

in the western world since over half a century ago have led to essential changes in society from materialism and collectivism to postmaterialism and individualism. The research hypothesis was that according to the collective identity principle – the protest movements reflect the difference in society's character between unity of a materialist collective and fragmentation of a post-materialist individualist society. Indeed we have proven our argument: the social values did reflect on the *modus operandi* of Israeli post-war protest movements in 1974 and 2006.

While the protest of 1974 acted as one united group, the fragmentation of 2006 protest movements expressed itself in the division of protest into sub-groups, with different actions and even different localities of action, with different messages coming across and competition over media attention. Alain Touraine put his finger on the incapability of protest movements' to unite in a post-materialist era; he wrote "Social movements are no longer spurred by the images of an ideal society but by the search of creativity".⁹⁶ An excellent expression of this principle is present in the interview with Klughaft who served as spokesman of the "bereaved parents group" and later of the "united staff"; after admitting he got a partial salary for his work, when he was asked whether his colleagues had been paid, he answered: "I did not deal with this. There are others who have goals such as political promotion, even some bereaved parents who compete in Likud primaries or in local governments".⁹⁷ That is, everyone in the protest movement acted for his own interests.

In the film "Elizabeth: the golden age", Queen Elizabeth turns to her fortune-teller, Dr. John Dee, asking him to give her hope in anticipation of the expected battle with the Spanish Armada. He answers: "when the storms breaks each man acts in accordance with his own nature – some dumb with terror, some flee, some hide, and some spread their wings like eagles who soar in the wind".⁹⁸

Paraphrasing that sentence one might summarize our article like this: when a war breaks and brings shock and trauma each society acts in accordance with its own nature – a materialist collectivist and united society will act so in protest, and an individualist post-materialist society will express its fragmentation in protesting. Thus, when we deal with contemporary Israeli society and its protest movements, it seems that there is a lot to Touraine's words: "Big brother is not a dangerous enemy for social movements in democratic societies; egotism is".⁹⁹

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