Veto Players and Patterns of Government instability

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Abstract

Current literature leaves an interesting question open – what causes governmental instability to manifest itself in various patterns – and usually account only for government duration. Moreover, there is a need for a closer connection between theory and empirical research. We hope to supply such a theoretical and empirical, comparative framework. We use George Tsebelis' Veto Players framework in order to develop theoretical expectations and predictions.

This framework provides us with the capacity to develop a single independent variable, effective number of veto players (ENVP), by which to attempt and explain different political systems. Our Hypotheses are that (1) government`s duration variables and ENVP are negatively correlated, that (2) governing party's electoral performance and ENVP are also negatively correlated while (3) electoral performance of other coalition parties will not be as strongly correlated as the governing party's and therefore that (4) ENVP is negatively correlated with the duration of the governing party and its prime-minister's rule.

Our empirical design is composed of seven cases - Austria, Denmark, England, Germany, Israel, Italy and the Netherlands - for the period of 1980-2010. By using government data from various sources, we compose a dataset containing the effective number of veto players, various duration parameters and various vote share and vote change parameters.

On the aggregated level, the results support our hypothesis that ENVP. In addition, the comparative analysis shows that instability patterns differ between countries of similar ENVP and adds interesting evidence to the discussion about minority governments.

Introduction

Governmental instability can be manifested in various ways, unnecessarily in accord with one another. For example, Israel seems normal compared to other countries when considering official government and parliamentary term duration, but its rate of ministerial turnover is high, and other instability indices are rising (,ברנע, דרייישפיץ וקניג, 2011). Furthermore, numerous public statements connect governmental instability with a feeling of low governability (cf. ברנע, דרייישפיץ ושרקנסקי, 2010), but the literature doesn't provide a sound theoretical connection between the two.

The literature on government stability also lacks a differentiation between various patterns of instability. In this paper we seek to distinguish and explain these patterns by suggesting a model combining the logic of the veto players' theory, with arguments and findings from electoral performance literature. We will argue that a high effective number of veto players may cause low stability, high leadership turnover rates and poor electoral performance of the governing parties.

In the following sections we will review the relevant literature, desalinate our analytical framework and model, and present the hypotheses deduced from it. We then turn to describe our comparative research design and results, followed by the discussion and a conclusion.

Literature Review

Government stability is a well-researched subject, and its determinants are generally known and agreed upon. The basic intuition is that the more complicated the government's environment is, the less durable it is, and hence its duration will be shorter.

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This means, basically, that coalition governments are less durable than single-party governments; oversized coalitions are less durable than minimal-winning ones; and fragmented party systems produce less durable governments than less fragmented systems (Taylor and Herman, 1971; Powell, 1982; Saalfeld, 2008). However, as we noted this literature generally doesn't account for the connection between low government duration and low governability.

As early as 1966, Sartori presented an explanation of low governability, or "governmental immobility" as he called it, as one result of an extremely pluralistic multiparty system, connecting it with the party system's complexity, as well as to the governments' short duration (Sartori, 1966:162). Sartori's account of an extreme multiparty system can be seen as a particular case of a system containing multiple veto players with different policy preferences. We find this terminology more productive, as it can be applied to various polities, regardless of their different regimes and institution. Since the veto player framework is in the heart of our research, we will expound on it in detail later.

Voters may have different reasons to vote as they do. They may vote prospectively, to select leaders by their promises, or retrospectively, to punish or reward the incumbents according to their performance (Strom, 1996:47). In the last two or three decades, there is evidence of a growing trend towards retrospective voting among developed democracies (Narud and Valen, 2008). This means that governing parties' electoral performance is more sensitive to their performance in government, or at least to the public perception of it. This brings forth the question – what types of government tend to perform electorally better than others. Strom shows that contrary to their image as "crisis governments",

minority governments usually do best in the following elections. These are followed by majority single-party governments and minimal winning coalitions. Surplus (oversized) coalitions tend to do worst, that is, lose most votes (Strom, 1985; Strom, 1990). Powell and Whitten also find that minority governments do the best. However, contrary to Strom, they find that coalition governments lose less than single-party ones (Powell and Whitten, 1993). With a much larger database, Narud and Valen's conclusion is in line with Strom, showing that the bigger the government's seats share in parliament, the more votes it loses. Although they find only a small difference between minimal-winning coalitions and single-party governments, the difference between these and surplus coalitions is substantial, with the latter losing more (Narud and Valen, 2008). This finding is in line with the assumed implications of high ENVP which is supposed to lead to poor government performance, as will be explained later.

Another rationale comes to a similar conclusion, without relating to assumptions on the government's overall performance. This starts with the obvious remark that coalition politics demand compromise. In principal, the more parties involved, and the bigger the distance between them, the more each party will have to compromise in order to coalesce. Narud and Valen conclude that the former is more influenced by their independent variables than the latter, meaning that the prime-minister's party takes a larger share of the credit, for better or for worse, than its coalition partners (Narud and Valen, 2008).

Analytical Framework

The Veto Player framework provides us with a deductive model that predicts certain governability problems, explained by the polity's institutional and political alignment.

The literature that we are building on is Tsebelis (1995, 2002) and Cox and McCubbins (2001). A veto player is an "individual or collective actor whose agreement is necessary for a change of the status quo" (Tsebelis 2002: 19), where status quo means the current status in a given dimension of policy. A veto player can be an institutional player, which derives its power from the constitutional set of rules (e.g. the judiciary), or a partisan player which derives its power from the political system (e.g. parliamentary parties). According to Tsebelis, a high number of veto players with differing policy preferences, makes it hard for the government to make a decision that changes the status quo. Cox and McCubbins define an "effective number of veto players" (ENVP) as a combination of the number of veto players and the distance between their different preferences. Thus, a high ENVP leads to indecisiveness, while a low ENVP leads to irresoluteness, the inability to commit to one policy over time.

The models of Tsebelis and Cox and McCubbins predict that a low capability to depart from the status quo (decisiveness) will result in political instability as the elected government cannot implement its policies. This is because when the ENVP is high, it is harder for a government to decide on important legislation and the internal cost of such legislation is high (Cox & McCubbins). In the opposite case, a low ENVP improves responsiveness of the government and "enables governments to produce a policy… and respond to subsequent exogenous shocks" (Tsebelis, 2002: 216). To sum up their argument in Tsebelis's words, "policy stability leads to government instability... [and] government duration in parliamentary regimes will be linked to the configuration of veto players" (Tsebelis, 2002:209).

However, as the models predict that immobility from the status quo (or extremely high internal costs) will be manifested in government instability, it is unclear theoretically what the mechanism that brings about this instability is. Fortunately, this prediction is in line with other theoretical models and predictions concerned with government duration. These show that the more complex is a bargaining surrounding – more parties with bigger ideological differences (i.e. larger effective number of veto players) – higher are the chances that small perturbations in a party's preferences due to external events will make the current coalition less preferable to an alternative one (Saalfeld, 2008:356; cf. Lupia and Strom, 1995).

Another possible explanation for the connection between high EVNP and short government duration can be inferred from Lupia and Strom's bargaining model, which assumes parties value coalitions in respect to their predicted policy, office and electoral gains from it (Lupia and Strom, 1995). High ENVP governments' difficulties in pushing policy forward should thus lower their value. Moreover, as we will show, participating in such a government should be an electoral burden, thus lowering the coalition's value even more. This low value means that parties will be relatively "trigger-happy" in defecting from the coalition, in favor of an alternative one or early elections, thus shortening the government's duration.

Another lacuna in Tsebelis' and Cox and Mccabins' predictions is that they consider only instability manifested as a change in coalition configuration or as government termination. In other words, the instability is operationalized only as short government duration. The reason for this lacuna is probably that instability is not the focus of these models. We suggest adding an account of the voters' reaction to the government's

indecisiveness that will predict high turnover rates of governing parties, as well as a decline over time the large parties' vote share.

Hence, the higher the ENVP is, the more likely it is that each government party will be less able to deliver on its promises to its voters. If this holds, than the higher the ENVP, the more likely are the voters to be unsatisfied by their representatives' performance.

However, as Cox and McCubbins argue (in an argument echoing Sartori's account), a government may overcome high EVNP-induced indecisiveness by "buying" each veto-player's support with "private-regarding", pork-barrel policies (Cox and McCubbins, PDF9). In this case, sectarian or constituency-based veto players may deliver on their promises more successfully than others. This means that the electoral "punishment" for high ENVP might not be equally inflicted on all government parties. Indeed, comparing the prime-minister's party to the whole government,

To sum up, high ENVP governments tend to perform poorly; poorly performing governments tend to lose votes; and the prime-minister's party should tend to show more radical – positive or negative – electoral changes than its coalition partners.

Counting the Effective Number - As noted above, veto players can be political or institutional. Within a government, a political veto player is any player that can bring down the government. In most parliamentary democracies, the prime-minister holds this kind of power, de jure or de facto. In some, the president also holds this power. Finally, since in parliamentary democracy the government depends on the support, or at least the toleration, of a parliamentary majority, any party in a coalition government that can, by leaving it, deny the government of its parliamentary basis is considered a veto player. We

will call this kind of party a pivotal party. It should be noted that not all coalition parties are necessarily pivotal. This is the case in surplus coalitions, where at least one party can leave the coalition without the latter losing its majority status. A complication is presented by minority governments, where the coalition does not enjoy the support of a majority in the legislative. In such a configuration, the government is either supported by "outside" parties not participating in the coalition ("formal" minority government), or uses ad-hoc coalition with opposition members in order to pass legislation ("substantive" minority government) (for more details, see Laver and Schofield 1998; Strom 1990). In these cases the effective number of veto player has to be adjusted as to capture the additional difficulty the government faces in passing decisions through the legislature, or the additional parties sustaining its de facto majority.

Once the nominal number of veto players has been calculated, by counting all pivotal parties and accounting for minority governments, the distance between the players' preferences should be accounted for as well, to get the effective number of veto players. Most research designs in the field consider one dimension, the economic left-right (e.g. Tsebelis and Chang, 2004). However, political systems may revolve around multiple dimensions, such as secular-clerical, urban-agrarian etc. Moreover, the salient dimension may vary across countries and time. This makes it difficult both to set an accurate preference distance within a country, since the veto players can be very close to one another on one dimension and very distant on another; and to compare between countries with different issue saliency. While acknowledging these problems, we adopt the common practice despite its weaknesses, in order to overcome data availability obstacles and maintain the research's comparability.

Voters' behavior and parties' electoral performance - Following the above-mentioned literature, we argue that at least to some extent, voters use their vote to punish or reward the parties for their performance in the passing term. Thus, parties that took part in high ENVP governments are expected to lose support in the following elections, and might not participate in the next government. This may lead to a high turnover rate in the coalition's composition, as former coalition parties lose seat share and thus their strength. This loss of vote share should be mainly critical to the identity of the governing party, the prime-minister's party, so we expect to see a high turnover of its identity in such circumstance.

As the literature shows, not all coalition parties may suffer the same electoral "penalty". In order to understand the subject of electoral penalty, we distinguish between three types of parties: the prime-minister's party, pivot parties and other coalition parties. We expect, with accordance to the extant literature, that the prime-minister's party will be more affected by the government's performance, and so lose on average more votes that the pivot parties and other coalition parties. This loss should lead to a relatively high rate of prime-minister's party (and hence, prime-minister's) turnover rate.

It is important to notice, that if this unequal expected electoral performance holds, and assuming the party leaders acknowledge such a tendency, than the coalition partners expecting better electoral fortunes than the prime-minister's party should have more bargaining power over the latter (cf. Lupia and Strom, 1995; Id., 2008). Examining the parties' bargaining powers is beyond this paper's scope. However, it is worth noticing that this state of affairs means the prime-minister's job of governing and promoting its own policies becomes even harder, hence its electoral performance worse. It also means that

the overall governmental policy promoted may be more favorable to the coalition partners, especially the pivot parties, which is likely to improve their electoral performance.

To sum up, our model produces the following hypotheses:

H1: EVNP and government duration are negatively correlated

H2.1: ENVP and the governing party's electoral performance are negatively correlated

H2.2: ENVP will not be as strongly correlated with the electoral performance of other coalition parties, as with the governing party's performance

H3: As a corollary of H2, ENVP is negatively correlated with the duration of the governing party and its prime-minister's rule

Data and Methodology

Our data include governments between the years 1980-2010 in Israel and six additional western-Europe parliamentary democracies – Austria, Denmark, (West) Germany, Italy, The Netherlands and United Kingdom. We intentionally selected parliamentary democracies, to reduce institutional differentiation. Also intentionally, we selected three countries that are assumed prima-facie to contain few political veto players (Austria, Germany and UK) as well as three that are assumed to have more (Italy, Netherlands and Denmark).

The European countries' data on governments, elections and party preferences is taken from the ParlGov database. The data on Israel was gathered from several resources. Government and election data was taken from the Israeli parliament – the Knesset –

official website. Party preferences up to 1999 were taken from the Manifesto Project database, whereas preferences for 2003 and 2006 were taken from Benoit and Laver (2006) and CECS database, respectively.

The data were analyzed by three primary approaches. First, we calculated averages per country in order to compare between countries. Second, when we analyzed each country in respect to its ENVP, looked for trends in the raw data, as we agree with Shalev (2007) that some trends should be dealt with manually. However, this attempt was dropped as it was impossible to provide intelligible conclusions. Therefore, although admitting the low N per country, we used Pearson's correlation in order to determine the direction of the relationship between the variables, per country. When we finally turned to analyze the aggregated data, the issue of sampling size was improved, although admittedly not fully solved.

The Independent Variable – Our independent variable is the effective number of veto players (ENVP), for which we could not find a database counting it the same way as our model requires. We consulted the World Bank Institute's DPI database and the POLCON index, but eventually we decided to compute the numbers from the governments' raw data.

This means we had to calculate the effective number of veto players ourselves. For that end, we first needed to determine the nominal number of veto players. Therefore we calculated the overall seat share of each government and determined which parties were essential for its majority. Then we calculated the average preference distance between these pivot parties depending on ParlGov's 0-10 "left-right" index, i.e. their standard

deviation. In the Israeli cases we depended on other indices (see above), recalculating the data to suit Parlgov's 0-10 scale. Now we could calculate the ENVP, by multiplying the nominal veto players' number by the mean distance between them. However, some of the coalitions in our dataset are minority coalitions. Other databases deal with such cases simply by adding "1" to the number of veto players. In order to solve this issue in a more proper manner, we calculated which opposition parties are eligible for "ad-hoc" coalitions with the government. Then we calculated the average distance of these parties from the average of the coalition, on the "left-right" index. We added this number, the average distance of ad-hoc eligible parties from the coalition, to the coalition ENVP, and did not multiply the distance with the nominal number of the ad-hoc parties as the coalition requires only one of them.

Control Variables - Vote share was calculated by two theoretically interesting types of parties: the PM's party and the pivots parties of its coalition. We think that in an institutional level, it is important to differentiate between the vote-shares of these two parties, independently from the following discussion of vote share *change*. These two variables enable us to analyze the composition of the coalition vote share distribution within the coalition, in addition to the ENVP as a measure for additional validation, especially when we try to supply a timeline-based analysis. These two variables should logically be negatively and possibly strongly correlated with ENVP, since a small prime-minister party is likely to be in a bigger need of partners, giving rise to a higher ENVP, and smaller pivot parties mean more of them are required for a majority.

The dependant variables - Our dependant variables can be categorized into two basic categories: duration and vote change. Duration variables were calculated for all countries, whereas vote change variables were calculated only for Israel, Denmark and Netherlands. Austria, Germany and the UK were dropped due to lack of variance in the independent variable (see section "results"), while Italy had to be dropped due to lack of consistent vote-share data.

Under duration variables, we measure government duration, prime-minister duration and prime-minister's party duration in government. In order to determine these variables we used Parlgov's operationalization of government termination: any change in the set of parties holding cabinet membership, any change in the identity of the prime minister, any general election and any substantively meaningful resignation. The duration of every government is counted from the day it starts to the day the next government is established. The duration of each prime-minister's term and each governing (or prime-minister's) party's reign was calculated as the sum of consecutive governments under the same respective leadership. In addition, we constructed a variable counting the number of governments within each parliamentary term, defined as the time between two consecutive elections.

Change in vote share was calculated for every party as its vote share in the following elections minus the vote share in the current elections. A further variable of vote share change in percentages was calculated, as the nominal vote share loss divided by the original vote share. This is the variable we used henceforth. In Israel, we took into account party mergers and splits. In other countries, lacking the in-depth knowledge required, we relied solely on ParlGov's "party_id" variable. It should be stated that the

complete majority of mergers and splits in the European cases were insignificant parties, vote share wise.

After determining the vote share change for each party in each government, we distinguished between prime-ministers' parties, pivot parties and other coalition partners, and created aggregated vote-change variables for the two latter kinds. This gave us three different vote-change variables, for each type of party. It should be noted that of the three countries checked, Denmark had no parties qualifying as "other", and the Netherlands had only two cases, thus only "other" parties in Israel are reported.

Results

First, when we compare each country's average ENVP (weighted by each government's duration) and its governmental stability, here measured by the mean values of coalition duration, prime-minister duration and governing party duration, we can see that our countries can be roughly divided into three groups. The first contains the countries with low ENVP and high levels of stability, namely Austria, Germany and the UK. The second group contains those on the opposite side, with high ENVP and low stability, namely Italy and Israel. A third group contains the countries that at first glance don't fit with our models, with high EVNP but with high stability, the Netherlands and Denmark.

Table 1 – ENVP and Stability by Country

Country	Weighted ENVP	Coalition Duration*	Prime-minister Duration*	Governing Party Duration*
UK	1	3.36	7.75	15.5
Austria	1.38	2.3	5.8	8.7
Germany	2.72	3.22	8.86	9.2
Netherlands	3.78	2.42	8.2	10.94
Denmark	4.96	2.1	8.53	8.53
Italy	3.91	1.22	1.62	5.6
Israel	3.47	0.89	2.67	3.30

* Mean values, in years.

Our next step is checking the correlations between the ENVP and our three dependant variable blocks, first for each country and then for all the cases. We also check for correlations with an ordinal time-scale, to discover trends in each country, and again for the whole data. All the data tables are in Appendix A.

When looking on the first, stable group of countries, we find little correlation between the ENVP and our dependant variables. This is probably because of the low variance in the independent variable. An extreme case is the United Kingdom (table 2), with all governments having an ENVP of 1, being single-party majority governments. So, the UK gives us a base-line case. Austria (table 3) shows no coherent trend, with the only significant correlation, a positive one between ENVP and prime-minister duration, is in opposite direction to the other variables, as well as to our model's logic.

Germany (table 4) shows correlations that are all in the predicted directions – negative correlation for the duration variables and a positive one with the "governments per election" variable, but none is significant.

Next we look at Denmark, which clearly doesn't fit our model. Its duration variables (table 5.1) are significantly correlated with ENVP, but in the opposite direction of our model's estimation. The vote-change variables (table 5.2) are in the directions suggested by the model, albeit with low significance. These findings suggest that the veto players framework, on which our model is based, may need further adjustments to account for minority governments which apparently can be as stable as single-party majority ones.

The Netherlands (table 6.1), which in the beginning seemed as stable as the low-ENVP countries, surprisingly fits the model relatively well. In the duration block, the two results not in the direction predicted (government duration and governments per elections), are insignificant end weaker than the others. The correlation between ENVP and the prime-minister's party duration is particularly strong – minus 0.736 – and significant at the 0.001 level. The vote change variables are again in the direction expected but weak and not significant, with the pivot vote change almost non-existent.

Italy, while being unstable on the whole as was shown in table 1, gives us no coherent picture (table 7), with prime-minister duration and governments per election in conflict with our model. Interestingly, both governments per election and government duration are negatively correlated with ENVP, which is counterintuitive. This may suggest that with the ENVP rising, governments are more prone to early elections instead of changing government without elections, thus inducing a decline in both parameters.

Last but not least, Israel (table 8.1) seems an interesting case. First, we find a strong and significant negative correlation between ENVP and government duration, as predicted. There is also a positive correlation between ENVP and governments per elections, also as predicted. However, the correlation between ENVP and prime-minister duration is positive, though insignificant, and there is virtually no correlation with prime-minister's party duration. What this may suggest is that Israeli prime-ministers deal with the burdens of high ENVP by changing coalitions as they go, without having to go to resign or go to elections. This is also in accordance with other researches' findings, pointing to frequent coalition change "intra-government" as the primary pattern of instability in Israel (cf. 2011 ,ברנע, דריישפיץ וקניג). The vote change variables (table 8.2), again, are insignificant but in the predicted direction, with prime-ministers' parties more influenced by ENVP than pivot parties. A curious result is the correlation with other coalition parties' vote change, showing them to be specifically prone to decline.

When we turn to look at all the cases together, the picture is much clearer, and with accordance with our model. In the duration block (table 9.1), all correlations are in the predicted directions, and three of them – governments per elections, governing party duration and government duration – are of medium strength and significant at the 0.01 level. The vote change variables (table 9.2) are in the predicted directions, but not significant and weak.

Finally, it is interesting to look at some trends over time. Germany shows a significant decline over time in governing party's duration as well as prime-minister's duration. Denmark is showing a significant decline in prime-minister and governing party durations, contrasted by an increase in government duration. Coupled with a decline in

ENVP (-0.367, significant in the 0.01 level), the picture is of a system moving to a pattern of two or three competitive parties interchanging in government. Both the Netherlands and Italy show a significant decline in governing party duration, but Italy shows also a significant decrease in governments per elections coupled with a slight increase in government duration. In Israel, all duration variables a pattern of decreased stability, the most prominent being the governments per election, again echoing prior finding of "intra-government" coalition instability. At the aggregate level, a significant trend is a decline in governing parties' duration, which in addition to a decline in their vote change suggests voters may have become more inclined to punish the prime-minister's party, making it harder for it to stay in power.

Further Discussion

Now that we presented our results, let's go back to our hypotheses. H1, predicting a negative correlation between ENVP and government duration has been confirmed at the aggregate level. H2.1 and H2.2 concerning the impact of ENVP on the electoral performance of the governing party and its partners received some reassurance, though not significant. H3, predicting a negative correlation between ENVP and leadership duration, also received confirmation.

Given the relatively small number of cases, it is not a surprise that many of our results are not statistically significant. Surely there is a need for a further, wider research containing more cases from more countries, applying more sophisticated statistics.

An interesting feature of our results is that different countries present differing patterns of stability and instability. Whereas in the Netherlands ENVP impacts the governing party's

duration, in Israel it impacts mostly the governments' duration and in Italy there is no clear indication of the impact's nature. This may mean that different systems react differently to the problem of indecisiveness, and find different ways of coping with it.

Denmark clearly confronts us with a problem in the model. As we are confident in our operationalization of the ENVP under minority governments, it seems that the veto players' framework is currently lacking in its account of such cases. What strikes us as particularly interesting is that our analysis echoes the argument brought forth by Strom (1985; 1990), that minority governments act more like single-party majority governments, than coalition governments.

Conclusion

Recent accounts of government research's "state-of-the-art" call for advancements in two main directions. One is a better connection between theoretical models and empirical research, meaning that existing theoretical models need to be checked empirically, and that empirical researches need to be well-grounded theoretically. The second is to deal with the different phases of government's life – formation, governance, termination and election – jointly instead of separately, as was done until recent years.

In this paper we aspired to do answer both calls. We constructed a model taking into account three of the four phases, combining governance with duration and election, and deduced from it a set of predictions which we attempted to check empirically. We found the veto players' framework to be a useful tool to connect these different phases of government life, as well as an efficient tool for wide comparative research.

In addition to its methodological and theoretical significance, we hope this paper presents an empirical contribution as well. We point to a real connection between the number of veto players to both government duration and electoral performance. This paper's shortcomings notwithstanding, we hope these preliminary findings stimulate further research in this direction.

Lastly, this paper originated from a desire to understand Israel's instability and its causes. Even if this paper doesn't explain all patterns of instability in the Israeli system, it certainly gives us an idea as to which solutions are in the right direction, and which are not. Any proposal aiming at lowering the ENVP, e.g. by helping to strengthen the big parties, is in the right direction. Any proposal that adds veto players, such as adopting presidential regime, is bound to reduce the system's decisiveness and stability.

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Appendix A - Tables

Table 2 - United Kingdom

		PM duration	PM-party duration	government duration
time dummy	Pearson Correlation	-.500	-.873**	-.193
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.207	.005	.648
	N	8	8	8

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 3 - Austria

		governments per elections	PM duration	PM-party duration	government duration
time dummy	Pearson Correlation	.235	-.388	-.766**	-.052
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.418	.170	.001	.867
	N	14	14	14	13
ENVP	Pearson Correlation	-.400	.537*	-.234	.469
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.156	.048	.420	.106
	N	14	14	14	13

Table 4 – Germany

		governments per elections	PM duration	PM-party duration	government duration
time dummy	Pearson Correlation	-.696*	-.665*	-.716*	.596
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.025	.036	.020	.091
	N	10	10	10	9
ENVP	Pearson Correlation	.263	-.069	-.053	-.160
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.464	.850	.885	.682
	N	10	10	10	9

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 5.1 - Denmark Duration Variables

		governments per election	PM duration	PM-party duration	government duration
time dummy	Pearson Correlation	.000	-.630*	-.630*	.326
	Sig. (2-tailed)	1.000	.021	.021	.277
	N	14	13	13	13
ENVP	Pearson Correlation	-.377	.937**	.937**	.057
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.184	.000	.000	.853
	N	14	13	13	13

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 5.2 - Denmark Vote Change Variables

		pivot vote change	PM vote change
time dummy	Pearson Correlation	-.217	.369
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.521	.238
	N	11	12
ENVP	Pearson Correlation	.106	-.144
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.757	.655
	N	11	12

Table 6.1 - Netherlands Duration Variables

		governments per elections	PM duration	PM-party duration	government duration
time dummy	Pearson Correlation	.124	.073	-.848**	-.093
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.687	.821	.000	.775
	N	13	12	12	12
ENVP	Pearson Correlation	-.038	-.366	-.736**	.231
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.903	.242	.006	.471
	N	13	12	12	12

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table 6.2 - Netherlands Vote Change Variables

		pivot vote change	PM vote change
time dummy	Pearson Correlation	.047	-.523
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.885	.081
	N	12	12
ENVP	Pearson Correlation	.037	-.175
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.909	.586
	N	12	12

Table 7 - Italy

		governments per elections	PM duration	PM-party duration	government duration
time dummy	Pearson Correlation	-.839[**]	.423	-.491[*]	.384
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.063	.028	.086
	N	21	20	20	21
ENVP	Pearson Correlation	-.280	.175	-.203	-.207
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.231	.474	.405	.380
	N	20	19	19	20

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table 8.1 - Israel Duration Variables

		governments per elections	PM duration	PM party duration	government duration
time dummy	Pearson Correlation	.345	-.019	-.288	-.150
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.053	.918	.110	.427
	N	32	31	32	30
ENVP	Pearson Correlation	.314	.225	.040	-.367[*]
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.080	.223	.829	.046
	N	32	31	32	30

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table 8.2 - Israel Vote Change Variables

		PM vote change	pivote vote change	others vote change
time dummy	Pearson Correlation	-.144	-.265	-.460
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.439	.246	.063
	N	31	21	17

ENVP	Pearson Correlation	-.256	-.151	-.296
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.165	.514	.249
	N	31	21	17

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table 9.1 - Aggregated Duration Variables

		governments per elections	PM duration	PM-party duration	government duration
time dummy	Pearson Correlation	-.028	-.115	-.351**	.048
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.767	.238	.000	.626
	N	113	108	108	105
ENVP	Pearson Correlation	.258**	-.075	-.296**	-.274**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.006	.440	.002	.005
	N	112	107	107	104

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 9.2 - Aggregated Vote Change Variables

		pivot vote change	PM vote change
time dummy	Pearson Correlation	-.183	-.169
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.235	.216
	N	44	55
ENVP	Pearson Correlation	.058	-.167
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.709	.222
	N	44	55